Technology Governance in a time of crisis:Covid-19 relatede decision support by Poullet, Yves
RESEARCH OUTPUTS / RÉSULTATS DE RECHERCHE
Author(s) - Auteur(s) :
Publication date - Date de publication :
Permanent link - Permalien :
Rights / License - Licence de droit d’auteur :
Bibliothèque Universitaire Moretus Plantin
Institutional Repository - Research Portal
Dépôt Institutionnel - Portail de la Recherche
researchportal.unamur.beUniversity of Namur





Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication
Citation for pulished version (HARVARD):
Poullet, Y 2020, Technology Governance in a time of crisis: Covid-19 relatede decision support. s.n., s.l.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 25. May. 2021
TECHNOLOGY 
GOVERNANCE IN A 
TIME OF CRISIS 




5 BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVES
19 UNDERSTANDING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TECHNOLOGIES
37 DEFINING A GOVERNANCE MODEL
65





79 APPENDIX 2: COMPARISON TABLE OF 11 INITIATIVES
83 APPENDIX 3: PIA STUDY REPORTS
This report does not constitute legal advice and  
is provided for information purposes only.
FOREWORD 
In our collective psyche, epidemics are one of the evils 
that threaten our existence. The COVID‑19 crisis has 
shown, vividly and abruptly, that an epidemic can also 
disrupt society and paralyze the world economy. In 
this challenging situation for public policy‑makers and 
business leaders, technology is clearly a valuable asset, 
both for combating the pandemic and for reopening 
society in the medium term. The roles played by 
IT‑based responses also raise ethical questions.
In keeping with its mission, at the request of its part‑
ners, the Human Technology Foundation undertook 
this study to determine how, in the current context, 
technology can still be used to benefit humanity. The 
study was led by a steering committee chaired by 
Jean‑Louis Davet, Chief Executive Officer of Denos 
Health Management.
The work was carried out according to the Foundation’s 
signature method, bringing together international, 
multidisciplinary experts, namely specialists in the 
target technologies, lawyers and ethicists, supported 
by the teams in our Paris and Montréal offices.
We collaborated with researchers from the Intern‑
ational Observatory on the Societal Impact of AI and 
Digital Technology (OBVIA) and instructors/researchers 
from several universities located in Montréal, Lille, 
Sherbrooke and Namur. Also taking part were member 
lawyers of ITechLaw and staff from partner companies 
such as Samsung and EY. The study was supported 
by institutions such as the Chambre de la sécurité 
financière du Québec and the Mutualité Française.
I would like to thank the thirty or so experts who 
rose to the occasion and contributed their skills, parti‑
cularly the members of the steering committee and 
coordinating team.
Beyond the current crisis, we hope that the method 
developed and set out in this report will be of use in 
selecting and governing IT‑based responses to this 
new situation, which is likely to remain with us for 
some time.
We hope you find our report rewarding.
Eric Salobir 




However, use of this significant power can also 
present its own risks and raise concerns that may 
even slow the adoption of proposed solutions. Often 
caught up in a tangle of constraints or contra‑
dictory orders, public and private decision‑makers 
are faced with choosing between the lesser of 
two evils. In particular, the effectiveness of health 
measures, safeguards for individual liberties, dig­
ital sovereignty, social inclusion and widespread 
adoption of the proposed measures are the issues 
at stake.
Citizens are questioning politicians on the social 
impacts of the health and IT‑based systems they are 
considering. Businesses are turning to the authorities 
for concrete recommendations to follow and guide‑
lines defining their responsibilities. Employees   are 
challenging their employers about how real their 
commitments are to social responsibility and work‑
place safety. Governments are calling on various 
intermediary bodies that can facilitate adoption of 
the measures they recommend, without actually 
imposing them. And businesses are also trying to 
assess the ways and means available to promote 
the buy‑in for protective solutions among their 
employees. Customers are challenging the right 
of a store owner to oblige them to take a particular 
action to enter the store, or even to benefit from 
special conditions. So many different situations! So 
many ethical beliefs and values tossed around by all 
and sundry, on either side of the fence. In the end, 
they are all dilemmas and constraints for those who 
have to decide on or manage the implementation of 
IT‑based health protection measures.
This report and its proposed methodology are 
primarily addressed to such decision­makers. This 
approach aims to provide them with the means for 
analyzing and deciding on the use of technologies 
to  safely exit the crisis and accelerate a healthy 
return  to normalcy. This report can be read on two 
levels: the first addresses decision‑makers across 
all  types of organizations and governance bodies, 
and  the second is more specifically geared to 
businesses.
Developed during the COVID­19 crisis, the pro­
posed method in fact heralds a more general 
approach (which will be the subject of future work) 
for implementing algorithmic and personal data 
processing, whose adoption and proper use involve 
fundamental ethical considerations.
This approach can be naturally extended to other 
areas of healthcare, where the crisis has catalyzed 
underlying existing trends, paving the way for in‑
creasingly digital and data‑intensive health services. 
Even more broadly, this method could be adapted 
to make ethics an enabler and not a constraint 
for developing digital services whose sensitive 
nature requires a contextualized approach in our 
democratic societies.
Our proposed methodological approach consists 
of several stages:
• Setting up an appropriate governance body, 
which brings together all stakeholders and steers 
the project from design stage through completion 
(return to “normal” health conditions), and has 
technical, ethical and legal expertise.
• Building a single frame of reference. Often‑
used analogies to familiar situations (plague, 
NEVER BEFORE HAS A PANDEMIC SPREAD ACROSS A WORLD SO ABUNDANT 
IN TECHNOLOGIES AND DATA. WHILE NOT ENABLING ALL COUNTRIES TO 
SUFFICIENTLY ANTICIPATE THE IMPACT OF COVID‑19 FROM ITS ONSET, THE 
POWER OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN LEVERAGED UNIVERSALLY TO 
ACCELERATE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, LIMIT THE SPREAD OF THE EPIDEMIC 
AND NOW FACILITATE THE REOPENING OF BUSINESSES.
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war, terrorism, mass surveillance, etc.), conjure 
up images and mould our perceptions of the 
situation. Some biases cause decision‑makers 
to prefer certain solutions while others trigger 
rejection or opposition from those the solutions 
are intended for. Clearly, the choice of mindset is 
key. Among other things, it helps build a shared 
vision of the issues at stake.
•  Clear identification of needs (tracing individuals 
carrying the virus, studying community behaviour, 
monitoring compliance with health measures, 
controlling access to private spaces, etc.), taking 
into account the overall health system in which an 
IT‑based solution is to be used.
• In‑depth analysis of available technologies and 
the technical, safety, ethical and legal issues 
related to deploying them.
• Based on the foregoing, a decision­making pro­
cess should be rolled out using a multifactor 
matrix that involves all project stakeholders. The 
considerations incorporated in this process will 
make it possible to identify risks and understand 
how to mitigate them, pave the way for broad 
adoption of the chosen measures, and determine 
the governance conditions and how they should 
evolve over time.
This report is made up of three main parts:
• The first part focuses on the anthropological, 
social and ethical aspects related to the IT‑based 
responses for exiting the health crisis. In particular, 
it discusses the different mindsets, principles 
and values conducive to achieving the crucial 
shared frame of reference mentioned above. 
• The second part provides an overview of the main 
technologies available with regard to health, 
technical and societal issues. Particular attention 
is paid to the most impactful issues, such as the 
nature of the data collected, how the data are 
processed and stored (centralized/decentralized/
hybrid), the security aspects related to the tech‑
nology used, etc. This part also aims to make the 
IT­based aspect understandable for decision­
makers from outside the industry.
• The third part sets out in detail the methodology 
and accompanying tools. It presents the multi‑
factor impact matrix we developed and how it is 
used. The matrix is presented in its entirety in the 
appendix. The method has been fully applied to 
a selection of responses illustrating the diversity 
of anti­COVID­19 IT­based solutions developed 
around the world. Eleven solutions were analyzed 
in depth by an international team of experts in 
technology, health, ethics and law. The results and 
lessons learned from this work are highlighted 
in the different sections of the report and inform 
our recommendations. Appendices include a 
comparative table of these 11 responses, as well as 
summaries of the analyses carried out on each.
Jean­Louis Davet
President, DENOS Health Management
Senior Advisor Human Technology Foundation
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Decision­makers, public and private, institutional and business alike, now find themselves facing 
a flood of opinions that raise issues of ethics around the IT‑based health crisis solutions they are 
weighing. However, against the complexity of a pandemic, accepting every argument that claims 
ethical legitimacy would result in paralysis. So it is essential to clarify which legal and ethical 
principles to favour.
The social acceptability of a technology does not depend solely on its accessibility, effectiveness, 
explainability and easy applicability for a wide audience, or on the related technical, legal and ethical 
precautions. Our level of acceptability also depends on the mindsets we use to understand the 
unknown based on what we know. This crisis has led to a real conflict of mindsets. Decision‑makers 
must determine what tone to take in the current situation, to enable adoption of the chosen tool 
and its contribution to achieving a desired outcome.
Every mindset can introduce its own biases when determining the measures to implement. Such 
biases influence both decision‑makers and those directly affected by the implemented measures as 
they cause some to prefer specific solutions and others to reject or oppose them.
The mindset around major epidemics of the past such as the plague, cholera or AIDS conjure up 
images, leading us to overreact to or, conversely, downplay the seriousness of COVID‑19. The mindset 
around mass surveillance prompts us to consider the use of technology as irreconcilable with safe‑
guarding individual freedoms. Clearly, other more enlightened mindsets must be used. Such a case 
in point is the mindset around our relationship with nature, which encourages us to develop a 
collective awareness of our shared responsibility in the current crisis. More specifically, the mindset 
around care implies that crisis exit strategies should be based on principles of inclusive governance, 
dialogue, solidarity and equity, accountability and trust. This seems to be the most constructive 
mindset. In particular, it avoids the pitfalls of other mindsets, such as around war and terrorism 
which, on the one hand, shift responsibility for defending ourselves to the state and, on the other 
hand, implies that the danger is external, while we can all be carriers of the virus and are therefore all 
partly responsible for the solution.
We all face danger from others and at the same time pose a danger to them. The mindset around 
care calls for a continuous search for the right compromise between the need for freedom of 
choice for individuals and each person’s responsibility for others, while paying particular attention 







Amidst the urgency of the situation, a host of 
digital projects is now underway across the world 
in an attempt to find ways to address the dilem‑
mas around SARS‑COV‑2 (COVID‑19). The common 
chal lenge of these technological solutions is to 
trace the local, regional, national and international 
transmission and spread of the virus in populations 
in order to contain infections, find a way to get back 
to normal living and avoid a second wave.
These developments are a source of hope, as the use 
of innovative medical technologies and public health 
tools could provide effective means of combating 
pathogens. But using today’s digital innovations 
is not without risks and raises important issues 
for society. Their misuse and the widening of their 
scope to purposes other than originally intended — 
whether by public authorities or private actors (police 
use leading to excessive controls, monitoring by 
employers, use by insurers, etc.) — require guarantees 
that the collection and processing of data comply 
with clear ethical and legal frameworks that protect 
individual rights and freedoms. Otherwise, they 
may profoundly undermine the public’s confi‑
dence in the promoters of these projects, and 
thus jeopardize the social solidarity required to 
combat a pandemic.
The ambivalence of mankind’s relationship with 
technology raises practical questions that are by 
nature at the same time philosophical (What can 
we learn through technology? Is the information 
reliable?), ethical and legal (What are the condi‑
tions for claiming certain benefits through the use 
of technology? What rules should govern its use? 
What are the risks and are they equitably shared?) 
and political (How do we govern the deploy ment 
and use of technology in a given society?).
PRACTICAL ETHICS TO GUIDE 
DECISION‑MAKING
In an environment of fear, uncertainty and some‑
times even suspicion, decision‑makers now find 
themselves facing a flood of opinions that raise 
issues of ethics around the solutions they are 
weighing: governments over national measures, 
employers concerning solutions they could im‑
plement to protect employees; retailers and public 
transit for their customers; building owners for their 
tenants, etc.
Out of this context emerge issues that could lead 
to the rejection of every solution put forward and 
thereby to paralysis. And the polarizing debate 
around some of the most highly publicized 
aspects of combating COVID‑19 makes gaining a 
bird’s eye view of the bigger picture difficult. For 
example, while the arguments put forward by 
defenders of individual freedoms and privacy are 
undeniably relevant and fundamental, the concept 
of privacy by design does not, on its own, fully 
address the ethical issues raised by the imple‑
mentation of technology‑based solutions. So, the 
issue is to find the right balance between the 
goal of public health (the right to health) and 
the various freedoms impacted by confinement, 
such as freedom of movement, assembly and 
expression, as well as privacy, fairness and non‑
discrimination, which are guaranteed to citizens 
but which could be compromised by certain uses 
that data might be put to. In particular, while some 
applications may enable contact tracing by public 
health actors or employers, they may also lead to 
the stigmatization or social exclusion of already 
vulnerable populations, thus reinforcing pre‑existing 
injustices and inequalities. For example, the issue of 
access to these digital devices — whether in terms of 
cost, equity or social acceptability — is more pressing 
than ever. While 80% of the population in France 
has smartphones, the penetration rate in India is 
only 30%, not to mention the distribution disparities 
within the population itself, depending in partic‑
ular on age group or social background. In other 
words, these populations cannot benefit equitably 
from automatic tracing solutions based on having 
a smartphone.
Clearly, a broader view of ethics must be applied 
to the different measures being studied to explain 
them to the public (as individuals, but also as 
groups or communities). The public must not be 
seen as mere users of digital tools: they are jointly 
responsible for the solutions to be implemen‑
ted since they all share in creating the risk. A 
practical approach to ethics, without advocating 
any particular moral code must be understood as 
a thoughtful, open and hands‑on initiative based 
on a genuine discussion of the values we wish for 
our society, for assessing, selecting and governing 
technological solutions to exit the health crisis.
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CHAPTER 1
TRANSITIONING FROM DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT TO LONG‑TERM 
RISK MANAGEMENT
The fierce debates around IT‑based solutions 
developed in the heat of the current health crisis 
highlight the real challenge for governance (for 
government agencies, industry, any organization 
and civil society), facing us over the long term.
On one hand, uncertainty remains high today 
with many questions unanswered — Will the virus 
mutate?; Can immunity be actually acquired and 
for how long?; Will seasonality affect the virus?; 
What is the potential for a second wave? Even if a 
vaccine does become available and, we hope, widely 
and equitably accessible to every single person on 
the planet, going forward we will inevitably face 
new epidemics that may take us just as much by 
surprise. On the other hand, our ability to mobilize 
the power of technology and harness digital exper‑
tise to prevent epidemics or protect our populations 
is a new and major asset for our societies in facing 
health disasters. But the methods for deploying 
these solutions will also come with their fair share 
of risk over the long term, particularly for regional, 
national and international sovereignty and the 
protection of user interests and freedoms. It is 
through constant exposure to these types of risks 
that we must learn to govern how we develop and 
implement solutions.
The processes for engaging stakeholders, analyzing 
and deciding on the best solutions, and facilitating 
ethical acceptance and social acceptability that will 
be developed to curb COVID‑19 may offer the first 
outline of a governance model for the future. In 
such a future, technologies and algorithms along 
with extreme risks — health‑related or not — will 
be determining factors and will be used to 




SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF 
TECHNOLOGY
The issue of access to technologies and their social 
acceptability is widely highlighted in the current 
debates around digital tracing technologies. 
These technologies (apps, smart watches, smart 
wristbands, etc.) could enhance and enable the 
return to social, economic and cultural activities. 
Very few studies have been conducted to date 
on the effectiveness of such technologies. One of 
them — extensively repeated since — stresses the 
need for adoption by a sufficient proportion of the 
population (around 60%, cf. Big Data Institute, 
Nuffield Department of Medicine, Oxford University 
headed by Dr. Christophe Fraser); if not, tracking 
their movements individually or collectively would 
be ineffective for monitoring the transmission of a 
virus nationally.
Since the effectiveness of these technologies 
depends on a high rate of voluntary uptake, a 
number of countries are now favouring more tradi­
tional alternative tracing solutions that have proved 
their worth in public health (telephone call centres, 
tracing by health personnel). The problem with this 
approach is that it is highly labour inten sive and 
enormously time consuming. Given the historical 
underfunding of public health in many countries, the 
lack of adequately trained public health workers to 
carry out contact tracing is no surprise and renders 
an already lengthy process even more problem‑
atic. To illustrate these choices, public authorities 
are observing (Iceland, Singapore) or predicting 
(Belgium, France) an interest in innov ative responses 
such as smartphone applications, as well as a lack of 
public support for digital tracing.
Interestingly, such lack of support is generally 
related to social, material, technology, or legal and 
ethical problems. Lacking either digital means or 
literacy, part of the population would not have the 
required technology, or would not have digital tools 
capable of supporting the proposed solution. Other 
causes cited relate to fears of mass surveillance or 
IT intrusion of privacy. These factors must of course 
be taken into consideration. But too few academic 
studies or media information sources to date have 
focused on the impact of the social myths and 
perceptions that filter our efforts to understand the 
current situation in Western countries. The social 
acceptability of a technology does not depend solely 
on it being broadly accessible, effective, explainable 
and easy to use (intuitive) for a wide audience, or on 
its related technical, legal and ethical precautions. 
The acceptability of digital tracing tools is also 
dependent on the value systems, and the mindsets 
we use to try to understand the unprecedented 
crisis based on what we are familiar with (we always 
try to understand the unknown based on the 
known), and on the value judgments around the 
technologies that these mindsets imply.
In other words, for example, making the interface 
of a tracing application user‑friendly and intuitive, 
easier for a wide audience to understand and use, 
and demonstrating its usefulness, is no guarantee 
that it will be socially acceptable (i.e., find audience 
buy‑in). Even ensuring full compliance in the design 
of the application with the main legal and ethical 
principles and values of a democratic society around 
the protection of individual rights is not in itself 
enough to guarantee that a technology will be 
widely used by its target audience. Why? Because 
our relationship with a technology is also mediatized 
by social affects and norms that influence how 
favourable we are to making it a part of our daily lives. 
Our relationships with IT‑based tools are not “pure” 
(in the sense of purely functional or mechanical). Our 
relationships with technology are always coloured by 
emotion and idealizations. We adopt a technology 
that we see as acceptable, desirable or reassuring 
(for instance, perceived as not being a threat to our 
property, fundamental values and human rights).
A technology’s social acceptability therefore does 
not depend merely on how effective, explainable, 
transparent, legally compliant and ethical, etc. it is. 
It depends also on the type of “background context” 
or “mind space” that colours this technology as 
more or less desirable and attractive or, conversely, 
undesirable within a given population.
UNDERSTANDING THE MINDSETS 
THAT SHAPE OUR THINKING
Our mindsets shape the way we understand and 
think about things. Collective sets of perceptions 
and social constructs play a major role in how we 
respond (accept or reject) to IT‑based measures in 
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CHAPTER 1
a time of crisis. We need to take a look at the main 
perceptions that make up the mindsets we use 
(more or less consciously) to gain an understanding 
of the crisis we are going through and the proposed 
solutions. In doing so, we can assess how suited or 
unsuited the mindsets are to the situation we are 
facing, and understand their effects on how we 
relate to the tracing technologies currently under 
debate. We can then adapt the understanding and 
communication framework to the current situation.
Without claiming to be comprehensive, we can 
identify at least five mindsets:
It thus becomes essential for decision‑makers 
involved in governance issues regarding innovative 
technologies to take into careful account the 
sym bolic, cultural or perceptual conditions sur‑
rounding the social acceptance of a technology, 
if they wish to gain the trust and support of a 
target audience. Such conditions refer to the field 
of affects, beliefs and social perceptions. These 
meanings come from the interpretations that 
social groups (family, social network, association, 
business collective, particular population, group 
of populations, country, continent, etc.) give to 
a technology on the basis of their history (past 
experience), political engagement and culture 
(philosophical and religious beliefs, practices, arts, 
symbols, images, myths, stories, etc.) at any given 
time. These interpretations and the meanings they 
impose on a technology are not definitive. They 
can be refined and contested through counter‑
interpretations, changes to meaning, socially signif‑
icant collective events that require new frame ‑
works for understanding. We must keep in mind 
that these mindsets and the shaping of these 
discourses will and probably must evolve through 
time and space.
1    THE MINDSET AROUND PAST MAJOR EPIDEMICS
The mindset around past epidemics stirs our age‑
old fears and causes us to overreact, even if it means 
jeopardizing the economy and social relationships. 
In fact, COVID‑19 is a global epidemic of viral origin. 
It thus shares a common range of meanings with 
other viral diseases (plague, cholera, AIDS, Ebola, 
Spanish flu). This has at least three paradoxical 
practical consequences. Because of its nature and 
unpredictable evolution, COVID‑19 creates strong 
anxiety, fear and even fantasy. However, in view of 
the mortality statistics (e.g., 50 million deaths from 
the Black Death in the 14th century), the mindset 
around previous deadly epidemic crises relates 
to devastating pathogens, out of all proportion to 
the current pandemic crisis. This has led some 
to criticize the overreaction of governments that 
have imposed lockdowns, with unprecedented 
economic effects. Given this ambivalence, reactions 
vary widely, which explains the difficulty in 
predicting whether or not the public will support 
IT‑based devices for tracking people carrying the 
virus. The  concern is that much stronger because 
the mindset around major epidemics — at least 
in the West  — does not naturally call to mind 
the new digital technologies, which did not exist 
in earlier historical instances. Therefore, until 
new technologies have demonstrated their real 
effectiveness for public health in the current crisis, 
social expectations of them will remain cautious. 
This lack of demon strated effectiveness explains why 
many members of the public are reluctant to deploy 
tracing applications.
2    THE MINDSET AROUND  WARTIME
The current crisis is also reviving memories of 
wartime deprivation and hardship. Leading politi‑
cians have intentionally linked the two situations to 
strengthen national unity in the face of COVID‑19. 
1    THE MINDSET AROUND PAST 
MAJOR EPIDEMICS
2    THE MINDSET AROUND  
WARTIME
3    THE MINDSET AROUND OUR 
RELATIONSHIP WITH NATURE
4    THE MINDSET AROUND 
MASS SURVEILLANCE




For example, on March 16, 2020, during a message 
to the country, French President Emmanuel Macron 
announced, “We are at war.” On May 8, 2020, the 
anniversary of the surrender of Nazi Germany, 
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson drew the same 
parallel. In an open letter to veterans, he likened 
the coronavirus pandemic to a “new battle” to be 
fought with “the same spirit of national endeavour” 
as 75 years earlier.
Summoning up the words and imagery of war 
draws on undeniable similarities between the 
two  situations: the state of emergency, the call for 
national unity, the mobilization of health services, 
calling in the army, mobilizing all forces, controlling 
population movements (police control, IT‑based 
monitoring), stocking up on essentials (pasta, 
rice, milk, flour...), closing borders, government 
requisitioning of equipment, war economy mea‑
sures (redirection and nationalization of certain 
private activities for the purpose of combating 
COVID‑19). The current crisis scenario does indeed 
resemble an exceptional wartime state of emer‑
gency, with restrictive measures affecting an 
entire country. But using the vocabulary of war 
is  a double‑edged sword, because it brings with 
it, in the present situation, its own interpretations 
of technology, not only as an arsenal and weapon 
of war, but also as a political‑ideological means 
of controlling the public. That being said, are we 
really at war with COVID‑19? Today’s prevailing 
strategies do not so much resemble acts of war as 
gestures of diplomacy and caution, such as: limiting 
expo sure to the virus, reducing interactions, self 
isolating, maintaining physical distancing, putting 
contacts on hold, communicating about channels 
of spread in order to contain it, wearing masks. 
Learning to live with SARS‑COV‑2 calls for arts 
other than the art of war: the art of living together, 
of  neighbourliness, of circumspection, of keeping 
the right distance and of consideration for others.
By framing us in a paradigm of conflict, the 
mindset around war can make us lose sight of our 
relationship to others and our relationship with 
nature. In the current context of a health as well as 
a socio‑economic crisis, wouldn’t a less militaristic, 
more peaceful and calmer relationship with 
technology be more constructive? The mindset of 
war suggests that defending ourselves against an 
enemy is enough. And as a result, it risks minimizing 
the scope of the organizational changes that need 
to be made to contain the risk of epidemic.
3    THE MINDSET AROUND OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH NATURE
The current crisis is also bringing up questions 
about our relationship with nature. In fact, we are 
becoming collectively aware that economic activity 
without regard for the natural barriers and balances 
between species is one of the factors behind the 
current pandemic. Observers point to the speed 
with which SARS‑COV‑2 has spread around the 
world thanks to the globalization of trade. It has 
been found that the vast majority of COVID‑19 
victims were vulnerable owing to impaired health 
conditions (chronic diseases, respiratory diseases, 
obesity, smoking, etc.) resulting from lifestyle 
choices, socio‑economic inequalities and industrial 
pollution. From this point of view, the primary cause 
of death is not SARS‑COV‑2, but rather in the way 
our lives are organized, which include disregard 
for public health recommendations, natural eco‑
systems, barriers between species, etc.
So we are not primarily combating an external 
enemy (nature, viruses are not foreign to us), but 
effects that we ourselves have caused. The war 
against nature mindset is therefore not relevant for 
discussing technologies whose objective is not to 
fight against nature. Unlike a future vaccine, which 
will give the immune system the means to destroy 
a virus, tracking technologies are not weapons of 
war against a natural scourge. Primarily, they are an 
“as far away as possible” means of prevention and 
protection against the virus.
The first step that this new mindset around our 
relationship with nature asks us to take is that we 
become aware of our responsibility for the current 
crisis. The second step involves, like our responsibility 
for global warming, a profound transformation 
of social, economic and political organizations at 
the international level. Determining how a chosen 
IT‑based solution contributes to attaining a desirable 
future that we can share with our fellow citizens/
employees requires a vision that gives meaning 




There is another mindset that in the current crisis 
impacts, more directly and more strongly than 
the above mindset, the social acceptability of 
IT‑based initiatives, particularly those using digital 
tracing: the mindset around mass surveillance. 
As soon as the first IT‑based solutions for exiting 
the crisis appeared, a large number of prominent 
figures from the academic world and civil society 
entered the public debate to warn of the threat 
that any projects for digitally tracing popula‑
tion movements would pose to our democratic 
prin ciples, the rule of law and fundamental free‑
doms. A direct consequence of the mindset 
around mass surveillance companies (as the 
recent cases of Snowden and Cambridge Analy‑
tica shows) is the polarization of the debate 
around privacy issues at the expense of other 
ethical issues.
Emphasizing the risks of possible abuses and 
the erosion of fundamental rights and freedoms 
that any use of digital technologies might entail 
is often backed up by one or two arguments that 
bioethicists, logicians and philosophers know well: 
the slippery slope and neo‑Luddism.
The slippery slope theory holds that a given first 
step (the introduction of tracing applications), 
could (the realistic version of the reasoning), or — 
conversely — inevitably (the skewed version), lead to 
a chain of events culminating in a result that no one 
wants (the replacement of a democratic state with 
an authoritarian and repressive state, for example). 
This argument is misleading when it disregards 
that a set of democratic mechanisms can seriously 
reduce the risks of the proposed technologies going 
off the track: strict legal and ethical frameworks, 
external controls, ongoing user feedback, etc. The 
neo­Luddite line of reasoning holds that any plan 
to solve a human problem with technology would 
given priority to the technical solution over any 
more humane, social, political and ethical solution. 
This type of reasoning is also problematic because it 
presupposes that the IT‑based tool could not be one 
means among many to a more global solution, as if 
the two were mutually exclusive, which is false.
The mindset around mass surveillance is linked 
to the legislative and political framework under 
which IT‑based measures are deployed. In fact, 
implementation of any IT‑based measures has to 
be (and will be) triggered by a state of emergency or 
special legislation to deal with the health crisis. In this 
context, many observers again use the slippery slope 
argument to warn against the likelihood of certain 
exceptional provisions sooner or later becoming 
the norm, albeit passed in an emergency situation. 
These observers base their warnings on past 
experience of states of emergency declared to deal 
with terrorism. They point out that special legislation 
had become enshrined in conventional legislation in 
those circumstances.
That being said, if, through the use of digital tracing 
tools, the fear of abusive curtailment of freedoms 
by governments or businesses is kept alive by the 
historical symbols it conjures up (totalitarianism, 
authoritarianism, etc.), this fear may, in some cases, 
be underestimating the strength of our institutional 
mechanisms (ethical, legal and political) to protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Since the 
second half of the 20th century, our democracies 
have developed solid democratic controls to 
protect against potential shifts in ideology that 
could undermine their foundations. While the risk 
of backsliding into repressive policies is always real, 
implementing stringent government surveillance 
in unprecedented times does not mean that we 
have abandoned our values and opened the door 
to all manner of abuses. Such cultural distortion also 
results in a reductionist interpretation of tracking 
and digital tracing. Tracking is not necessarily 
“threatening” or “bad”.
Surveillance in the modern sense of the term 
emerged between the sixteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, before it was abused by the totalitarian 
regimes of the last century. It is no coincidence 
that the development of the term in the French 
language during this period coincides with the 
gradual birth of the rule of law. “Surveiller” was 
forged in the sixteenth century from the verb 
“veiller” which means “to stay awake (to intervene if 
necessary)”, “to remain vigilant”, and the prefix “sur” 
which indicates excess or superiority. “Surveiller” in 
this sense meant to “protect” something “smaller” 
4    THE MINDSET AROUND MASS SURVEILLANCE
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than oneself, to “keep it out of harm’s way”. Use of 
the verb became widespread in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, giving rise to the word 
“surveillance”, which appeared in English circa 
1800. In the positive sense of the term (watch over), 
the function of surveillance is to guarantee a safe 
space. It is a legitimate means of ensuring public 
order and a duty enshrined from the outset in 
the rule of law, which must guarantee its citizens 
protection and the best possible conditions to enjoy 
their fundamental rights and freedoms.
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The same nuances also apply to the means of 
surveillance: similarly, digital tracing technologies 
do not necessarily lead to authoritarianism or 
totalitarianism. In fact, carrying out surveillance 
by such means produces many social benefits. 
How many people in danger, stranded in the moun‑
tains or lost in an unfamiliar environment have 
been rescued thanks to telephone cell tracing 
or by activating the GPS on their smartphone? 
Many crimes of various types have been prevented 
thanks to digital data. In certain situations, digital 
tracing can provide protection and rescue coverage 
unmatched in history. Under  certain conditions 
defined by law, the potential for medical moni‑
toring of patients and their state of health also 
offers exciting  therapeutic possibilities in the 
field of personalized healthcare. Digital tracing 
tools give many athletes the means to measure 
their performance in real time, schedule tailored 
race training and evaluate their progress based 
on increasingly precise bio‑physiological indica‑
tors. At city level, it can optimize the infra struc‑
ture planning based on analyses of crowd move‑
ment, road traffic, etc. But it is also true that 
digital tracing can involve many other possible 
spinoffs: invasion and loss of privacy, disclosure of 
personal data, covert unethical use of sensitive 
data, commercialization of health data, data theft, 
hacking of digital tools, stigmatization of certain 
segments of the population, abuse of power by 
public authorities, etc.
Given these different examples, digital tracing tech‑
nologies can offer both the best and the worst, 
but there is no real cause and effect that they will 
inevitably compromise our future. 
A political, legislative and ethical framework desi‑
gned to protect democratic values and fun da‑
mental freedoms should provide effective pro‑
tec tion against the risks of misuse of digital 
tracing technologies so that their disadvantages 
are minimized and their benefits maximized. To 
ensure that we move more towards improving 
the beneficial aspects of “surveillance” for both 
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individuals and the public (e.g., monitoring disease, 
influencing behaviour), we need an explicit and 
public social contract. Those under surveillance 
must be able to understand both the extent and 
the limitations of the surveillance, in order to 
accept it. Governments and businesses must do 
the same, and if necessary, limit certain types of 
surveillance that would be “effective” or “efficient” 
because they are not socially acceptable.
5    THE MINDSET AROUND  CARE
As we have seen, a number of mindsets are used 
to view the crisis from a variety of perspectives and 
offer courses of action that reflect the perceptions 
identified. Some of these mindsets may seem more 
relevant than others. But the target that has been 
the focus of the vast majority of the public’s hopes 
and efforts in the current situation lies elsewhere.
We are not really at war, faced with a defence issue 
where the enemy is at the borders, or putting the 
country’s stability at risk. Nor are we in an anti‑
terrorism state of emergency, faced with a security 
issue where the enemy is linked to specific parts of 
the population, or certain profiles. Rather, we are 
in a situation where everyone is potentially both a 
risk and a resource for others, where everyone has 
to take responsibility for themselves and for others. 
Our  present concerns, tied to the “total social fact” 
that we are currently experiencing (see Appendix 1), 
have not been prompted by unacceptable surveil‑
lance practices but by the spread of a pandemic and 
its multiple social, economic and political effects. 
Lastly, we are not engaged on the front line in talks 
with nature for a new alliance, as with the issues 
around climate change. Instead, we are dealing with 
a public health issue that involves safeguarding a 
common asset, namely health, which we are striving 
to maintain for as many people as possible, especially 
those of us most at risk of COVID‑19 morbidity.
While the health emergency has similarities to other 
exceptional situations in terms of the means used, 
the end is nonetheless very different, as is the intent 
of the measures. Understanding this is essential if 
we wish to remain on topic, on vision, and on target. 
Faced with the pandemic as a public health issue, 
we are not at war, we are in a situation of care, and 
in need of care far beyond any other identifiable 
mindset, beyond any range of actions that may be 
parallel to, compatible with or complementary to 
our needs in the current situation.
Because the crisis underscores our fundamental 
vulnerability and interdependence. It brings to our 
conscious minds, through our confinement and its 
various consequences, that we all depend on the 
care and attention of countless private and public 
actors who, in every sphere of life in a society, enable 
us to go on living. The current situation underscores 
more than ever the value of “caring for yourself, 
others and the world”, which transcends the bounds 
of private and public, and profoundly challenges 
the way we will carry on our human pursuits in the 
future: are we ready to do so with greater care?
It is important to stress here that while this call to 
care cannot be confined to the world of medicine 
and the unfailing commitment of our health care 
workers, even if they embody it, they are obviously 
part of it and play an essential role in managing the 
pandemic. Reference to care in the crisis implies 
a much broader understanding of care, in which 
medical care is only one expression, and is reflected 
in everything we would like to do (and are already 
doing) to make our “worlds” livable (worlds that 
includes our bodies, our social, cultural and technical 
environments, our relationship with nature), so 
that we can live and flourish in them to the fullest. 
In this sense, care is as much a goal as it is a set of 
subjective arrangements and particular practices 
whose purpose is to support, maintain, protect, and 
allow a human world, and all those who live in it, 
to flourish.
This need for care also ties in with a need for 
justice expressed by the public in the face of 
risks from new sets of inequalities and discri­
mination that crisis governance could create, in 
particular through recourse to certain tracing 
technologies in an emergency situation where the 
public is unprepared. Finally, there can be no care 
policy without the inclusion and participation of 
all care stakeholders. Concern for self, others and 
the world always presupposes the exercise of a 
set of skills that are always specific, often learned 
from experience and adapted to the challenges 
of specific situations (parental, social, educational, 
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environmental, cultural, etc.). These practices are 
themselves part of very diverse institutions, evalua‑
tion procedures, contracts of objectives, local policies 
and concrete cultures.
Beyond this exceptional period with its lockdowns 
and public health strategies implemented to avoid 
health system collapse in many countries, the 
mindset around care in the current situation calls 
more than ever for the development of an ambitious 
care policy and the conditions for a more just society. 
But care must not be limited to its biomedical sense, 
it must encompass much broader social, political 
and economic considerations.
A care ethic requires that those who aspire to it 
be transparent, sincere and consistent, which 
are necessary conditions for fulfilling any social 
contract, as well as for ensuring human dignity 
and human rights. Faced with the ever possible 
risks of breaking the social contract, compliance 
with a care policy requires not only a good under­
standing of the technologies proposed in the 
current crisis (Chapter 2 of the report), but also 
inclusive governance and an appropriate technical, 
legal and  ethical tool for assessing technologies 
(Chapter 3 of the report). Indeed, any digital tech‑
nology to support a crisis exit strategy should 
only be implemented on the condition that its 
design and use are subject to rigorous evaluation 
by independent bodies representing civil society, 
in accordance with processes that guarantee 
compliance of the technology with the terms of 
the  social contract and democratic principles and 
values held dear by everyone faced with the crisis.
From the perspective of a crisis care policy, the ideal 
of inclusive governance and the multidimensional 
digital technology assessment tool discussed later 
in this report are complementary and necessary, 
which should be adapted to real situa tions on 
the ground, at the corporate, intermediary and 




From a shared perspective of combating COVID‑19 and resuming social, 
cultural and economic activities, this section, which focuses on the mindsets 
around the crisis, was an essential starting point. While the crisis poses 
many challenges, it has in fact shown that they also stem from a conflict 
of perceptions. Therefore, decision‑makers and communities must be able 
to speak accurately about the problems encountered if they wish to find a 
tailored solution. To that end, it is essential to know what mindset to appeal 
to, what tone to take, and the consequences or implications (benefits and 
limitations) of such a choice.
In this current context where IT‑based responses are sometimes equated 
by the public with monitoring and sometimes with war or terrorism, the 
question of temporality appears to be a crucial one for decision‑makers. 
Governments must determine the criteria used to define a state of 
emergency, the conditions under which the exceptional crisis measures can 
be lifted and those that require the reactivation of exceptional measures 
to prevent a new epidemic. For businesses, the challenge is to ensure that 
practices for controlling access to premises or for managing private spaces 
in the workplace are not allowed to continue after the crisis, as this could 
create distrust and lead to a state of emergency that would become or be 
perceived as permanent.
The danger would in effect be the gradual trivialization of the use of tracing 
technologies and becoming accustomed to the practice of monitoring 
citizens and employees. The mindsets we have reviewed make us aware of 
the impact they can have on our perceptions and decisions and taking those 
into account can inform both governments and companies on the choice of 
appropriate technologies and governance methods.
Thinking of the current situation from the mindset of care, which seems 
to us to be the most appropriate for the public health situation we are in 
and for the broader societal challenges it raises, implies that crisis exit 
strategies should be based on principles of inclusive governance, dialogue, 
solidarity and equity, accountability and trust. In contrast to the idea that the 
responsibility to defend ourselves lies with government and that the danger 
is external (even though we may all be carriers of the virus), such a mindset 
requires us to continuously strive for a fair compromise between the need 
for individual freedom of choice (autonomy) and the responsibility to care 




Selecting a technology to resolve a problem is never neutral. Not because of the technology itself, 
but rather because of the conditions of acceptability and governance required for their effective and 
appropriate use.
With this in mind, four purposes of the IT‑based approaches to exiting the crisis and reopening 
the economy were analyzed: (1) tracking individuals carrying the virus, (2) studying community‑
wide behaviours, (3) monitoring compliance with health measures, and (4) controlling access to 
private spaces.
For each of these areas, the choice of IT architectures and solution governance methods are closely 
linked, so decisions by public or private decision‑makers must be based on this inseparable whole.
Some dozen tracing applications developed throughout the world were analyzed and discussed. 
The risks that these technologies could present were also raised, as well as the options available to 
mitigate them. These considerations may assist decision‑makers in the trade­offs to be made in a 
highly complex context dictated by emergency.
The important challenges identified in this work include the type and accuracy of the data collected 
(GPS location data vs. Bluetooth proximity data), application interoperability both nationally and 
internationally, and interdependence with third party systems.
There has been intense, and often heated, debate around a centralized versus a decentralized 
system. Our analysis shows that this apparent dichotomy must be nuanced: many responses are 
hybrid, integrating both centralized and decentralized components. However, this is a particularly 
impactful decision, both in terms of IT security measures and respect for individual rights, as well as 






According to a number of recent studies and publi‑
cations, over 40 tracking applications have been 
developed or deployed in more than 20  countries. 
Alternative measures for digitally tracking indivi‑
duals (wristbands, cameras) and tech nologies for 
monitoring (movements or body temperature) 
the public were in use in some 30 countries. These 
developments are either the result of private initia‑
tives, led by independent non‑profit organiza tions, 
or initiatives actively supported by public authorities. 
All in all, techniques for managing and controlling 
the health crisis using digital tools are currently 
being developed in very different ways in well over 
50 countries. This report presents a typo logy of the 
IT‑based technological approaches to a health crisis 
exit strategy. It sets out their main technical charac‑
teristics in order to illustrate their influence on 
governance methods and to alert public and private 
decision‑makers to the importance of the IT‑based 
option and the impact it can have on society, their 
public administration or their businesses and how 
they are organized.
TYPOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
DEVICES FOR COMBATING COVID‑19
International attention and debate has so far 
focused  particularly on the tracking applications 
studied by governments. However, it is important 
to bear in mind all the technologies that can be 
used in  the context of a health crisis exit strategy. 
In  particular, major challenges will arise for busi‑
nesses that choose to deploy tools for monitoring 
employee health, whether by collecting health data, 
processing movement data or encouraging (or even 
requiring) the use of a smart device.
Given the proliferation of these tools, multiple 
classifications are possible. We have opted for a typo‑
logy which breaks down the IT‑based measures 
according to the four main approaches:
1    TRACKING INDIVIDUALS CARRYING 
THE VIRUS
2    STUDYING COMMUNITY‑WIDE 
BEHAVIOURS
3    MONITORING COMPLIANCE 
WITH HEALTH MEASURES




The diagram below shows the different aims associated with each of these approaches as well as the techni‑
ques that can be used.






Controlling access to 
private spaces





Controlling access to 
workplaces and stores
Purpose • Automatically notify 
individuals who have 
met a person who has 
tested positive to allow 
those at risk to manage 
their isolation
• Identify the main 
vectors of infection 
in order to take 
appropriate measures
• Notify property owners 
and employers that 
individuals testing 
positive have been 
on the premises, 
and manage cases 
requiring building or 
workplace closures
• Improve peoples’ 
understanding of risk 
factors and probabilities 
of contagion
• Provide real‑time 
information on virus 
spread
• Anticipate population 
trends to adjust 
resource requirements 
(e.g., within hospitals)
• Measure the 
effectiveness of the 
public policy measures 
implemented
• Monitor unusual 
concentrations of 
people in public spaces 
for effective response
• Improve peoples’ 
understanding of risk 
factors and probabilities 
of contagion
• Monitor compliance 
with containment 
measures by affected 
individuals
• Measure effectiveness 
of compliance rules
• Restrict unauthorized 
travel and movement
• Accurately identify 
symptoms and offer 
effective detection 
solutions
• Provide medical 
assistance to individuals
• Assist employers in 
their duty to ensure 
employee safety
• Enable reopening of 
businesses
• Prevent the virus from 
entering the workplace 
or supply chain (within 
businesses, their 
business partners and 
customers)
• Regulate, authorize 
or prohibit access to a 
store, business, private 
space, etc. 
• Assess personal risk for 
employer management 







• Phone cell tracing
• Video surveillance















There are many examples for each of these four categories. This list is not intended as comprehensive, but 
rather to illustrate their diversity and outline their main characteristics.
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1    TRACKING INDIVIDUALS CARRYING THE VIRUS
For the purposes of this report, we have, in particular, 
extensively studied a number of initiatives in the first 
category, namely tracking. In particular the DP­3T, 
TraceTogether, COVI App, ROBERT, Apple/Google 
API, Aarogya Setu, COALITION, or NHSx initiatives, 
based on publicly available online documentation. 
A comparative table of these projects is appended 
to  this report (see Appendix 3), as well as more 
specific analyses (see Appendix 4). The vast majority 
of these initiatives collect personal data through the 
use of Bluetooth technology (some also use GPS 
data), use technical encryption measures (mostly for 
data “at rest”, sometimes also for data “in transit”, i.e., 
while it is being transmitted) and pseudonymization 
of data.
It should be noted that many publications refer to 
the anonymous nature of the data collected, which 
must be largely qualified. On the one hand, because 
the definition of personal data varies from one 
continent to another (see, for example, the difference 
between personal data and personally identifiable 
information — PII). On the other hand, because 
the standards for recognizing the anonymous 
character of a data item are not uniform from one 
country to another, some refer to it as anonymized 
data, which would imply that it is irreversibly 
impossible to re‑identify an individual, while most 
of the time it is simply pseudonymized data, i.e., 
data for which the identification of the data sub‑
ject remains technically possible. Decision‑makers 
must therefore be aware that in deploying these 
solutions, the data processed will most certainly be 
in personal and non‑anonymized form. Finally, some 
data may not at first glance appear sensitive. This 
is so for notifications sent to individuals considered 
infected. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
merely notifying an individual could potentially in 
itself be considered as health data (see in particular 
Appendix 4).
Furthermore, several distinctions must be noted. 
Firstly, the difference between a protocol and an 
application. A protocol is a set of rules that govern 
the operation of a tool (be it an application, a 
smart device, etc.). Thus, a protocol defines the 
rules and procedures allowing IT processes to 
exchange data. An application, on the other hand, 
is software used to perform a task. An app runs on 
an operating system (e.g., the Operating System 
(OS) of a computer or smartphone) and follows 
the rules of several protocols. For example, the 
StopCovid application is based on the ROBERT 
protocol. But StopCovid could also have opted to 
use the DP‑3T protocol. Conversely, the BlueTrace 
protocol was used in the TraceTogether app by 
Singapore as well as by the Australian government, 
which developed its own COVIDSafe app, based on 
feedback from the Singaporean app. 
Without going into overly technical considera‑
tions, a distinction should also be made between 
applications and APIs (Application Programming 
Interfaces), which are programming interfaces 
allowing an IT entity to interact with third‑party 
systems. This raises important issues of depen‑
dency. In fact, application interdependence with 
third‑party systems creates potential exposure 
to IT  access to the data stored in an application. 
Equally sensitive is the issue of interoperability. 
For example, Apple and Google jointly offer an API 
which is only compatible with applications that 
run on decentralized systems. This API enables 
tracking applications to be used on smartphones 
with Android (Google) and iOS (Apple) operating 
systems, while maintaining user privacy. The 
issue of system interoperability is fundamental 
and has already given  rise to much controversy 
in some countries, such as France (where the 
ROBERT protocol is considered centralized and is 
not compatible with the Apple/Google API). The 
application developed by NHSx — which has long 
wavered between a centralized and decentralized 
approach — could encounter similar problems.
Another important distinction must be made 
between a technology and how it is used. Debates 
about whether these devices should be deployed 
on a mandatory or voluntary basis revolve around 
the context, both legislative and political, in which 
a technology is deployed, but not the technology 
itself. Thus, although a protocol or an application 
is “mandatory” per se, its use may or may not be 
mandatory. That depends on the context in which it 
is implemented. Thus, the same application may be 
mandatory in one country and optional in another. 
In India, the Aarogya Setu app is one of the few 
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initiatives to be made mandatory, under threat of 
criminal prosecution (the government later changed 
its position).
In addition, when a tool is intended for use by 
governments and businesses around the world, 
there is an inherent risk for citizens and employees 
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residing in countries that do not have laws and 
regulations governing data protection, safety in the 
workplace, or anti‑discrimination. For example, some 
countries such as Australia have already amended 
their national privacy legislation to introduce specific 
provisions for the national privacy authority — the 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 
(OAIC) — to exercise oversight over application data; 
establishing a data deletion process at the end of 
the pandemic; and requiring the Minister for Health 
and the OAIC to submit enforcement reports. Other 
countries currently do not have general application 
legislation that would apply to the collection, use 
and disclosure of personal information through 
contact tracing applications; and still others do not 
have a body of law ensuring that fundamental rights 
are upheld.
We thus understand the importance of using, as 
far as possible, IT‑based tools that by default and 
by design safeguard individual freedoms and fun‑
damental rights. On the other hand, we can also 
appreciate that a device's effectiveness or technical 
features may sometimes be inadequate, particularly 
when their use is not governed by sufficiently robust 
legislative or regulatory protection requirements.
We should not underestimate the cultural aspects 
of our relationship to technology. As such, Singapore 
is a socially cohesive country, that is, a society with 
a high degree of trust in government. As a result, 
TraceTogether and other applications using the 
BlueTrace protocol could have difficulty achieving 
the general acceptance necessary to be effective in 
jurisdictions that do not share those traits. For such 
countries, deployment of that type of application 
would certainly entail mandatory regulations in 
order to achieve the expected societal benefits.
Finally, the issue of whether a SARS‑COV‑2 diagnosis 
is accurate and verifiable, scarcely discussed in 
the literature, is an important selection criterion. 
The ten or so initiatives studied break down into 
two  types of approaches in equal proportion: self‑
diagnosis versus verified diagnosis. For example, 
the TraceTogether initiative operates on the basis of 
verified diagnosis, involving a screening verification 
procedure by government agents responsible for 
tracing contacts, which provides more accurate 
data. Conversely, self‑diagnosis (as with NHSx or 
COALITION) only takes symptoms into account, 
without a medical diagnosis, which increases 
the likelihood of false positives. The use of a self‑
diagnosis based application also depends on the 
relative ease or difficulty of access to screening tests 
as a condition for obtaining medical confirmation of 
infection. In any event, there is a legitimate concern 
that an IT‑based device could provide a digital risk 
score, which might lead to a heightened sense 
of panic in a user with a high score. In this respect, 
the chosen technology developed for COVI‑App 
is interesting. In fact, the application is configured 
to provide information and recommendations, 
rather than a raw, uninterpretable score. Instead of 
providing a binary (yes/no) assessment of whether 
an individual has been in contact with another 
individual diagnosed with COVID‑19, the COVI‑App 
machine learning solution developed by the MILA 
calculates the overall probability of user exposure to 
COVID‑19 (the risk score), based on demographic, 
health and behavioural information provided by 
the user, official diagnoses, if available, and the risk 
of other network users. This choice of technology 
aims to empower users by enabling them to adopt 
appropriate behaviour based on their level of risk.
2    STUDYING COMMUNITY‑WIDE BEHAVIOURS
The purpose of the second category of IT‑based 
devices is to analyze behaviour, not on an individual 
level, as do tracing applications, but community­
wide. This does not involve processing personal data, 
but aggregated statistics. This practice is found on 
several continents. In the United States, for example, 
researchers have been able to use location data from 
Facebook users who share their location history to 
develop maps measuring physical distance. In China, 
Baidu used its mapping service to model areas of 
contagion in real time. In Finland, telecom operator 
Telia shares anonymized cellular location data with 
the government to enable monitoring of population 
movements and identify at risk areas.
In some cases, these practices involve the use 
of data from telephone cells, which transmit 
information from mobile devices without requiring 
user activation. In other cases, processing GPS data 
from mobile apps requires user activation. The data 
are aggregated and used to generate check‑in 
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reports. On a more trail‑based level, the credit card 
system allows transaction locations to be traced and, 
by aggregating the data, provides a map of user 
movements.
3    MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH HEALTH MEASURES
The third category of technologies relates to smart 
devices that allow for monitoring individuals’ 
status and their compliance with containment 
measures. Once again, while not claiming to 
provide a comprehensive analysis, we cite a few to 
illustrate the diversity of approaches. In Australia, 
some quarantined people may be monitored via a 
camera installed in their home or may be required 
to wear a smart bracelet. In Poland, individuals in 
confinement are asked to download an application 
that prompts them to take geo‑localized selfies. 
Agents then verify that these people are at home 
by sending messages and analyzing location 
data. In Hong Kong, persons in confinement are 
required to wear a smart bracelet which, combined 
with an app, allows the authorities to monitor 
quarantine compliance. In Taiwan, persons in home 
confinement receive calls from government agents 
twice a day and risk publication of their identities 
and fines of €30,000 if they are absent. Russia’s 
government uses cameras combined with a facial 
recognition system and phone location data to 
monitor individuals under quarantine.
This report looked at an innovative approach 
launched in Germany by the Robert Koch Institut 
(RKI). The German govenment’s federal public 
health agency released a data “donation” application 
called Corona‑Datenspende. Designed by RKI, the 
application enables users to donate health data to 
the agency from their smart clothes, wristbands 
and wellness apps. The goal is to derive information 
from these data on the spread of COVID‑19 at the 
national and regional levels. Our report looked more 
specifically at this initiative, which has the unique 
feature of improving the ability to predict the spread 
of COVID‑19 using nationally based on non‑specific 
health data (such as pulse rates) and thereby 
accelerate and target future contain ment measures 
in identified high‑risk areas. That being said, the 
project is designed to serve public health rather than 
to give the donor an indication of whether or not they 
are infected. Given that testing capacity is limited 
and that many COVID‑19 infections show only very 
mild symptoms (so infected individuals will probably 
never seek testing themselves, but may nonetheless 
transmit the virus to others who may develop more 
severe symptoms), the RKI aims to improve the rate 
for estimating the number of possible undetected 
COVID‑19 infections.
4    CONTROLLING ACCESS TO PRIVATE SPACES
Lastly, the fourth category includes applications 
that can be deployed within businesses and private 
spaces. While attention thus far has been focused 
primarily on applications that can be implemented 
by governments and the issues surrounding tracking, 
initiatives by private businesses should be carefully 
studied. They will most certainly take a greater place 
in the future and require serious consideration as 
they are impacting and will continue to impact our 
lives and actions. In any event, employees should 
not be forced to adopt the tool, but rather be fully 
involved in it. Voluntary employee buy‑in for the tool 
will be all the easier.
In a work environment, the “voluntary” element 
around using the tool may need to be clarified. 
Like many other tools used in a work environment, 
their use may become a mandatory condition of 
employment, as long as requiring employees to use 
the tools does not infringe on applicable law.
However, the fact that employers may have the legal 
right to impose the use of certain technologies on 
employees in the workplace does not mean that 
they are “obliged” to impose new technologies with 
monitoring capabilities without first giving the 
affected employees the opportunity to participate, at 
least to some extent, in the decision‑making process 
related to the selection and deployment of these 
tools, as part of an inclusive governance process, as 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
The purpose of these devices is to measure em‑
ployees’ state of health to determine whether or not 
they can enter the workplace. For example, British 
telecom operator Vodafone and remote surveillance 
company Digital Barriers have developed a thermal 
smart camera to detect any employee with a fever. 
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Québec‑based OPTEL has launched a mobile 
appli cation designed to make premises more 
secure. The  application asks employees to answer 
questions about their health, through a chatbot, 
and to enter their workplace if the risk is considered 
low. In France, Crédit Agricole and Onepoint 
worked together to develop the “Copass” (digital 
badge) application to manage the reopening of 
businesses. By answer ing a health questionnaire, 
employees are  given a  COVID‑19 “sensitivity level’ 
to help busi nesses establish organizational proto‑
cols (teleworking, stag gered working hours, etc.). 
Software developer ONHYS simulates the flow 
of visitors, users, patients or employees within an 
establishment. The software  tests different layout 
configurations to identify the solution that best 
reduces the risk to people. To ensure physical 
distance in the workplace, Landing AI has developed 
a detection tool based on artificial intelligence, 
which models the  distance between people 
based on real‑time video streams. This system has 




In particular, this report looked at two use cases. 
The first, developed by Canadian business TerraHub, 
is an example of an “immunity passport” based 
on blockchain technology, allowing employees 
to voluntarily share health data, while controlling 
access to it. TerraHub decided to adapt its Credential 
Link solution to implement functionalities for accel‑
erating and facilitating the return of employees after 
the confinement period. Based on the Hyperledger 
Fabric blockchain protocol, Credential Link allows 
employees to self‑declare their state of health on a 
daily basis or to download additional proof of their 
ability to return to work safely. An algorithm that 
produces a health summary is sent to their employer 
each day to assist the employer in implementing 
security measures.
The second use case studied is a connected object 
developed by Estimote in Poland. Called Proof of 
Health, its aim is to enable employers to anticipate 
virus spread among employees. The device has a 
button employees can use to alert management of 
an event (symptom, infection). The device includes a 
GPS system, as well as Bluetooth‑powered proximity 
sensors and ultra‑wideband radio connectivity. The 
solution’s effectiveness depends on reporting by 
the infected employee and the onset of symptoms. 
Due to its high‑tech features, this type of application 
presents significant ethical risks of tracing each 
employee's movements within a building, measuring 
time at a workstation as well as break times, or even 
the frequency of interactions between employees 
(and perhaps even outside the workplace or outside 
working hours). No information regarding security 
or data stored on the device and server seems to be 
available for the Estimote device.
In this context, The Coronavirus (Safeguards) 
Bill 2020 in the UK is interesting to consider, as it 
attempts to provide appropriate safeguards for the 
symptom tracking and contact tracing applications 
currently being deployed in the UK, and provides 
for minimum safeguards that will be required if 
we move to deployment of “immunity certificates” 
(commonly known as passports) in the near future. 
It does not specify any particular IT‑based approach 
for creating applications and does not attempt to 
replicate the GDPR and ePrivacy guidelines. Rather, 
it suggests some basic safeguards that need to be 
added to what these rules already provide.
More specifically, the bill states that:
(a)  No one shall be penalized for not having a phone 
(or other device), leaving house without a phone, 
failing to charge phone, etc.;
(b)  No one is compelled to install a symptom and 
contact tracing app, or to share messages of their 
status on such an app (e.g., with an employer, 
insurer or university);
(c)  Personal data collected by an app, or contained 
in an immunity certificate, shall not be shared 
beyond the NHS and coronavirus researchers 
unless securely anonymized;
(d)  What is true, secure, verifiable, anonymization 
needs to be certified by a stringent Code of 
Conduct;
(e)  Personal data collected by apps or immunity 
certificate must be deleted or anonymized as 
soon as possible, or at latest immediately after 
the emergency period has expired;
(f)  “Immunity passports” must not become novel 
and uncontrolled internal passports, nor used 
by either state or private sector to discriminate 
in ways not necessary or proportionate to the 
legitimate social goal of controlling COVID‑19.
TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
INFLUENCE MODES OF GOVERNANCE
Analysis of the measures developed to manage 
the  health crisis shows that the choice of IT 
architecture has a direct influence on how it is 
governed: the type of technologies used, the 
methods of data storage, the choice of a centralized 
or decentralized structure all have an impact on 
the entire initiative and on its social acceptability. 
Professor Lawrence Lessig’s adage “code is law” is 
more topical than ever. Certain technical charac‑
teristics must therefore be known to decision‑
makers who have to evaluate and choose an IT‑based 
approach, in the public sector or in companies.
Currently, contact tracing applications have been 
the subject of the most intense public debates. 
Information on their technical characteristics is the 
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most readily available, which is sometimes accessible 
in the form of open source documentation. We have 
therefore decided to use these applications as  a 
case in point to highlight the governance issues 
they raise and illustrate the challenges raised by 
the deployment of IT‑based devices. This analysis 
can be used to study other types of technologies, 
such as those mentioned in categories 2, 3 and 4 of 
our typology.
AVOIDING TWO TRAPS: REDUCTIONISM 
AND SOLUTIONISM
Before choosing an IT­based response, decision 
makers must bear in mind two important potential 
biases: reductionism and its corollary, solutionism. 
Reductionism consists in “reducing” reality and all 
phenomena to mathematical equations that are 
used to reach a decision. This trend is considerably 
reinforced by big data. Algorithmic processing has 
its advantages, but also carries significant risk of 
taking the measure (i.e., the observed correlation) to 
be the cause of the phenomenon (i.e., the causality 
of that measure). The actions and notifications 
associated with tracking applications (i.e., warning 
messages sent to users) are not explainable to 
users, as they do not obtain any information about 
the location or exact time of contact. Users have to 
trust the application without being able to obtain 
other information about the “real” risks, for example 
the percentage of associated risk of infection, which 
would be a function of contact time, proximity, and 
other possible factors.
The study carried out on tracking applications 
highlights the danger of relying unthinkingly and 
uncritically on a measure that can lead to automation 
bias (unconditional reliance on the results obtained 
by the application) or to ostracizing others. This puts 
these devices on the brink of becoming proxies for 
social interactions, because adopting them could 
condition human relationships positively (I tested 
negative, so I can interact) or negatively (I'm at risk 
so I’m an outcast). This artificial alteration of social 
relations therefore has the potential to strengthen 
or, on the contrary, weaken peoples’ confidence 
not only in the people around them but also in 
government, institutions and public authorities.
Without being overly simplistic in criticizing tech‑
nology, we must also guard against a tendency 
towards techno­solutionism, which aims, by solely 
technical means, to resolve problems that are essen‑
tially social and political, such as those posed by a 
pandemic crisis situation, which is a public health 
issue involving national and international solidarity. 
In this way, technology can become an alibi 
for decision­makers to excuse the lack of other 
initiatives. A related issue is the IT imperative: that 
is, the moral obligation to use an IT‑based “solution” 
because it exists. However, just because an IT‑based 
tool is available does it not necessarily mean it is 
the most suitable response (i.e., the most effective, 
efficient, socially acceptable or ethically responsible) 
to the problem in question.
Thus, operational efficiency (What is the detection 
quality? What is the rate of false positives? etc.) 
and ethical acceptability of a digital application 
for combating COVID‑19 can never be analyzed 
in isolation from other health measures or social 
processes. Experience shows that the countries which 
pioneered the use of digital tools for combating 
COVID‑19, such as China, Taiwan and South Korea, 
derive effectiveness from using technology only 
by carefully fitting it into a much broader global 
and multidimensional crisis governance policy. 
Social and political participation by communities 
and intermediary bodies, intervening between the 
individual and the government, makes it possible 
to continuously monitor the effectiveness of digital 
tools and how they are adapted to human needs in 
fighting the pandemic.
CHOOSING TECHNOLOGIES AND 
THE DATA COLLECTED
A first aspect concerns the type of technology used 
and the type of data it can collect. With regard to 
applications for monitoring virus carriers, it should 
be noted that they can identify people who have 
been in close proximity to an individual reporting 
symptoms, but they cannot identify possible conta‑
mination by an asymptomatic patient or by a person 
who does not declare his or her condition to the 
medical authority. Technology is part of the solution, 
but its effectiveness depends on human factors.
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The type of data collected by tracking applications 
can be either location or proximity data. Location 
data allow the position of an individual to be tracked 
and can be gathered by GPS technologies; prox‑
imity data provide information on the interactions 
between people (contact or passing nearby...) that 
could be occasions for spreading the virus. They are 
accessible via Bluetooth.
While the chips in smartphones communicating 
with the GPS satellite network give a position to 
the nearest metre, their accuracy is impaired in 
urban environments, especially if the user is in a 
large building. This makes it difficult to use them 
in situations that could be hotbeds of transmission. 
Bluetooth, on the other hand, locates a device in 
relation to other smart devices nearby. It works 
well inside buildings. However, the technology is 
not designed to gauge distances. The signal range 
depends on the quality of the device, its position 
(hand‑held, in a pocket or luggage) and the battery 
charge status. Moreover, the technology cannot 
establish with certainty that there has been contact: 
the signal transmits easily through a window (train, 
car at a stop sign, building...) and cannot detect 
spread by indirect contact, such as touching an 
infected object, or by suspended droplets in the 
airflow of an air‑conditioning system.
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TECHNICAL RISKS AND BLUETOOTH 
COMPUTER SECURITY ISSUES 
Of the ten or so initiatives reviewed as part of 
this project, the majority are based on Bluetooth 
technology, or beacons. Devices with the application 
signal each other by sending a short (16 byte) 
signal, allowing any device to detect another device 
signalling nearby.
Thus, it is impractical for a device to send messages 
that are to be understood only by a limited number 
of  authorized devices, while the algorithm for 
handling these messages is public. Under these 
conditions, it is easy for anyone with a modicum 
of IT  skills to intercept Bluetooth signals and even 
spread malicious information using their own soft‑
ware, or a modified version of the original software. 
For example, the range of a Bluetooth signal varies 
depending on the equipment used, with a dedi‑
cated antenna being able to pick up the signal up 
to several hundred metres away in open terrain. 
However, it is impossible to limit a Bluetooth signal 
to a maximum of five meters on a smartphone, and 
the same is true for reception.
Knowing this, we can see there is a wide array 
of more or less damaging attacks that can be 
carried out against tracking devices. A first possible 
scenario for attack could be to send a mass of wrong 
information to corrupt the application data and 
render it useless. An attacker with the technical 
capabilities to intercept and engage with the large‑
scale solution could also link the data collected 
with other information (geolocation, time indicator, 
photo/video capture), to re‑identify users who have 
tested positive for COVID‑19. It is perfectly feasible 
to then extrapolate this information in order to link 
it to previously targeted groups of individuals or 
communities.
These attacks pose a risk to some of the main 
requirements for tracking applications: data accu‑
racy, medical confidentiality, anonymity, meeting 
privacy (locations, dates, identities). Accordingly, 
the DP‑3T project has been particularly vigilant 
with regard to all of these risks and constantly 
improves its protocol in order to mitigate or even 
prevent them.
Servers for centralized solutions (for example, the 
ROBERT protocol project), are able to associate these 
few bytes with a device identifier and a specific date. 
Contact graph anonymity and privacy are more 
vulnerable in this case. For the DP‑3T protocol’s 
decentralized solution, the few bytes transmitted by 
a device simply represent a fleeting random value 
associated with raw date data. Only the transmitting 
device would be able to identify its information as 
originating from itself. Consequently, in this solution, 
compromising data privacy is more complicated. By 
bearing in mind some of these technical elements, 
decision‑makers will be able to assess whether or not 
the technical risks and IT security issues they present 
leave a trail or not, in order to assist in selecting the 
IT‑based response to be deployed.
CENTRALIZATION VS. DECENTRALIZATION: 
AN IMPACTFUL CHOICE
The choice of a centralized or decentralized system 
is particularly impactful. Centralization and decen‑
tralization are often explained in IT as a sharp 
dichotomy. As we shall see, the reality is more subtle 
and complex.
Both systems are viable technically speaking and 
have their pros and cons in terms of security and 
infrastructure. The main difference is not technical 
but lies in the concepts we want to instill in those 
systems with respect to our societies, rights and 
duties, laws, and ethics. Accountability and privacy 
are the first of those concepts.
Decentralized systems (more or less like DP‑3T 
or COALITION) by definition spread the roles to 
different actors who take part in the system. 
Accountability in a decentralized context becomes 
a  chain of responsibility: a decentralized system 
works if the chain of responsibility is ensured by 
enough fair actors in the system (not necessarily all 
of them). Those systems are inspired by the more 
general concept of “decentralization” which links to 
the concepts of participation in decision‑making, 
local representation, democracy, equality and liberty. 
Yet, due to the increased number of responsible 
actors in the system, it has a cost in terms of 
upstream specifications, downstream rigidity and 
more complex security processes and systems. 
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It also poses the issue of the malicious user who 
sends wrong or even crafted data to spoil the whole 
system (that can be mitigated by mechanisms of 
authorization with more or less centralized certifi‑
cation authorities). It also raises the issue of global 
governance of the system with respect to laws in 
countries and across borders.
A centralized system (more or less like ROBERT) is 
aimed at gathering the responsibility in one central 
entity (the central server) which ensures the whole 
system is consistent and coherent. This kind of 
system works perfectly when a single entity is able 
and is required to endorse the whole responsibility 
(especially in the context of organizations such as 
states or cross‑border organizations such as the EU). 
The central entity manages everything much more 
easily: the level of authentication and authorization 
of users, the data life‑cycle (security, authentication, 
certification) and the evolution of the infrastructure. 
But this naturally implies that this central entity is 
fully trusted by users and does not misuse the data 
(A “trusted third party”).
Risks of using such centralized system include the 
following:
•  Single point of attack: Any breach in a server 
would endanger the whole federated system and 
all users of affected applications. Intrusion into the 
server could result in the identification of users.
•  Linkability of users: With a centralized system, 
the  server is able to learn and potentially piece 
together information about specific users. The 
server could infer that two infected users were 
in contact at some point in time based on 
timestamps, allowing the server to build a partial 
social graph that reflects these encounters. 
Furthermore, the server could identify anonymous 
uploaders with co‑locations by performing a 
frequency analysis on the up loads and cross 
referencing with who performed the uploads. In 
addition, the server could identify anonymous 
uploaders with causality, as causality is preserved 
in the uploads. Thus, the server can reconstruct a 
pseudonymous graph using time causality.
•  Tracing of users: The centralized server creates 
ephemeral identifiers and can, at any point, link 
the past and future ephemeral identifiers of 
any  user, infected or not, by decrypting back to 
their permanent identifier. In combination with 
other data sets, such as CCTVs, the server can 
therefore track all individuals, infected or not. 
Given a target ephemeral ID, such as one 
collected  by law enforcement from a suspect, 
it is possible to tag and classify individuals that 
third parties can recognize without access to 
the centralized server or database. For instance, 
ROBERT’s ephemeral IDs are not authenticated, 
and the server does not  provide any proof that 
they are an encryption of the ID, or that the 
correct key was used. This capability could allow 
law enforcement, or other actors, without any 
access to  the backend database, to track the 
movements of specific users and communities 
by assigning them distin guishable identifiers 
and  recognizing their tagged Bluetooth emis‑
sions. This could enable long‑term tracking of 
individuals or communities (as one could assign 
specific identifiers to target groups of people) by 
third parties.
•  NB. These are hypothetical attacks which repre‑
sent a potential risk and will depend on the 
mitigation means implemented in the solution 
when in pro duction. There are ways to reduce 
the risk as the DP‑3T specs show it.
Both centralized and decentralized systems can 
scale their boundaries to mitigate their respective 
drawbacks while also paving the way for new kinds 
of attacks:
• Example 1: The ROBERT protocol delegates data 
collection and obfuscation to users but keys are 
generated by the central server. It then opens 
the door to possible attacks by malicious users 
injecting bad data. It is unclear, in the related 
StopCovid application, whether a validation step 
with an authority is to be implemented, thanks to 






The server processing and distributing 
updates is independent of the 
administrative entities, but update 
sharing can be enabled, for example, 
in collecting positive diagnoses. Some 
aggregated information on the evolution 
of disease transmission can be produced 
to assist in managing the health crisis.
Only scrambled information 
(obfuscation) is exchanged 
between physically close 
devices. Private information 
never leaves the device.
The updated information is 
transmitted to a central server 
that processes and distributes the 
updates throughout the users’ 
network. The shared information 
is not useful in itself. Only the 
application of each device can 
transform these updates into 
useful information for users.
CENTRALIZED 
SYSTEM
The server processing and 
distributing the updates is 
managed by an administrative 
unit. This leverages the maximum 
amount of information from 
contact tracing for the benefit 
of a centralized health crisis 
management strategy.
Only scrambled information 
(obfuscation) is exchanged 
between physically close 
devices. Private information 
never leaves the device in these 
The updated information is 
transmitted to a central server 
that processes and distributes 
the updates throughout the 
users’ network. In contrast to 
the decentralized model, here 
the exchanges contain key 
contact tracing information. 
Information security is ensured 




• Example 2: Decentralized systems need to authen‑
ticate and certify users to mitigate the issue of 
malicious users. But an authentication authority 
is a more centralized system so it again raises the 
issue of trust.
Thus, the apparent dichotomy between centraliza‑
tion and decentralization is actually more subtle 
than this, as some elements of a solution can be 
decentralized while others cannot. So much so 
that most IT‑based responses appear in reality 
hybrid, through a choice of both centralized and 
decentralized components.
Several consequences flow from this, as outlined 
in the table below. For example systems like 
DP‑3T/Coalition are partially decentralized: they 
decentralize the collection, exchange and checking 
of contact data on the client‑side: people are 
responsible for their own data. But the storage of 
infected users’ data is still centralized in a central 
server. We could imagine pushing decentralization 
further by decentralizing the storage itself.
33 
CHAPTER 2
Comparison based only on (de)centralization aspects and high‑level features for which there are remar‑
kable differences.
Categories ROBERT DP­3T Coalition Google/Apple MILA
Bluetooth Tracing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GPS Tracing No No Yes (for coarse 
localization)
No Yes
Contact Data Collection Decentralized Decentralized Decentralized Decentralized Decentralized 
Contact Data Ciphering Decentralized Decentralized Decentralized Decentralized Decentralized 
Contact Secret Keys 
Generation
Centralized Decentralized Decentralized Decentralized Decentralized
Contact Data Storage Centralized Centralized Centralized N/A Centralized
Risk of infection 
Evaluation































Private user data 
collection
No No Coarse location No Yes
Future Predictive 
System 
No No No No Yes
Can be cross­border 
System
Yes Yes Yes N/A No
Can be used for more 
than contact tracing




Possibly Possibly No N/A Yes
Relative Server 
Infrastructure 
Complexity (1: basic to 5: 
complex)
2 3 3 N/A 5
Open source Partially 
opensourced 
(protocol + data 
model)





Organization Governmental Non‑profit Non‑profit TBD Non‑profit




Effective technologies can be used without sacrificing our individual freedoms and 
fun damental rights. An informed choice of technologies requires knowledge of their 
under lying technical characteristics.
And understanding of the technical aspects must be shared — through an appropriate 
educational initiative — across an entire organization or population in order to foster 
buy‑in. For example, to limit any digital divide, inclusiveness and information are 
required (Do your employees know what Bluetooth is, how a blockchain works, where 
data is stored? Do you intend to disclose your technology’s potential percentage of false 
positives, etc.?) Both governments and businesses must take care not to compound 
the  consequences of unequal access to technology or risk penalizing those who are 
already largely excluded from the digital world. Moreover, the information provided 
to users must make it very clear that no application can be considered as a medical 
device, despite the notifications and guidelines, and that it is not a substitute for a 
screening test.
Comparisons drawn from benchmarking tracing applications help to illustrate the 
questions that need to be asked. These issues also apply to the deployment of other 
types of technologies (connected devices, thermal cameras, AI systems, blockchains, 
etc.), with the benchmarking process adapted to the particular features of each 
planned project.
Given the circumstances, decision‑makers must develop a critical view with regard to 
selecting IT‑based solutions. For example, where the code for a proposed tool has not 
been checked by independent third parties, there is no guarantee it will process the 
data as stated by the project promoter. For that reason, we recommend providing for an 
independent control body, which seems particularly appropriate as part of a governance 
system, and third‑party auditability, which is particularly suited for businesses. A further 
recommendation in this respect is to oblige providers to conduct separate and publicly 
accessible impact measures (such as the one set out in Appendix 2).
Technical measures alone will certainly not suffice to guarantee that individuals are 
protected. Governments must bear in mind the importance of the legislative, social and 
political context in which such solutions could be deployed. Accordingly, it would be 
necessary to enact appropriate legal and regulatory provisions to safeguard individual 
freedoms and fundamental rights and to avoid discriminating against or stigmatizing 
certain groups.
Finally, beyond or additionally to any immediate objectives for a technology’s usefulness, 
decision‑makers would have to factor ecological transition needs into the preferred 
IT‑based solution. The health crisis must not overshadow the climate crisis facing 
humanity and every human being.
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By basing our understanding of the situation on the appropriate mindset and armed with detailed 
knowledge of the various technologies available, we can build an IT‑based strategy to combat the 
pandemic, restart economic activity and, more generally, operate in the post‑crisis landscape.
To make the most appropriate choices and ensure the project is positively received, the key success 
factor in our opinion is governance. The method detailed in this chapter could inspire decision‑
makers in developing their strategy and particularly in deciding how IT‑based tools are selected, 
deployed and managed.
This method is based on six principles, which guide the entire approach, and on a participatory 
mode of governance. The current crisis context calls for innovative solutions and real social accep‑
tance, both of which will be helped by the inclusion of all stakeholders from the outset of the 
decision‑making process. The presence of technical, legal and ethical experts within the governing 
body also seems crucial to us.
During the methodological stage of validating the choice of a technology, these six principles will 
take the form of concrete criteria put together in an evaluation matrix. This document, compiled by 
the project’s participatory governance body, will address all aspects of the technology under review 
and provide a basis for discussion in the decision‑making process. It can be used as a guideline 
throughout a project managed in agile mode, to ensure that the measures taken are consistent 
with changes in the health and economic situation.
This method can be used by any type of institution. Specific recommendations for its deployment 





Our report shows how essential it is to determine 
the appropriate framework for dealing with this 
protean crisis, particularly in terms of health and 
socio‑economic issues (see Chapter 1). Knowledge 
of the characteristics of technologies is equally 
fundamental to understanding their influence on 
our individual and collective freedoms and how 
our societies are run (see Chapter 2). We need 
to determine how a governance model can be 
defined for the  technological solutions under 
consideration. Indeed, SARS‑COV2 is having and 
will continue to have an unprecedented impact on 
the functioning of our organizations, particularly 
businesses. Accordingly, governance should be 
based on key principles. In this last section of the 
report, we propose a two‑tiered analysis: first, we 
will identify ethical values and legal standards 
and secondly, they will be linked to different criteria 
in a multi‑factor impact matrix. With this impact 
matrix – which is intended to be a sound gover‑
nance tool for the responsible deployment of 
COVI technologies and whose instructions for 
use are detailed below  – we can go beyond the 
simple assessment of data protection or the 
simplistic conflict between individual privacy and 
public security and propose a concrete method 
for selecting and deploying crisis exit solutions. In 
this third chapter, we address the need for 
inclusive and participatory governance to avoid 
any disruptions to social bonds, and more 
spe ci fically how solutions can be implemented in 
businesses.
METHODOLOGY FOR SELECTING, 
DEPLOYING AND GOVERNING AN IT‑BASED 
HEALTH CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
The specific nature of pandemic risk implies that 
restarting economic and social activity requires 
that organizations develop a type of herd im­
munity and resilience. This approach calls for 
active buy‑in and responsibility on the part of 
everyone within an ethical culture of techno‑
logy use. It requires a participatory approach that 
can put IT‑based choices in context and build in 
the diversity of real‑life situations experienced by 
the different stakeholders and the ethical issues 
they face.
Moreover, the inextricable link between technical, 
legal and ethical aspects forces us to address the 
issue of deploying IT‑based tools systemically. We 
therefore propose a multi­factor matrix method 
implemented by a multidisciplinary team.
The analysis begins by studying the objectives 
that an IT‑based tool must achieve, through its 
purpose, the context in which it is developed or the 
ecosystem in which it is integrated: its effectiveness 
must be assessed in the light of the entire strategy it 
is deployed within.
Next, we analyze the technical characteristics of 
the devices under consideration. For example, an 
application using a centralized or decentralized 
protocol implies far‑reaching governance choices. 
Similarly, the issues of interdependence and inter‑
operability with other external technologies can 
be crucial.
In addition, challenges related to social acceptability 
need to be addressed. The risks of fraudulent or 
wrongful use of the solution must be considered, as 
well as other social risks, such as the widening of the 
digital divide or forms of discrimination.
The question of temporality is also key: an IT‑based 
solution needed to exit the crisis may end up being 
disproportionate. The criteria that characterize a 
“crisis situation” within an organization should be 
determined. Should the solution be used as long 
as epidemic outbreaks are identified around the 
world, or if the disease takes the form of a seasonal 
epidemic? Is it necessary to adopt a logic of 
preventing of a new epidemic?
In practical terms, to implement the method 
advocated here, the first step is to set up an 
appropriate governance body, involving represen‑
tatives of all stakeholders with technical, legal and 
ethical expertise. This body will guide the project 
end to end.
Firstly, we recommend that such a group familia‑
rize itself with the principles and contextual 




The group can then determine needs, both 
from the organizational perspective, but also 
according to realities on the ground such as pro‑
fessional practices, habits and concerns, based 
on user knowledge. This approach can be used 
to identify the constraints as well as the elements 
of effec tive solutions put forward by stakeholders 
on the ground. During this phase,  it’s important 
to remain focused on the expres sions of needs, 
seen through users’ eyes, and not be too hasty in 
embracing IT‑based solutions. The aim is to develop 
a comprehensive response to the situation in which 
IT‑based tools would be used.
With the organizational needs identified, the typo­
logy of technologies available and the examples 
presented in the previous sections could help in 
selecting the option to implement.
Once a process is outlined and a technological 
solution chosen, the matrix in Appendix 2 could 
help validate these decisions. Note that this tool 
designed for the purposes for our approach with 
the members of the ITechLaw association and 
collaborators of the Human Technology Foun‑
dation is not only intended to assess the legal 
risks associated with the implementation of a 
project, but also to strengthen good governance 
practices and to support effective and ethical 
decision‑making. The aim is to encourage decision‑
makers to ask the right questions from the 
outset of the project and provide both a big‑
picture and a granular view of the technology 
under consideration. The process rolls out in 
seven steps, corresponding to the ethical values 
discussed below. Each step identifies questions 
that allow the proposed system’s suitability to 
be assessed against the imperative of serving both 
the public interest and users’ needs.
The more inclusive the governance body using 
this matrix, the greater the diversity of aspects 
considered in the solution. It will thus constitute 
a tool for achieving objectivity and a single 
forum of discussion for stakeholders from different 
backgrounds.
The proposed matrix is deliberately very detailed, 
in order to meet the needs of large organizations 
implementing complex projects. However, it can be 
used in a simplified format, if the seven steps of the 
process are implemented carefully:
The first two columns of this matrix describe the 
technology under review together with the related 
potential ethical issues. We recommend these 
two columns be completed first, for evaluation by 
governance body members. The implementation 
of a technological solution always involves making 
trade­offs and prioritizing the principles that 
should be followed. This approach leads to the 
definition of a framework of common rules and 
may include constraints or restrictions, which must 
be accepted and built in to be effectively applied 
over time.
If, in the course of this process, sticking points 
remain, the “mitigation measures” column makes 
it  possible to study ways of making these con‑
straints acceptable to all and eliminate difficulties 
through dialogue. The approach can be carried 
out for several solutions under consideration, with 
a comparison of the “issues and risks” columns to 
help separate them and choose what is most 
appropriate.
1. Ethical Purposes and Societal Benefit
2. Accountability
3. Transparence and Explainability
4. Fairness and Non‑Discrimination
5. Safety and Reliability





Once the decision has been made to deploy a 
solution using an IT‑based device, this matrix can be 
used at each iteration of an agile process, in order 
to monitor the sticking points. The matrix can also 
provide the key messaging elements for ensuring a 
wide adoption of the solutions by its users.
For implementation in a business organization, 
please refer to the specificities described in the 
framed text below.
GOVERNANCE BASED ON KEY PRINCIPLES 
The choices made by different states, companies 
or organizations with regard to COVID‑19 tracking 
applications are therefore not benign and are based 
on policies and orientations around both technology 
governance and governance of the health crisis itself. 
Accordingly, an ethical viewpoint that highlights 
the values or principles applied (voluntarily and 
explicitly or not) and their implications for the way 
these applications are designed, deployed and 
implemented can provide us with useful insights 
faced with the difficult choices that entrepreneurs 
and public decision‑makers must make in these 
times of crisis and, often, urgently.
The collective crisis governance model we are 
calling for is based on a set of values that we believe 
are relevant to analyzing the various technological 
solutions, particularly those based on tracking:
Each of the six ethical values presented below are 
applied at a practical level in the criteria of our 
multifactor matrix as well as in the methodology 
discussed above.
Using primarily public documents, members of 
the ITechLaw association and collaborators of the 
Human Technology Foundation have applied 
the multifactor impact matrix (see Appendix 2) 
to all of the eleven applications under review: 
DP‑3T, TraceTogether, COVI App, ROBERT, Apple/
Google API, Aarogya Setu, COALITION, NHSx, 
Corona‑Datenspende, TerraHub and Estimote. We 
then applied the matrix to produce a document 
summarizing the key findings observed by the 
teams. Three examples of summarized key findings 
can be found in Appendix 4. A comparative table of 
the eleven applications is provided in Appendix 3.
Accordingly, we have analyzed each principle at 
two  levels: firstly, the basic legal‑ethical concept; 
and secondly, the framed text shows the opera‑
tional variations of each principle with illustra‑
tions from our  multifactor impact matrix of the 






1. ADDED VALUE IS BEYOND DOUBT THE FIRST 
CRITERION TO BE CONSIDERED, although the 
meaning of the term covers a variety of ideas as to 
the expected benefit of an IT‑based system. No 
point of view should be favoured over another, at 
least initially, but all of them should be considered 
before any decision is taken. Added value is mea‑
sured above all in terms of public health and 
presupposes the comparison of various IT‑based 
as well as non IT‑based methods. Then, their 
contributions — separately or in combination — to
combating new transmissions must be considered. 
This added value is also assessed in economic 
terms of the direct or indirect costs associated 
with implementing and operating contact tra‑
cing, and when calculating the impact of a 
persistent pandemic on economic activity. Added 
value is also  assessed in terms of the population’s 
psychological well‑being. This value is reflected in 
criterion No. 1 of the multifactor matrix (Appendix 2), 
some illustrations of which are provided in the 
framed text that follows.
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ETHICAL PURPOSE AND SOCIETAL BENEFIT
Corona­Datenspende translates into English as “coronavirus data donation,” which is what the 
application is all about: German citizens are encouraged to donate, on a voluntary basis, their data 
from fitness trackers or health applications, not for any direct feedback on their personal health 
status, but solely for societal benefit and to support scientists in their work. In terms of the Ethical 
Purpose & Societal Benefit, the application or, at least, the idea behind its deployment is: since 
analyses are carried out using the data collected through “Corona‑Datenspende,” the application 
could help foster people’s impression that each person counts and that each and every citizen can 
do their part in mitigating the pandemic. In a broader sense, the public discussion about donating 
one’s data may also work as a trigger to strengthen people’s perception that their data actually are of 
value, not only for scientists but for every governmental or private entity seeking to obtain data, and 
that “donating” one’s data should be carefully thought through.
The UK’s NHSx App currently undergoing beta testing on the Isle of Wight (a small island off the 
southern coast of England which is part of the British Isles) is based on the user’s self‑diagnosis 
(which may be confirmed or not). It uses information about proximity encounters (the Transmitted 
IDs, i.e., encrypted “Sonar” ID, together with a timestamp for the encounter, and radio signal 
strength indicator information) uploaded by users either when they have (a) “self‑diagnosed” as 
infected (based on their presentation of symptoms assessed in the tool) OR (b) they report they have 
confirmed results that they tested positive for the virus. The information provided should reveal to 
the centralized backend “Sonar” server the devices that were in close proximity to one another, the 
duration and the distance of that proximity. The UK is currently undecided as to whether to adopt 
a centralized or decentralized application. Coupled with this is the recent decision by UK authorities 
to implement manual contact tracing prior to finalization of the application itself (when this had 
always been viewed as a complementary activity). In this event, it seems likely that the application 
would be reduced in its effectiveness and consequently in whatever form it is deployed, its ethical 
purpose and societal benefit will be in doubt.
The COVI Canada App is a decentralized contact tracing and risk assessment mobile application 
developed by a consortium led by the Montreal Institute of Learning Algorithms (“MILA”). The 
application is designed to provide contact tracing among users, to assess their risk of COVID‑19 
infection and provide them with recommendations in relation to current behaviour or changes 
in risk level. It also aims at providing governmental authorities with aggregated information 
about contagion risks to assist them in designing more effective responses to the pandemic. Like 
other contact tracing applications, it is estimated that the COVI App will require an uptake rate 
of 60% of the general populace to ensure efficacy and accuracy of the AI‑aspect (aggregate data, 
epidemiological models, etc.). Nevertheless, for COVI’s unique AI‑enhanced features (aggregate data, 
epidemiological models, etc.), MILA estimates that the minimal percentage of download required 
is much lower, namely approximately 10%. Accordingly, in theory the app should provide a societal 




2. TRANSPARENCY IS ESSENTIAL TO DEBATES 
ON ETHICS. How do you discuss what might be 
right and good if you fail to understand the pros 
and cons involved in the discussions. In the case at 
hand, this means educating the public at large, on 
the issues in a debate that is certainly technical but 
ultimately political, involving citizen behaviour. What 
are the IT‑based solutions? What are the alterna‑
tives? Who are the actors behind each solution? 
Who manages the system, with what data and how? 
So, in discussing a Bluetooth solution, it is important 
to know which population the solution is suitable 
for or which population will be excluded from it.
With what risks of error? The efforts of certain 
research organizations to give an open access de‑
scrip tion of the specifics of its technological so lu tion 
are commendable. It is the duty of the government 
or  an independent commission of experts from 
various disciplines to provide this information (in a 
simplified and accessible format) — not to make 
decisions but to respond to requests from all 
sides and to promote an authentic discussion of 
ideas among the whole population. This value is 
reflected in criterion No.  1 of the multifactor matrix 
(Appendix 3), some illustrations of which are provid‑
ed in the framed text that follows.
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TRANSPARENCY AND EXPLAINABILITY 
In this regard, our analysis shows that the COVI App is notable from a transparency and explainability 
perspective. First, in order to help ensure that key components of the terms and conditions are 
well understood by users, not just agreed to haphazardly, a multi‑layered, “progressive” disclosure 
approach will be adopted. For example, a graphic‑heavy top layer illustrating privacy implications 
can link to a somewhat more textual second‑layer — this can then link to the longer FAQ section on 
the website, which in turn sends users to the full privacy policy. Second, according to the COVI App, 
user comprehension is verified rather than assumed: “[MILA will] apply in-app analytics to estimate 
users’ comprehension — for example, by looking at the average amount of time each user has spent 
looking at various layers of disclosure information. Second, we administer dynamic comprehension 
quizzes to a random sample of users, allowing us to understand what information has and has not 
been internalized. Finally, disclosure tools are iteratively revised based on the feedback from these 
measures, to ensure they best cater to actual user behaviour.” Third, the output of the model can 
be explained and decisions can be audited. The user does not receive specific information as to how 
the risk assessment is calculated. The user will only receive personalized recommendations and tips 
that are updated as more information becomes available. Fourth, MILA will make available a web 
page dedicated to this app (where the privacy policy will be available to app users) that explains how 
individuals may submit a complaint about the handling of their personal information in relation to 
the app.
The Aarogya Setu App is a mobile application developed by the Indian government with private 
partnership to provide health related information and carry out contact‑tracing based on the users’ 
Bluetooth and GPS location data. Responding to pressure from citizens, researchers and civil society 
groups, the government recently changed its position on two controversial features of the app. The 
first was the lack of transparency arising from the fact that the app was not open source. In the past, 
there had been news reports of ethical hackers pointing out security issues in the solution, which 
had been disputed by the solution’s developers. However, it was difficult to comment on the veracity 
of the claims of either side without the solution’s code being audited by multiple independent 
researchers. The government has now initiated the process of trying to fix this, starting with the 
release of the app’s client‑side code for the Android platform and launch of a bug bounty program to 
encourage improvements to the code. It has also announced that the iOs version and the server code 
will be released subsequently. Further, the terms of use of the solution have also been modified to 
remove the prohibition on reverse engineering of the solution. Complete openness in the solution’s 
code is necessary to facilitate audits by independent third parties so as to assess whether the data is 
indeed being processed in the exact manner stated by the government.
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3. AUTONOMY AND RESPECT FOR PERSONAL 
CHOICE MUST BE AFFIRMED. Expressed in law 
through the concept of privacy, this ethical value 
must not mean the single‑minded pursuit of self‑
centred choice but rather the need for a capa‑
city for self development. A democratic society has 
a duty to guarantee this ability such that this 
development constitutes a guarantee for every‑
one of full participation in democratic life. This view 
of autonomy thus prohibits pitting individual and 
collective interests against each other, but sees 
each as linked to other, in a dynamic relationship. 
Autonomy underlies the responsibility of every 
individual to work for the common good. We might 
add that pursuit of the common good cannot stop 
at national borders but must extend into a global 
solidarity imposed by the disease. This value is 
reflected in criterion No. 7 of the multifactor matrix.
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PERSONAL DATA AND PRIVACY 
“Apple/Google Contact Tracing API”, in short “Apple/Google API”, is a comprehensive solution that 
includes application programming interfaces (APIs) and operating system‑level technology to 
assist in enabling contact tracing. To strengthen privacy, this protocol leverages a new concept — 
Bluetooth pseudorandom identifiers, referred to as Rolling Proximity Identifiers. Each Rolling 
Proximity Identifier is derived from a Rolling Proximity Identifier Key, which is in turn derived 
from a Temporary Exposure Key and a discretized representation of time. The Rolling Proximity 
Identifier changes at the same frequency as the Bluetooth randomized address, to prevent linkability 
and wireless tracking. Non‑user identifying Associated Encrypted Metadata are associated with 
Rolling Proximity Identifiers. The broadcast metadata from a user can only be decrypted later when 
the user tests positive.
The ROBERT (ROBust and privacy‑presERving proximity Tracing) protocol was initially a proposal 
for the Pan European Privacy‑Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP‑PT) initiative, whose main goal 
is to enable the development of contact tracing solutions compliant with European standards in 
data protection, privacy and security, within a global response to the pandemic. It has to be noted 
that, for the time being, “StopCOVID”, supported by the French government, appears to be the only 
application built on the ROBERT protocol. It has been reported that many other countries that were 
said to be backing PEPP‑PT have now moved to DP‑3T, using a decentralized structure instead of 
the centralized ROBERT approach. Some of the initial developers of the PEPPP‑PT are also reported 
to have abandoned the project due to concerns about centralization, transparency and privacy 
protection.
The Estimote wearable transmits and scans for other wearable devices. If the system detects that 
two  (or more) wearables are too close to each other, that is, they are not complying with social 
distancing guidelines, then the employees are notified via their wearable, such as with a flashing 
light and an audible beep that gets louder and faster the closer the employees are to one another. 
Estimote has not updated its Terms of Use or Privacy Policy since 2015. So, although it states it 




4. SOCIAL JUSTICE must not be set aside at 
a time when, in the face of disease, vulnerability 
is not the same for everyone, demanding that 
technology be made accessible to all and, first and 
foremost, to the most disadvantaged. The use of 
auto matic tracking systems excludes people who 
do not have mobile phones or cannot use Bluetooth; 
predictive artificial intelligence systems may lead 
to stigmatizing certain categories of people sus‑
pected of being affected by the virus or certain 
neighbourhoods where infected people reside 
(usually members of already marginalized groups).
The aim must not be simply to protect individuals’ 
data but to avoid discrimination against groups 
of people. Finally, the value of dignity disallows 
constant surveillance and public targeting of 
people with the disease (the coloured QR codes 
used in China). These values must be taken into 
consideration from the outset in designing IT‑based 
solutions and throughout their lives (ethics by 





The Indian government’s contact tracing tool, Aarogya Setu, already has more than 114 million 
registered users. In relation to the overall population of a country with 1.3 billion inhabitants, this 
figure could be put into perspective by explaining that this represents only 8.7% of the citizens. 
The government recently announced that adoption of the app has to be on a “best effort basis” for 
private workplaces, diluting its earlier position on mandatory adoption, but its use is still mandated 
by many employers and in contexts like train and air travel. Given the mandatory nature of the tool 
in some contexts and the potential sanctions that might ensue, one cannot help but notice that the 
number of people affected by these measures alone exceeds the number of inhabitants of France 
and Singapore, taken together. This is a risk of discrimination on a large scale, leading to situations 
where employees/individuals would have no choice but to install the solution or stand the chance 
of losing an employment opportunity. While a committee set up by the government has issued a 
protocol to govern the use of data by the app, the lack of a comprehensive data protection law and 
legislative support for the solution raises concerns about the legal implications and the risk of harm 
to users. In addition, there is a general risk of surveillance‑related use, false positives and negatives 
and unauthorized access to data (including health data) by third parties.
Estimote is a very simple wearable device. No app is needed, and thus it does not tie up the wearer’s 
phone, nor does it (likely) contain any personal information of the wearer. It can also easily be used 
by those with disabilities or who are not tech savvy. It merely requires the pressing of a button to 
indicate infected status. It also has alerts, both visual and vibrations, to let the wearer know that they 
are not complying with social distancing guidelines (they are too close to one another) and/or that 
they have been exposed to an infected individual and must then take appropriate measures.
Note that some additional criteria could have a significant impact on fairness or non‑discrimination, 
namely: (i) the content of the notifications, (ii) sanctions (if any) for non‑compliance (including, but 
not limited to, legal sanctions, but also related to the return to work, especially after a period of 
authorized absence), (iii) limitations on compliance and non‑compliance (e.g., financial constraints 
and socio‑economic circumstances).
TerraHub has developed a blockchain solution that allows employees to share health information 
or certificates on a voluntary basis. A proprietary algorithm is then used to analyze these elements 
to provide the employer with a binary “OK” or “NOT OK” summary result to accompany post‑
confinement economic recovery measures. This operation legitimately raises questions in terms 
of transparency and explainability. On the one hand, there is no guarantee that the employee 
can access the operating mechanisms of this algorithm, so it seems difficult for the employee to 
understand the underlying criteria that led to an “OK” or “NOT OK” result, and therefore possibly to 
challenge them. This could, on the other hand, lead to important consequences if this algorithmic 
decision support tool determines, for example, the conditions of access to the workplace (obligation 
to stay at home in the event of a negative result, what additional measures will be taken in the event 
of a positive or negative test, etc.), not to mention the risks of false positives and false negatives. 
In addition, the secondary use of these data, both “OK/NOT OK” reports and personal data stored 
outside the chain deserves a clearly defined framework to avoid any misuse by third parties.
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5. ASSESSING WHAT IS IN THE PUBLIC INTER‑
EST MUST BE INCLUSIVE AND INVOLVE ALL 
STAKEHOLDERS. It is important that room should 
be made for public discussion in a forum that brings 
together all stakeholders: the medical profes sion, 
representatives of civil society (especially vulne‑
rable or marginalized groups), business, educa‑
tion, etc. Decisions around choosing one system 
over another cannot be left to experts alone, but 
rather choices must be open for discussion and 
assessed at both the technical level (ethics by 
design) and other levels (psychological, socio‑
economic, etc.). In the end, it is up to the consti‑
tutionally designated competent political autho‑
rity, after hearing the opinions of the required 
“independent” bodies, to determine and set 
the parameters and mode of operation of any 
IT‑based tool. To achieve (and maintain) full 
transparency and public confidence (including how 
to prevent secure technologies from becoming 
security technologies), the public authority must 
explain, minimizing as much as possible the use 
of patronizing language, the reasons behind the 
choices made and the details of the decisions, 
including any AI algorithm models used. In this 
regard, we must not accept technology choices 
dictated by actors who might not operate 
transparently and have no interest in assessing 
issues of ethics. This value is reflected in criteria No. 2 
and No. 6 of the multifactor matrix.
ACCOUNTABILITY
The pseudonymized data necessary for training predictive statistical and epidemiological models for 
the COVI App will be stored in a secured server with restricted access to selected AI researchers who 
will train these models. To manage these data, MILA is in the process of setting up a COVI Canada 
not‑for‑profit data trust. According to the COVI White Paper, “The data trust would have open rules 
about its governance, open access to the code and aggregated epidemiological models, and would 
be continuously monitored by its board, internal experts committees, and external evaluations from 
independent academic groups and governmental representatives, to make sure that it stays faithful to 
its mission. It would be dismantled at the end of the pandemic, and all personal data destroyed. The data 
trust would be in charge of determining who could access the data, and only towards its mission, i.e., to 
better serve the health and privacy of citizens by managing or doing research on that data. The single 
mission and non‑profit nature of the data trust, as well as the mechanisms to monitor its decisions would 
be a strong defence to make sure the data does not end being used by companies or governments 
for surveillance.”
The COVI application is an IT‑based tool for a post‑COVID risk management strategy developed by 
an independent non‑profit organization made up mainly of researchers and not a private company. 
However, NPO does not necessarily mean absence of private interests. Also, for this approach to be 
beneficial, it would have to promote greater transparency of the technical characteristics and algorithms 
used by the application, a principle that is a central issue for digital tools. This transparency will also be 
enhanced as this is an open source application and since the developer shows a clear concern for the 
responsible development of products resulting from artificial intelligence. The application’s developers 
have also agreed to have the COVI application evaluated by multiple external parties, including a specially 
constituted ethics committee, the Commission d’éthique, science et technologie (CEST) of Québec and 
researchers from the International Observatory on the Societal Impacts of AI and Digital Technologies 
(OBVIA). This is essential for transparency. Moreover, the openness to external evaluations and the fact 
that the application has been developed by an interdisciplinary team including experts in technologies 
and health, promotes the best possible consideration of the various contextual and societal issues that 
could arise from its use.
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The contact‑tracing Coalition App, developed under the lead of US company Nodle, offers a COVID‑19 
positive/negative self‑declaration service. Users declare themselves “positive” and may choose to notify 
their condition to the system. Unlike other solutions, this is not necessarily done with the intervention 
of a health authority or even the need of a test, according to the current information, which may lead to 
notifications made in error or even maliciously. This is all the more important since this self‑declaration 
triggers notifications to contacts.
OPEN DATA, FAIR COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
TraceTogether is a Bluetooth‑based application developed by the Singapore Ministry of Health running 
on the BlueTrace protocol with the aim of assisting and increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
contact tracing. The BlueTrace protocol is open sourced and the Singapore Ministry of Health has 
indicated that any other jurisdictions are free to implement locally as they deem appropriate. In fact, 
this includes the COVIDSafe application launched by the Australian Government Department of Health. 
In the context of the pandemic, this example shows the value of open source licensing models and 
interoperable technologies.
DP­3T is a decentralized protocol for a contact tracing app hosted on Apple (iOS) and Google (Android) 
smartphones which is designed to facilitate contact tracing in the general populace. It proposes an 
architecture that is capable of international deployment. DP‑3T has been released on an open source 
basis. Data classes are compact ephemeral IDs which are capable of being transmitted via BT LE 
protocols. Full publication has taken the place of system architecture to enable this portability. Given the 
need to assess actual national implementations of DP‑3T, we are unable to review actual interoperability 




6. PROPORTIONALITY AND SECURITY OF IM‑
PLEMENTED SYSTEMS. This value must guide the 
choice of technology‑based systems, if that option 
is selected. In this respect, the principle of minimum 
data collected both in terms of content (e.g., in the 
case of a centralized database, should the national 
register number of infected and in‑contact persons 
be recorded? Should the name of the doctor who 
diagnosed the infection be stated?). The quality 
of data collected and processed and above all the 
limits on the duration of processing operations will 
be emphasized. The temptation to preserve the 
IT‑based systems implemented to deal with the 
emergency of the moment is great. The perpetuation 
of solutions implemented in the heat of a crisis (the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks of may be cited 
here) is often justified in the interests of innovation 
and the considerable effectiveness that technology 
can offer legislation. The need for strict compliance 
with the purpose for which systems are set up 
must be guaranteed. This implies that the manage‑
ment of health crisis systems exploiting personal 
health data should be entrusted to bodies bring‑
ing together health professionals and stake holders 
(e.g., patient groups). Compliance with these prin‑
ciples can be ensured only by giving citizens 
the right to verify compliance. Lastly, the safety 
and reliability of the solutions is a crucial point. 
Indeed, if the solution can be easily pirated or 
manipulated or if it does not work as intended or is 
used for non‑consensual purposes, then acceptance 
and trust in the solution will be largely under‑
mined. This value is reflected in criterion No. 5 of the 
multifactor matrix.
SAFETY AND RELIABILITY
In the case of Corona­Datenspende, third parties who know the pseudonym of a data donor could 
retrieve their authentication token from the RKI server and send further data to the RKI under that 
pseudonym, including, for example, the number of steps taken or other activity data. Third parties 
can also connect their own fitness tracker and thus their health data with the pseudonym of another 
user. These risks must not be considered as simply theoretical because they do not require high‑level 
technical skills.
We would recommend imposing additional safeguards on data deletion. The DP­3T proposal 
currently recommends that data be deleted from servers after 14 days, and the solution itself will 
“gracefully” and organically disassemble itself when no longer needed as users will stop uploading 
their data to the Authorization server, or stop using it per se. Our proposal is that a “sunset” provision 
be added such that data are automatically deleted when an external agency (such as the WHO) 
declares the pandemic over.
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ADOPTING INCLUSIVE AND PARTICIPATORY 
GOVERNANCE 
Beyond the debate on the intrinsic effectiveness of 
each IT‑based solution as a pandemic prevention 
tool, note that given its nature, the risk may be 
countered only through a collective effort. No anti‑
COVID‑19 tool will therefore produce the expected 
results if it is not part of an inclusive and partici‑
patory public governance approach that makes 
all the populations concerned accountable and 
also reassures them. It is not up to the govern‑
ment alone  or to individuals, professional unions 
or companies to impose their solutions without 
broader consultation and coordination; otherwise, 
they could be ineffective.
This need for participatory and inclusive gover‑
nance of IT‑based solutions must be rapidly put on 
the agenda at all levels of civil society: companies, 
public institutions, intermediary bodies, govern‑
ments. Indeed, the risks and consequences of 
sterile opposition between “individuals” and the 
“state,” “businesses” and “public institutions,” “fed‑
erations” and “administration” are too important 
not to consider the role that intermediary bodies 
could play at their respective decision­making 
level. While such a need had been expressed 
before the current crisis, it is now acquiring visibility 
and public attention unprecedented in the history of 
our democracies in the digital age.
But what is meant here by governance? Focus‑
ing on  decision‑making processes focuses not so 
much on the choices to be made as on how we 
make those decisions and imagine those actions. 
While war or terrorism have, in the past, made it 
possible to justify the use of exceptional powers, 
the present health crisis offers the possi bility 
for the mindset of care (see Chapter 1) and an 
ethic of caring.
The current crisis can therefore be seen as an 
educational opportunity to strengthen the capa‑
city of individuals, groups and communities to 
become involved in making decisions that affect 
them. Such a process will enable citizens to better 
adapt to changing circumstances, and to contribute 
towards making our society more resilient to face 
future crises.
This very active and participatory concept of 
governance should be deployed at several levels. 
First, at the political level, to manage the crisis. 
In this respect, countries have used different 
approaches, ranging from interventionism to a 
certain laissez‑faire approach. While rapid and 
coordinated intervention often led to better control 
of the pandemic, the initiatives that subsequently 
led to more effective crisis management seem 
to have been those where the communities and 
professional groups involved (intermediary bodies) 
were listened to. Putting aside the representative 
aspect resulting from democratic elections and the 
option not to adopt a proposed action, when citizens 
play an active role based on choices informed by the 
different expectations and realities on the ground, 
they can energize social and political life.
While playing a central role in taking rapid deci‑
sions and coordinating actions at the national 
level, governments must also encourage local 
and sectoral initiatives — whether through crisis 
management committees in various professional 
groups to promote economic recovery. In this way, 
governments can ensure that their guidelines and 
policies are constantly adjusted with feedback from 
these initiatives. In Québec, for example, many 
expert or consultation committees were set up to 
manage the health crisis, to ensure better alignment 
between national guidelines and local actions. 
Difficulties were observed when these groups did 
not feel sufficiently involved or were not mobilized, 
or when the authorities announced guidelines and 
measures that were not supported by their work 
and recommendations. 
The participatory aspect of governance can also be 
deployed in the way we make our IT­based choices. 
In this report, we have looked at the specific case of 
tracing applications proposed in different countries 
and by different developers. In all instances, special 
attention is given to the individual’s choice to 
consent or not to consent to using the applications 
in question and transmitting personal data. The 
adoption of an inclusive governance process will, in 
our view, ensure voluntary buy­in by the populations 
concerned to the use of an IT‑based tool. We 
therefore believe that this approach is incompatible 
with the choice by some governments to make the 
use of applications mandatory.
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Accordingly, our study showed that most initiatives 
rely on obtaining consent to justify adequate 
protection. Can this consent really be considered 
free and informed? Under social pressure to use 
such applications, whether in the workplace or in 
an apartment building, the agency of the person 
concerned and the “true” voluntary nature of the 
adoption of technical solutions will have to be 
questioned. Some informed commentators indicate 
that this could be at most an induced consent.
Therefore, besides studying each digital appli ca‑
tion, our broader relationship to the technology 
must also be examined. The current crisis is thus 
leading us to (re)consider our entire technological 
governance, i.e., our policies as to when and how 
to manage IT‑based tools in our societies and 
organizations. It is therefore a question of imple‑
men ting mechanisms for initiating discus sions 
on the social relevance of available tech nolo‑
gies, and when they are deemed desirable, to 
define the boundaries of social acceptability 
with respect to them and to develop the values, prin‑
ciples and guidelines for governing their use.
The earlier this inclusion takes place, i.e., when a 
technology is emerging, by questioning its “why” 
before considering the “how”, the more capable 
we will be to integrate into design choices a wide 
range of concerns, both for public health and 
for users, who may be end consumers as well as 
collaborators or communities. Inclusiveness at the 
early stages of a technology's development allows 
us to anticipate problems or challenges that would 
necessarily arise later and minimize complications 
resulting from adjustments at more advanced 
stages. That said, not all issues can, of course, be 
identified in advance, and it will also be important 
to ensure feedback throughout the life cycle of 
the selected technology, to enable constant ad‑
justments for practical issues raised by the use 
of a technology.
That is the best sense of what we call ethics by 
design; a notion that goes far beyond the mere 
statement of general ethical principles to be 
respected and covers a much broader field than 
privacy by design. The aim here is to allow for 
the contextualization of technological choices 
and to consider the multiplicity of ethical conse‑
quences and issues they entail. In this respect, 
the current situation highlights the fact that a 
health crisis, which calls for care and solidarity, 
may lead to a review of the priority given to certain 
values. It has, for example, been pointed out on 
many occasions that compromises on tracing 
applications deemed acceptable in some countries 
would not be so in Europe or North America, because 
of possible infringements of freedoms.
The risk of dogmatically pitting individual rights 
and freedoms against public health needs and 
the protection of a collective interest remains 
real and constitutes a trap, particularly in modern 
Western culture which values the individual. 
Conversely, groups – families, communities, insti‑
tutions – always have the authority to restrict their 
members’ rights and freedoms (for example, 
by citing the common good, such as public 
health), provided they demonstrate necessity 
and proportionality. Such political measures are 
common in certain countries, where curtailment 
of individual rights and freedoms is not rare. 
Faced with what is presented as a dilemma, we 
believe that we must rely on collective intelligence 
and adopt what we have called the standard of 
care to walk the narrow path between the 
two  extreme positions. Recent polls show that, 
in the current context of pandemic, some citizens 
would be willing to make compromises to ensure 
the  health and safety of their loved ones and 
seniors. This does not mean that they are ready 
to give up on their personal freedoms. It 
implies the need to respond creatively to the 
challenge of defining public health and safety 
with respect for individual freedom and privacy 
so they strengthen each other mutually. In the 
context of a pandemic, this means rethinking 
IT‑based tools to increase collective (health) security 
that incorporate robust privacy and data safe‑
guards, while incorporating concerns for fairness 
and social justice. If we can meet this challenge, this 




In all instances, definitive choices must be avoided 
and instead use a reasoned, transparent and itera‑
tive process to allow for an ongoing evaluation 
of our technology choices. Trusted third parties, 
such as independent verification or certification 
bodies, could be usefully involved in such moni ‑
toring. Their action should then comply with the 
policies identified through the mechanisms for 




IMPACT OF COVID‑19 ON BUSINESSES
While we do not have sufficient hindsight to analyze the consequences of COVID‑19 on the business 
world, shifts have occurred and must be considered when guiding the choice and implementation of 
IT‑based crisis exit solutions.
With this epidemic, more than just a few isolated individuals have been affected by the fragility of the 
working world; the entire workforce has been prevented from carrying out its daily work under normal 
conditions overnight. Those who promote automation and robotization have seen the impact of the 
pandemic as confirmation of theories calling for the replacement of the fragile human factor. While 
no area seems to be immune to partial or total automation, the immediate reality is quite different in 
that the core operations of the businesses hit by the virus have been able to survive only through the 
work — often “invisible” — of some of the least valued occupations. Moreover, in view of the prospects 
of an unprecedented rise in unemployment in the coming months, or even years, the choice of fully 
automated systems is likely to provoke strong social tensions. Lastly, note that the apparent automation 
of human tasks sometimes simply displaces or conceals human work.
But the pandemic has also highlighted the fragility and vulnerability of lean management, zero 
stock and just­in­time theories. Tight global supply chains have shown, as the image of the chain 
suggests, that the snapping of a single link produces a domino effect with global impacts. The extreme 
fluctuations in demand, whether higher (masks, respirators) or lower (tourism), have suddenly derailed 
the rules of free trade, to the point that some states — including the most liberal — have had to take 
action to set prices. There is no doubt that the issues of relocation and reindustrialization and their 
social impacts are going to be intense for all the world’s economies, against the backdrop of the desire 
to regain economic and technological sovereignty, with far‑reaching geopolitical consequences.
In this crisis, the theory of “creative destruction” is likely to have many applications. The automotive 
sector, for example, which has already been disrupted for several years due to changing consumption 
patterns and a loss of reputation as a result of various business issues, is already seeing an acceleration 
of its “reorientation” with the crisis not yet over. Like other sectors that were the flagships of powerful 
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economies (air transport, aeronautics, distribution, etc.), the education sector itself, with its sudden 
and more or less successful shift towards remote teaching and research practices, will also undergo 
profound changes. Similarly, public services that have been subject to privatization, sometimes 
excessively so, will also obtain a clearer definition of their real collective challenges.
But the most immediate and massive phenomenon for the economy remains the sudden 
generalization of remote working. This is not a new subject, but the global scale of the shift to 
remote working touches the core of the value and social representation of work that has defini‑
tively marked a profound change in the organization of salaried work, inherited from Fordism. 
Numerous testimonials speak to the productivity gains resulting from the elimination of transport 
time  and a more rigorous organization, linked to digital modes of communication. Discovering 
colleagues and customers in their family environment may have contributed to closer ties. 
However, many point to the lack of time for socializing and face‑to‑face meetings, which diminishes 
the sense of belonging to a team and the serendipity necessary for innovation processes. In this 
new way of doing things, the methods for controlling employees who are “at work”, which 
are the result of Taylorism, are no longer acceptable and a deep rethinking of the organi‑
zation of businesses is called for, to adapt them to this period of crisis. Needless to say, the effects 
of these changes around practices are unclear but, by breaking up some of the regulatory frame‑
works and social consensuses, they are shifting the balance of power by increasing the strength of 
employers, who can increase their profitability and move gradually towards a platformization of 
work relationships.
The coming months and years will usher in a completely new reality. Whatever the outcome, which 
is impossible to estimate at this stage, the notion of individual and herd resilience will be essential. 
In light of human history and development, our ability to act collectively and therefore politically in 
the face of limited resources has always been our asset. More than ever, the ability of economies to 
survive will rely more than ever on the human capacity to act together, no doubt by reimagining the 
tension between productivity and resilience.
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EXCERCISING GOVERNANCE OVER 
CORPORATE IT‑BASED TOOLS
Deconfinement and the return of employees to the 
workplace give rise to the need for companies to 
have solutions, whether technical or not, to protect 
everyone from infection and ensure trust in each 
other, a prerequisite for business to reopen. Previous 
analyses have identified a range of technologies 
that can support social distancing measures 
(see in particular the framed text on Bluetooth/ 
iBeacon technologies and the presentation of 
various workplace access applications). Our aim 
is not to discuss in detail the practical aspects of 
deploying each of these IT‑based tools, but to identify 
the characteristics of appropriate and effective 
governance. Furthermore, lessons learned during 
containment can lead to a willingness to modify 
processes and work organization in businesses.
The specific features of corporate governance 
must be acknowledged at the outset. Relationships 
between employees are both closer and often more 
intense than in society. The return to work is the time 
for sharing the experiences lived differently by each 
person amid the coronavirus pandemic. This sharing 
is not always an easy thing to do, as the period of 
confinement may have changed people and their 
relationships experienced remotely. It is therefore 
important, at the local level, to create or recreate 
spaces for dialogue and sympathetic listening so 
that everyone can express themselves on the reality 
they have lived through and, if necessary, on how 
remote working has changed the perception of their 
work within the organization.
Clearly, if an employee becomes infected, manage‑
ment's responsibility would be called into question, 
risking the right of withdrawal, since safety at work 
will be declared by the employees as insufficient. 
The measures related to the health crisis are not 
part of the normal business activity and can affect 
the health, relationships and even intimacy of 
individuals. The employer­employee relationship 
may therefore not be sufficient to ensure they are 
adopted effectively. However, measures deemed 
inappropriate, unilaterally imposed or too restrictive 
are at risk of being circumvented. Accordingly, 
corporate management must, at the same time, 
reassure the employees, clients and suppliers who 
need to visit the premises while relying on them to 
apply the measures strictly. Building this mutual 
trust requires an appropriate mode of governance. 
In the absence of externally imposed rules, such as 
legislation, guidelines from regulators or professional 
bodies, a common framework of standards must 
be drawn up and the hierarchy of principles to 
be applied and the constraints to be imposed 
will have to be discussed. Indeed, if they have to 
choose between security and respect for individual 
freedoms, employees and clients will most likely 
choose security, the basic level in Maslow’s pyramid 
of needs. However, such decisions will not be made 
without regret and bitterness, and could tarnish the 
image of management.
However, the structures for social dialogue are 
not adapted to such crisis situations: even bodies 
such as the CHSCT in France or occupational 
medicine rarely (with the exception of a few specific 
sectors) have to decide on measures that could 
impact the survival or structural organization of a 
company. To ensure that these discussions do not 
undermine the social climate, it seems appropriate 
to set up a multi­stakeholder body to manage 
corporate health crises. This body will be key for 
collecting suggested solutions, discussing priorities, 
analyzing possible strategies and the IT‑based 
solutions envisaged, and above all in adopting 
the measures decided upon. The experience of 
the successful management of the health crisis 
in countries such as Taiwan or Vietnam has 
shown the importance of using communities and 
proximity management. Such a project governing 
body will enable ethical management by design, 
i.e., from the very beginning of the strategy design, 
and will help to create, within the company, an 
authentic ethical culture and concern for the health 
of others. In addition, it will offer the possibility of 
implementing technological solutions designed 
from the point of view of users, whether they 
are employees or visitors to the premises. Thus, 
for example, if a self‑diagnostic questionnaire or 
temperature monitoring device indicates that 
employees are unable to access their workplace, they 
must be taken care of, by referring them to health 
care facilities that can confirm a diagnosis and treat 
them, as well as by offering them the conditions for 
remote working, if possible, or means of subsistence, 
while avoiding any stigmatization.
58 
CHAPTER 3
Furthermore, the scale of the efforts that will be 
required from individuals (access control, physical 
distancing, disinfection measures, etc.) and the 
nature of the information that could be collected 
mean that the health crisis management process 
should be treated as a project independent of 
any other security or control measure. Although 
companies can be strongly tempted to use the 
tools implemented to fine‑tune human resources 
management (employee localization, calculation 
of working times and breaks), the health crisis 
management process will need to have specific 
databases, fully segregated and protected. Employee 
health data cannot be processed by the employer. 
The exclusive purpose of the data collected must 
be guaranteed to those who give their consent.
Lastly, such a participatory governance process, 
based on dialogue, will enable the strategy for 
managing the health crisis and the return to work 
to be developed in agile mode: measures can be 
tested and evaluated, in full transparency, in order to 
achieve the optimal situation by successive iterations. 
Moreover, while allowing the strategy to be deployed 
gradually, this mode of governance can also reduce 
the measures and discontinue them when that 
is possible, since such limitation of duration is an 
important factor for trust and social acceptability.
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In view of the many unknowns surrounding the 
virus and the factors of contagion, our societies 
must prepare to live with the threat of pandemic. 
The end of the crisis expected by the public 
therefore requires shifting from health disaster 
management mode to a medium­term risk man­
agement process. IT‑based solutions to assist 
with deconfinement and economic recovery may 
thus be studied only as part of a broader risk 
management process that includes health mea‑
sures, support for potentially infected people, 
and oversight of different types of economic and 
social activities.
To avoid being caught up in a tangle of double 
constraints that would inhibit decision‑making, 
a  trade­off between the values underlying 
choices  and the prioritization of principles we 
collectively wish to be upheld must be made, 
while  avoiding focusing the debate solely on 
respect  for privacy. In this exceptional situation, 
assimilating data collected or used in managing 
pandemic risk with particularly sensitive data, 
possibly placed through management agreements 
in the care of medical institutions, could offer 
satisfactory guarantees.
We believe the principle of necessity should be 
favoured: if the usefulness of an IT‑based solution 
is deemed too low in view of its implementa‑
tion conditions (for example, an application that 
would require, in order to be effective, uptake 
by 60% of the population, but whose adoption 
would be voluntary), it would be advisable either 
to temporarily change the conditions of its 
deployment or change strategy by deploying a 
different technology.
While tracking potentially infected people is the 
usual way of managing epidemics, and while one 
application may allow for large‑scale deployment, 
other approaches are emerging, such as the use of 
predictive models of pandemic evolution, which 
make it possible to identify places and situations 
at risk. Here again, ethical risks exist, such as 
seeing certain neighbourhoods or populations 
(often already vulnerable or marginalized) stigma‑
tized, but they must be put into perspective in 
terms of the solution’s effectiveness in preserving 
public health. Thus, the debate cannot focus on 
how to implement a solution without reflecting on 
the appropriateness of the solution.
Implementing measures allowing for medium‑
term management is a challenge in societies that 
have developed a strong aversion to risk. It requires 
careful support from public authorities. This sup‑
port concerns, first of all, the management and 
sharing of responsibility: it cannot rest solely on 
the shoulders of the individual, which could lead 
to the stigmatization of infected people; however, 
it cannot be borne solely by the collective, which 
could result in a lack of accountability among 
the least vulnerable people, at the expense of 
social justice.
Any effective solution therefore requires solida­
rity among committed citizens. This assumes the 
following:
• The role of the government as coordinator in 
determining public health priorities (for example, 
whether to open up sectors of the economy, and 
in determining the characteristics of IT‑based 
solutions and the type of data collected), and in 
promoting standards that enable national and 
international interoperability of digital devices. 
In particular, business leaders, cannot be solely 
responsible for deciding on deconfinement or 




of a health crisis (prior to the mass distribution of 
a vaccine), in the midst of a social dialogue that 
could become tense. The government will also 
have to define the adjustments for minimizing 
the discriminatory effects or harm suffered by 
certain categories of the population as a result 
of the use of such measures, for example, by 
introducing public policies to compensate for the 
loss of income for persons or communities who 
declare they are infected.
• The role of standards bodies or independent 
multidisciplinary advisory groups in assessing 
the potential technologies and developing stan‑
dards that consolidate all best practices for 
the  responsible development and deployment 
of these new technologies and enabling their 
national and international interoperability.
• The role of the private sector in the ethical and 
responsible development and deployment of 
these technologies and in the overall measures 
taken to ensure the health of employees and 
customers, as well as the responsible reopening 
of the economy.
• The management role of communities (muni‑
cipalities, intermediary bodies, neighbour hood 
associations, school boards...) in the local appli‑
cation of measures, adapting them as much 
as possible to the realities on the ground and 
encouraging the population’s buy‑in.
• The role of each citizen in adopting measures 
that are sometimes very restrictive, but which 
can effectively combat the pandemic — which 
requires individual, collective and equitable 
responsibility across all stakeholders — and the 
desire of the vast majority of citizens to avoid 
catching the virus and infecting their loved ones.
The governance of the selected IT­based solu­
tions therefore appears to be the key factor 
conditioning their success or failure and must 
reflect the management of the responsibilities 
mentioned above. To do so, an appropriate body 
must be created, which must be:
•  Multipartite: In addition to members of parlia‑
ment and the government, who guarantee 
legitimate regional and national representation, 
as well as experts, the specific body for gover‑
nance and control of IT‑based solution deploy‑
ment must also include representatives of civil 
society and intermediary bodies, capable of 
inspiring citizen trust and commitment.
•  Agile: As the situation and knowledge of the 
virus and how it spreads evolve, the chosen 
solution will have to be adapted in successive 
iterations.
•  Transparent and reasoned: In periodic assess‑
ments and possible adjustments to potential 
solutions, the reasoning process and rationale 
(or evidence) used must be explained and sup‑
ported transparently and understandably. This 
is crucial for stakeholder confidence in the 
choices made.
•  Temporary: If the risk of pandemic persists, the 
evolving and iterative nature of the proposed 
solutions should allow for their impact to be 
reduced and then discontinued as required, 
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NOTE: This PostCoviData Impact Assessment template has been developed by 
the members of ITechLaw listed in Appendix 3 in the context of the PostCoviData 
Project led by the Human Technology Foundation. The contributors to this 
template have participated in its development on a personal basis. Accordingly, 
the views expressed in this template do not reflect the views of any of the law firms 
or other entities with which they may be affiliated.
This template is provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute 
legal advice. It is provided as an example of the key types of information that 
can be considered during the PostCoviData Tech Solution Pandemic Impact 
Assessment process. Adjust it as necessary to fit your needs in consultation with 
qualified legal counsel.
64 
1. PROJECT SUMMARY 
(Describe the Pandemic Tech Solution, the dataset and the context)
In this document, “Pandemic Tech Solution” means a software solution, device or product developed or deployed by the Project Owner 
that integrates data‑driven functionalities.
Describe the project and what it intends to achieve by addressing the following key points: 
• Describe the Pandemic Tech Solution as a whole, including a functional description/overview and the datasets.
• What does the Pandemic Tech Solution seek to achieve?
• What is the political and social context in which the Pandemic Tech Solution would be deployed or used?
• Does the Pandemic Tech Solution raise issues of specific ethical concern that should be explored prior to proceeding?
• Where does the PIA sit within the project timeline? Is it intended to evolve?
• What is the Project Owner trying to achieve with the Pandemic Tech Solution?
• Is the Pandemic Tech Solution a one-off initiative or part of ongoing business development?
Project summary 
[NOTE: Is this Pandemic Tech Solution an expansion of a previous activity? If yes, determine whether a previous assessment has been done. 











2. KEY FACTORS FOR CONDUCTING A PIA
The first step in conducting a supplemental Pandemic Tech Solution Impact Assessment should be an evaluation of why that specific 
Pandemic Tech Solution requires such a PIA, with regard to any Risk Impact Assessment already conducted.
To conduct this first step, the Project Owner should define clearly the scope and goals of the Pandemic Tech Solution and the 
characteristics of the envisioned Pandemic Tech Solution. At this stage, many elements need to be considered, but the analysis 
need not be as thorough as at the main assessment. Important criteria to consider are listed in the Table below (note that this list 
is non‑exhaustive and should be adapted to the specific context of the Project Owner). It should be noted that this PIA will need to 
be continuously adjusted as the scientific community confirms the pandemic’s characteristics. The present PIA will also need to be 
adjusted based on evolving knowledge about the impact of any tech solutions on individuals and societies.
At this preliminary stage as well as during the main risk assessment, risks factors should be evaluated based on low to high risk scale 
(low, medium, high). A holistic and contextual approach is recommended. Such an approach should consider the factors in relation to 
one another. For instance, a Pandemic Tech Solution deployed strictly internally to support certain decision‑making processes might be 
said to be, in general, less risky than a citizen‑facing system. However, an internal Pandemic Tech Solution used to evaluate or monitor 
employees might trigger certain labour laws obligations and in consequence be riskier than certain citizen‑facing systems. 
Factors Justifying Need For Impact Assessment Risk Rating(Low, Medium, High) Commentary 
1. What is the context in which the Pandemic Tech Solution will be used or 
deployed? Would this use be citizen‑facing?
2. Does the country have data protection laws or regulation? How does it fare 
on rule of law? Is the Pandemic Tech Solution deployed in an exception legal 
context (state of emergency)?
3. Will the Pandemic Tech Solution be used across legal jurisdiction borders 
(whether they be across federal states or country borders)?
4. Who will be the categories of persons involved in the Pandemic Tech Solution?
5. What is the type and origin of the data that will be used to train the Pandemic 
Tech Solution? Will, in the context of an AI solution, the training data include 
personal information? What is the level of sensitivity of the data? Who are the 
data subjects?
6. What kind of decisions will the Pandemic Tech Solution be making? What 
rights and interests will be at stake? Are those rights fundamental or 
human rights?
7. What is the expected degree of autonomy of the Pandemic Tech Solution? Will, 
for instance, human operators or decision‑makers have oversight on individual 
AI decisions, if any? How frequently will oversight occur? What measures will be 
made to avoid automation bias or anchoring to the Pandemic Tech Solution?
8. What are the technical characteristics of the Pandemic Tech Solution that 
could influence the explainability and auditability of the algorithm? Can the 
Pandemic Tech Solution be explained?
9. What will be the Project Owner’s degree of control and responsibility over 
the finalized Pandemic Tech Solution? Who are the expected contributing 
third parties?




Each row in the following table summarises the key requirements of responsible Pandemic Tech Solution principles and outlines some 
key questions or considerations you should address. See the checklists provided in the attached Appendix 1 for assistance in what 
documents should be consulted and what information should be included in filling out the following table. 









Principle #1: Ethical Purpose and Societal Benefit
Project Owners that develop, deploy or use Pandemic Tech Solution and any national laws that regulate such use should require the purposes 
of such implementation to be identified and ensure that such purposes are consistent with the overall ethical purposes of beneficence and 
non-maleficence, as well as the other principles.
Overview of the Principle
• The Project Owner should review the objectives of the Pandemic Tech Solution, e.g. ensuring consistency in decision‑making, improving 
operational efficiency and reducing costs, or introducing new product features to increase citizen choice. The Project Owner should then weigh 
them against the risks of using the Pandemic Tech Solution in the Project Owner’s decision‑making.
• The Project Owner should gather the key stakeholders required for the discussion/decision, including: 
 – Internal stakeholders (project manager, chief scientist, officer, board member, employees, civil society etc.)
 – External (developer, external data provider, research partner, distributor, etc.)
 – End user (citizen, service user, etc.)
 – Government (public institution, regulatory agency, etc.)
 – Members of vulnerable groups requiring special care (children, disabled persons, people with little technological literacy, etc.)
In determining the level of human oversight, the Project Owner should consider the impact of the decisions of the Pandemic Tech Solution on the 
individual, group of individuals and on society in general. On that basis, the Project Owners should identify the required level of human involvement 
in the decision‑making of the Pandemic Tech Solution.
PART I – GENERAL ASSESSMENT APPLYING TO ALL TECH SOLUTIONS
1. What laws apply to the collection, analysis and use(s) of data?
2. Are there other legal, cross‑border, policy, contractual, industry 
or other obligations linked to the collection, analysis and use(s) 
of data?
3. May the Pandemic Tech Solution be deemed as medical 
device or any other qualification that could entail application 
of other regulation (e.g. medical secrecy) that could modify its 
ethical perception?
4. Does the Pandemic Tech Solution comply with the values, standard 
and policies of the Project Owner?
5. What are the potential reputational and material risks for the 
Project Owner? 
6. Will the deployment or use of the Pandemic Tech Solution affect 
the autonomy of the affected stakeholders?
7. Consider appropriate safeguards to promote the informed 
human agency, autonomy and dignity of employees and to 
avoid inappropriate or destructive impacts on the emotional or 
psychological health of employees (monotony of tasks, excessive 
surveillance, gaming of behavior, continuous exposure to 
horrific content).
8. Consider any other appropriate safeguards that should be assessed, 
as time‑limit, automatic deletion.
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PART II – SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT APPLYING TO AI AND MACHINE-LEARNING BASED SOLUTIONS
9. Consider whether it is achievable from a technological perspective 
to ensure that all possible occurrences should be pre‑decided within 
the Pandemic Tech Solution to ensure consistent behavior.
If this is not the case, consider how the outcomes (aka machine 
behaviours) will be monitored and fed back into the governance and 
oversight framework.
Principle synthesis
• Is the Pandemic Tech Solution compatible with human agency, human autonomy and the respect for fundamental human rights?
• Does the Pandemic Tech Solution comply with the ethical purposes of beneficence and non-maleficence? 
• What are the risks of harm to persons and their rights of this Pandemic Tech Solution? 
 – Should notably be considered as a risk factor the possibility given to individuals to decline to install the solution and to uninstall it/remove it from 
devices.
 – Should also be considered the proportionality of the collection of device data regarding the aims of the solution.
 – Should be considered as well whether the Project Owner has implemented effective measures to ensure human control and oversight on the 
automated decision‑making process of the solution, if any.
 – Should also be investigated the broader impact that use of the solution may have on stakeholders other than the end‑user.
Principle #2: Accountability 
Project Owners that develop, deploy or use Pandemic Tech Solution and any national laws that regulate such use shall respect and adopt the seven 
principles developed in the framework (or other analogous accountability principles). In all instances, humans should remain accountable for the 
acts and omissions of data‑driven systems.
Overview of the Principle — The Project Owner should ensure at all times that it remains accountable for the ethical and responsible deployment of 
Pandemic Tech Solutions that the Project Owner deploys, including by means of “human‑in‑the‑loop” or “human‑over‑the‑loop” deployment.
PART I – GENERAL ASSESSMENT APPLYING TO ALL TECH SOLUTIONS
1. Is the Pandemic Tech Solution centralized or decentralized?
2. What is the level of internal support, including financial, for the 
Pandemic Tech Solution?
3. Who will be accountable within the Project Owner with regards to 
the Pandemic Tech Solution? Is there a central coordinating body? 
Who will be accountable within the Project Owner upon failure 
of the Pandemic Tech Solution, or upon production of adverse 
outcomes for its users?
4. What are the roles played by the Project Owner within the Pandemic 
Tech Solution pipeline (end‑user, developer, data provider, etc.)?
5. Is there an independent commissioner committed to the review 
and control of such Pandemic Tech Solutions? (e.g. governmental 
agency, designated official)
6. Will the staff be trained to use the Pandemic Tech Solution? Are the 
relevant personnel and/or departments fully aware of their roles and 
responsibilities?
This inquiry should account for different types of staff and the 
different layers of personnel involved in the design of the Pandemic 













7. How will the internal use of the Pandemic Tech Solution by the 
Project Owner affect the roles and tasks of employees?
8. What elements of the training and development “supply chain” have 
been outsourced? If handed off to a third party, are their services 
subject to the same levels of quality control as the Project Owner?
9. To what extent does the Pandemic Tech Solution rely on third 
party data/systems input? How accountable are those third‑party 
dependencies?
10. Have external QA/QC control methodologies been observed in the 
creation of the Pandemic Tech Solution (i.e. ISO 9001)?
PART II – SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT APPLYING TO AI AND MACHINE-LEARNING BASED SOLUTIONS
11. If applicable, how will the AI model training and selection process 
be managed?
12. If applicable, consider maintenance, monitoring, documentation 
and review of the AI models that have been deployed.
13. If applicable, consider the various degrees of human oversight in 
the decision‑making process:
a)  Human­in­the­Loop: This model suggests that human 
oversight is active and involved, with the human retaining full 
control and the AI only providing recommendations or input. 
Decisions cannot be exercised without affirmative actions by 
the human, such as a human command to proceed with a 
given decision. 
(NB: Considering here also the concept of “Human in the 
Loophole” where there is automation bias, anchoring or 
confirmation bias in respect of the human operative. The 
human essentially affirming the AI outcome without critically 
assessing whether it is correct or not).
b)  Human­out­of­the­Loop: This model suggests that there is 
no human oversight over the execution of decisions. AI has full 
control without the option of human override. 
c)  Human­over­the­Loop: This model allows humans to adjust 
parameters during the execution of the algorithm.
14. Does the Pandemic Tech Solution involve development, 
deployment or use of an AI solution or a combination of the three? 
15. What are the rights and interests at stake when the Pandemic 
Tech Solution makes an automated decision?
Principle synthesis 
• Should notably be considered the governance of the Pandemic Tech Solution and whether it ensures the respect of rights and interests of 
the users.
• Should also be considered the safeguards implemented to ensure independence of the Pandemic Tech Solution.
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Principle #3: Transparency and Explainability
Project Owners that develop, deploy or use Pandemic Tech Solution systems and any national laws that regulate such use shall ensure that, to 
the extent reasonable given the circumstances and state of the art of the technology, such use is transparent and that the decision outcomes of 
the data-driven system are explainable.
Overview of the Principle
• The Project Owner should ensure at all times that the Pandemic Tech Solution is transparent, including by means of notifying affected 
stakeholders of: a) the fact that a Pandemic Tech Solution is being used; b) the intended purposes of the Pandemic Tech Solution; and c) the 
identity of an individual who can respond to questions regarding the Pandemic Tech Solution. Transparency can be reinforced through the 
concepts of explainability, repeatability and traceability. 
• The intensity of the transparency and explainability obligations will depend on a variety of factors, including the nature of the data involved, the 
result of the decision and its consequences for the affected individual. 
Project Owners that develop Pandemic Tech Solution should ensure that the system architecture, algorithmic logic, data sets, testing methods, and 
all related development and operational policies and procedures serve to embed transparency and explainability by design. 
PART I – GENERAL ASSESSMENT APPLYING TO ALL TECH SOLUTIONS
1. Are clear and readable Terms of Use provided to users of the 
Pandemic Tech Solution?
2. Do the Terms of Use include data sharing mechanisms? Are there 
any inconsistencies between what is stated in the Terms of Use and 
the identified functioning of the Pandemic Tech Solution?
3. Is a Privacy Policy available?
4. Does the Project Owner provide information on the scale of 
adoption? Is there such information available outside of the Project 
Owner?
5. Is the Project Owner transparent about the outcomes of the 
Pandemic Tech Solution? (e.g. false positive or false negative rates of 
a contact‑tracing app…)
6. Does the Project Owner know what data is used in the Pandemic 
Tech Solution and how that data is used to arrive at a decision? 
Would the Project Owner be able to explain the Pandemic Tech 
Solution to the public?
7. Does the original data include proprietary information?
8. Does the original data include anonymised or synthetic data? Would 
the Pandemic Tech Solution outcome be more accurate/beneficial/
less risk of bias if it had included personal information?
9. Does the original data include personal information?
10. Is the Pandemic Tech Solution auditable? Auditability refers to the 
readiness of a Pandemic Tech Solution to undergo an assessment 
of its algorithms, data and design processes.
11. Is the Pandemic Tech Solution robust? Robustness refers to the 
ability of a computer system to cope with errors during execution 
and erroneous input, and is assessed by the degree to which a 
system or component can function correctly in the presence of 
invalid input or stressful environmental conditions.
12. Is the Project Owner able or prepared to undertake an assessment 
of the Pandemic Tech Solution to identify the cause of any 













PART II – SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT APPLYING TO AI AND MACHINE-LEARNING BASED SOLUTIONS
13. What is the general degree of opacity of the Pandemic Tech 
Solution? (ie to what degree could it be described as a "black box")
14. What type of AI model was used to create the Pandemic Tech 
Solution, if any?
15. Is it possible for a specialist to understand how the Pandemic 
Tech Solution makes its decisions and how it reached a specific 
conclusion in a specific case?
16. Consider designing the Pandemic Tech Solution from the 
most fundamental level upwards to promote transparency and 
explainability by design. 
17. What are the risks for the rights and interests of stakeholders of 
unexplainable AI decisions, if any?
18. What are the transparency and explainability expectations of the 
different stakeholders?
19. What is the degree of sophistication of the persons due to receive 
the explanation (AI specialist, lay‑person, educated lay‑person, etc.)?
20. How useful would be this data for persons outside the Project 
Owner to understand the AI system and its decisions? Would end‑
users be incentivised or able to game the Pandemic Tech Solution, 
if aware of the solution’s decision‑making process?
21. Is the Pandemic Tech Solution explainable? The Project Owner 
should be able to explain to a third party how the Pandemic Tech 
Solution’s algorithms function and/or how the decision making 
process incorporates model prediction.
22. Is the Pandemic Tech Solution repeatable? Repeatability refers to 
the ability to consistently perform an action or make a decision, 
given the same scenario. The consistency in performance could 
provide AI users with a certain degree of confidence.
23. Is the Pandemic Tech Solution reproducible? Reproducibility 
refers to the ability of an independent verification team to 
produce the same results using the same AI method based on the 
documentation made by the Project Owner.
24. Is the Pandemic Tech Solution traceable? A Pandemic Tech 
Solution is considered to be traceable if its decision‑making 
processes are documented in an easily understandable way.
Principle synthesis
• Should notably be assessed the documentation available to users and the degree of clarity of such documentation.
• Should notably be highlighted any opacity of whole or part of the Pandemic Tech Solution. 
• Should also be summarized the choices made by Project Owner regarding datasets used for the Pandemic Tech Solution.
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Principle #4: Fairness and Non­Discrimination
Project Owners that develop, deploy or use Pandemic Tech Solution and any national laws or internationally recognized standards that regulate 
such use shall ensure the non-discrimination of data-driven outcomes, and shall promote appropriate and effective measures to safeguard 
fairness in use.
Overview of the Principle
• The use of the Pandemic Tech Solution should be non‑discriminatory in terms of accessibility. The Pandemic Tech Solution should be accessible 
also to people with disabilities (such as, for instance, limited visual capacity). 
• Decisions based on the Pandemic Tech Solution should be fair and non‑discriminatory, judged against the same standards as decision‑making 
processes conducted entirely by humans. AI development should be designed to prioritize fairness. 
• This would involve addressing algorithms and data bias from an early stage with a view to ensuring fairness and non‑discrimination.
PART I – GENERAL ASSESSMENT APPLYING TO ALL TECH SOLUTIONS
1. Is the data high quality data? The following factors should be 
assessed:
 – the accuracy of the dataset, in terms of how well the values 
in the dataset match the true characteristics of the entities 
described by the dataset;
 – the completeness of the dataset, both in terms of attributes 
and items;
 – the veracity of the dataset, which refers to how credible the data is, 
including whether the data originated from a reliable source;
 – how recently the dataset was compiled or updated;
 – the relevance of the dataset and the context for data collection, 
as it may affect the interpretation of and reliance on the data for 
the intended purpose;
 – the integrity of the dataset that has been joined from multiple 
datasets, which refers to how well extraction and transformation 
have been performed;
 – the usability of the dataset, including how well the dataset is 
structured in a machine‑understandable form; 
 – the usability of any personal information contained within the 
data sets, including with regards to obtaining any requisite 
consents; and
 – human interventions, e.g. if any human has filtered, applied labels, 
or edited the data.
2. Consider minimizing inherent bias:
 – Selection Bias: This bias occurs when the data used to produce 
the Pandemic Tech Solution are not fully representative of the 
actual data or environment that the Pandemic Tech Solution 
may receive or function in. Common examples of selection bias in 
datasets are omission bias and stereotype bias.
 – Measurement Bias: This bias occurs when the data collection 
device causes the data to be systematically skewed in a 
particular direction.
 – The following factors should be assessed:
• the frequency with which the dataset is reviewed and updated;
• the diversity of the dataset, and the variety of sources from 
which the data has been collected (i.e., numeric, text, audio, 
visual, transactional etc.); and
• the usability of different datasets, including how those datasets 
have been matched and cleaned so that relational datasets can 
be correlated and linked.
3. Is the Pandemic Tech Solution making automated decisions 
affecting the rights and interests of individuals or businesses
 – Should notably be considered whether the Pandemic Tech 
Solution may have consequence for the user to suffer differential 
treatment which would otherwise be prohibited under any 
applicable law.













5. Is there rigorous testing of the Pandemic Tech Solution, both before 
use and periodically afterwards, to ensure that there is no disparate 
impact on a protected class of individuals?
6. May the Pandemic Tech Solution exclude some categories of 
people from using it? 
 – Have design features contemplated needs of the elderly 
(for example, ease of use)? 
 – Have design features contemplated the needs of people with 
disabilities:
See: World Wide Web Consortium's Web Accessibility Initiative
7. Does the Project Owner have in place a system to respond to 
and resolve situations in which the Pandemic Solution produces 
discriminatory or unfair outcomes? 
 – This should encompass the Project Owners’ capacity to 
assess and identify biased datasets, potential relief measures 
provided to end‑users and any scope to re‑design the 
Pandemic Tech Solution.
PART II – SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT APPLYING TO AI AND MACHINE-LEARNING BASED SOLUTIONS
8. What methodologies have been applied and used in the training of 
the Pandemic Tech Solution?
9. Does the Pandemic Tech Solution have a fixed learning phase 
followed by static use phase or does it continuously improve? If the 
latter, how are improvements filtered for bias, quality etc.?
10. What are the risks of bias in 1) the algorithm, 2) the training data, 
3) the human developers, 4) end‑users?
11. What are the reputational risks for the Project Owners of the 
Pandemic Tech Solution making biased automated decisions?
12. How are “edge cases” managed by the Pandemic Tech Solution?
13. Is the data used for the training of the Pandemic Tech Solution 
representative of the population about which the Pandemic Tech 
Solution will make decisions (data accuracy, data quality and 
data‑completeness)?
14. Does the Project Owner have an established and robust selection 
process in relation to the datasets training the Pandemic Tech 
Solution? For example, are there minimum requirements as to the 
diversity and quality of the datasets used?
15. Does the Pandemic Tech Solution use different datasets for 
training, testing and validation?
Weighting Bias: This bias occurs when the data used by the 
AI Solution are attributed differing weights in producing the 
relevant outcome. The datasets might be afforded greater or lesser 
value, which might be arbitrarily or inaccurately awarded.
Principle synthesis
• Summarize inherent biases of the Pandemic Tech Solution, if any.
• Should notably be assessed any identified discrimination or potential restriction of use for certain categories of persons. 
• Should notably be addressed the risk of having derivative misusage of the Pandemic Tech Solution.
1 Précité, note 11.
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Principle #5: Safety and Reliability
Project Owners that develop, deploy or use Pandemic Tech Solution and any national laws that regulate such use shall adopt design regimes and 
standards ensuring high safety and reliability of data-driven systems on one hand while limiting the exposure of developers and deployers on the 
other hand.
Overview of the Principle
The Project Owner should test the Pandemic Tech Solution thoroughly to ensure that it reliably adheres, in operation, to the underpinning ethical 
and moral principles and has been trained with data which are curated and are as ‘error‑free’ as practicable, given the circumstances.
PART I – GENERAL ASSESSMENT APPLYING TO ALL TECH SOLUTIONS
1. In case the Project Owner does not hold international recognized 
information security certifications (such as ISO/IEC 27001), what is the 
current level of the security measures adopted? 
It should notably be assessed the following measures: security 
incident detection, response and management, business continuity 
plans, change management policies.
2. What is the Project Owner’s history of data breaches and incidents? 
How has the Project Owner responded to data breaches and 
incidents in the past?
3. What are the cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities of the Pandemic 
Tech Solution? Who is at risk of harm? What preventative measures 
are in place?
4. Regarding people accessing the data, is confidentiality ensured?
5. What are possibilities for subversion of intended use? (i.e. where the 
technology is capable of “dual use”)
6. What are the safety and reliability expectations of the clients and 
what are their level of sophistication?1
7. What information relating to secure software development and 
implementation of encryption measures at rest and in transit are 
provided?
8. What are the availability and effectiveness of redress mechanisms?
PART II – SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT APPLYING TO AI AND MACHINE-LEARNING BASED SOLUTIONS
9. What are the risks of a technical failure of the Pandemic Tech 
Solution? What are the risks of inaccurate results, polluted datasets, 
and misuse?2
Principle synthesis
• Should notably be summarized and assessed all the technical and organizational measures taken to ensure the safety of the Pandemic Tech 
Solution. 
1 Supra note 11. 
2 Supra note 5.
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Principle #6: Open Data, Fair Competition and Intellectual Property
Project Owners that develop, deploy or use data-driven systems and any national laws that regulate such use shall promote open source and 
decentralized frameworks. Project Owners that develop, deploy or use Pandemic Tech Solution should take necessary steps to protect the rights 
in the resulting works through appropriate and directed application of existing intellectual property rights laws.
Overview of the Principle
• The Project Owner should assess how its Pandemic Tech Solution and its outputs can be used in other pandemic situation or by other 
Project Owner.
• Project Owners must be allowed to protect rights in Pandemic Tech Solution. However, care needs to be taken not to take steps which will 
amount to overprotection, as this could prove detrimental to the ultimate goal of IP protection.
1. Is the Pandemic Tech Solution open‑source?
2. Are some use restrictions made clearly public? (e.g. for open‑source 
solutions)
3. Does the Pandemic Tech Solution offer portability easily?
4. What is the scope of interoperability with tech solutions offered 
by other providers?
5. When developing “heat maps” or related projects, are data sharing 
is based on anonymized data?
6. Is the data generated by the Pandemic Tech Solution reusable for 
other public interest (data for good) projects?
7. What are the ownership or intellectual property rights attaching to 
the Pandemic Tech Solution?
8. Are there any compulsory licensing or patent rights issues relating 
to the Pandemic Tech Solution?
9. Have the intellectual property rights attaching to the Pandemic 
Tech Solution been made publicly available (i.e., turning the 
underlying code into an open source program)?
10. Alternatively, are there any obligations or expectations around 
the provision of the underlying code or software to the public or 
government entities? If so, will there be any measures regarding 
adequate remuneration for Project Owners that make such 
contributions?
Principle synthesis 
• Summarize the rights and restrictions attached to the use of the Pandemic Tech Solution.
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Project Owners that develop, deploy or use Pandemic Tech Solution and any national laws that regulate such use shall endeavour to ensure that 
data-driven systems are compliant with privacy norms and regulations, taking into account the unique characteristics of data-driven systems, 
and the evolution of standards on privacy.
Overview of the Principle
The Project Owner should consider implementing operational safeguards to protect privacy such as privacy by design principles that are specifically 
tailored to the specific features of deployed the Pandemic Tech Solution.
1. Are the principles of necessity, proportionality and data minimization 
fully integrated?
2. What privacy by design measures have been implemented?
3. Are personal data that are being collected by the Pandemic 
Tech Solution used for any secondary purposes during or after 
the pandemic? Are secondary use of data compatible with initial 
purposes, if any?
4. How are transfers of data of the Pandemic Tech Solution outside of 
the EU/national/regional frontier organized? 
5. What is the Project Owner’s lawful basis for processing personal 
information? What measures does the Project Owner take to ensure 
compliance? 
6. Who were the data subjects? What type of information was collected 
about them? What is the scope of the consents obtained?
7. Do they include children or other vulnerable groups? Are there prior 
concerns over this type of processing or security flaws?
8. What is the nature of the Project Owner’s relationship with the data 
subjects? How much control will they have? Would they expect you 
to use their data in this way?
9. Is sensitive data collected? If so, are there higher standards being 
adopted for protection of this kind of data?
10. How was the data used by the Pandemic Tech Solution collected 
and stored? Was the data transferred by third parties or will the 
data be transferred to third parties?
 – Consider whether preprocessing activity has been done on the 
data before the analysis and whether it would have affected the 
accuracy and appropriateness of individuals
11. Are there viable alternatives to the use of personal information? 
(e.g. anonymization or synthetic data If so, what mechanisms/
techniques are implemented to prevent from re‑identification?
12. Consider if the data is provided by the individual (originated in 
direct action taken by the individual) and whether: 
 – The data is initiated (the product of individuals taking an action 
that begins a relationship) 
 – The data is transactional (created when the individual is involved 
in a transaction) 














13. Consider if the data is observed (created as the result of individuals 
being observed and recorded), whether:
 – The data is engaged (instances in which individuals are aware of 
observation at some point in time) 
 – The data is not anticipated (instances in which individuals are 
aware there are sensors but have little awareness that sensors 
are creating data pertaining to the individuals) 
 – The data is passive (instances in which it is very difficult for 
the individuals to be aware they are being observed and data 
pertaining to observation of them is being created)
14. Consider if the data is derived (created in a mechanical fashion 
from other data and becomes a new data element related to the 
individual), whether: 
 – The data is computational (creation of a new data element 
through an arithmetic process executed on existing numeric 
elements) 
 – The data is notational (creation of a new data element by 
classifying individuals as being part of a group based on 
common attributes shown by members of the group)
15. Consider if the data is inferred (product of a probability‑based 
analytic process), whether: 
 – The data is statistical (the product of characterization based on a 
statistical process) 
 – The data is advanced analytical (the product of an advanced 
analytical process)3
16. Beyond the data subjects’ privacy, may the privacy of an identified 
group be at risk?
17. Are there procedures for reviewing data retention and performing 
destruction of data used by the Pandemic Tech Solution? Are there 
oversight mechanisms in place?
18. Does the Pandemic Tech Solution provide a functionality allowing 
the user to “turn‑off” the app for a limited time?
Principle synthesis
• Summarize how personal data protection and privacy principles are 
addressed by Project Owner:
 – Data subjects;
 – Categories of data;
 – Rights and exercise;
 – Potential conflict with Group Privacy. 
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4. RISK ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 
This section describes the risks you’ve identified through the PIA process and how you propose to mitigate and manage those 
risks. It can be useful to link this back to the principles to show why these risks and the proposed actions are relevant. Document 
the risks  in  line  with  any existing risk management processes the Project Owner has – it will be more efficient than trying to run 
a separate process.
5. RISK MITIGATION ACTION PLAN
This section describes how you propose to mitigate and manage the risks previously described. In some cases, it may be helpful to 
categorize these actions into areas such as: Governance / People / Process / Technology.
Please provide details of all such strategies. Also, please identify the likelihood (low, medium, or high) of this risk happening and the 
degree of impact it would have on individuals if it occurred. You can use the form of table below. 
Risk Mitigation Table
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As part of the PostCoviData project conducted by the Human Technology Foundation, the summaries 
of the PIA Study Reports reproduced in this appendix have been prepared based on a review of publicly 
available documents by members of the ITechLaw Association who are cited as contributors to each 
of the  respective documents. The contributors participated in this project in their personal capacities. 
Accordingly, the views expressed in the summaries of the PIA Study Reports do not reflect those of the law 
firms or other entities with which they may be affiliated. The contributors have worked diligently to ensure 
that the information contained in the PIA Study Reports is accurate at the time of publication. The publisher 
will be pleased to receive information that will assist in correcting any inadvertent errors or omissions.
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FACTORS JUSTIFYING NEED FOR IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT
• COVI Canada App (“COVI App”) is a decentralized 
contact tracing and risk assessment mobile 
application developed by a consortium led by the 
Montreal Institute of Learning Algorithms (“MILA”).
• The application is designed to provide contact 
tracing among users, to assess their risk of 
COVID‑19 infection and provide them with recom‑
mendations in relation to current behaviour or 
changes in risk level. It also aims at providing 
governmental authorities with aggregated infor‑
mation about contagion risks to assist them 
in designing more effective responses to the 
pandemic.
• Instead of providing a binary assessment (yes/
no) of whether the individual has been in contact 
with another individual who has been diagnosed 
COVID‑19, the AI/ML solution developed by 
MILA calculates the overall likelihood of users’ 
exposure to COVID‑19 (the “risk score”), based on 
demographic, health and behaviour information 
provided by the user, official diagnoses if available, 
and the risk scores of other users in the network. 
To  the best of our knowledge, COVI is the only 
contact tracing app that is seeking to send multi‑
level risk messages.
• This solution allows copies of the application 
installed on users’ devices to send and receive 
risk scores through a private messaging system. 
If official diagnoses become available, and a 
user tests positive as validated by public health 
authorities, other users who came into proximity 
with that user will be contacted through the 
private messaging system. The app will send a 
message that does not indicate time or place of 
contact informing these other users that they 
are at heightened risk and giving appropriate 
proposed courses of action, such as beginning to 
monitor symptoms.
• It prompts the user for a health status, pre‑existing 
conditions and demographic parameters via an 
auto‑diagnostics questionnaire. It then combines 
that information with GPS and bluetooth tracking 
to propose personalized non‑binary recommen‑
ded actions and tips. It uses a machine learning 
algorithm that predicts risk‑based per sonalized 
actions to the user. It is also a platform to share 
confirmed positive COVID‑19 diagnostics that 
would then propagate into the network of 
contacts to update the risk kevel and associ‑
ated recommendations to all concerned users. 
Through the combination of GPS and Bluetooth 
handshakes, positive diagnostics and a machine 
learning algorithm it seeks to modify individual 
behavior to isolate (self‑imposed confinement) 
To be read in conjunction with Privacy Impact Assessment and whitepaper for COVI Canada App 
(“COVI App”).
Montreal Institute of Learning Algorithms ‑ MILA
COVI Canada App 
PostCoviData Impact Assessment (“PIA”)
June 1, 2020 
ItechLaw Evaluation Committee 
Charles Morgan, McCarthy Tétrault LLP
Manuel Morales, Université de Montréal 
Allison Marchildon, Université de Sherbrooke
© ItechLaw Association 2020, CC‑BY‑SA
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of high‑risk individuals as new positive cases and 
their associated person‑to‑person contagion path 
emerges. 
• The system utilises a hybrid decentralised of 
data storage and analysis. Most of the data is 
stored directly on the users’ mobile devices. 
The information collected by the application 
will only be accessed by the MILA data trust in 
pseudonymous form in order to train and refine its 
machine learning‑based risk assessment model, 
understand how widely the application has been 
adopted and how its features are being used, 
and determine whether the recommendations 
made are having an impact on a user’s risk score. 
De‑identified, aggregated data based on this 
information can be provided to government for 
epidemiological analysis and strategic planning. 
Geolocation data for contract tracing is exchan‑
ged through a private messaging system and 
protected from retracing by an encryption system.
• According to the COVI White Paper, “The pseu‑
donymized data and geographical zone risk 
packets necessary for training predictive statistical 
and epidemiological models will be stored in a 
secured server with restricted access to selected 
AI researchers who will train these models. This 
machine will not be managed by the government; 
[MILA is] in the process of setting up COVI Canada, 
a not‑for‑profit organization focused on managing 
these data according to the highest standards 
of  good governance and with the sole mandate 
to  protect Canadians’ health, well‑being, dignity 
and privacy.”
• The relevant data subjects will be individual 
citizens who have installed the COVI App (initially 
in Canada, primarily in Quebec).
•  The COVI App will process data on the basis of 
consent; its use will be voluntary.
• Main regulatory requirements: Compliance with 
applicable privacy and data protections laws in 
the jurisdictions in which it is deployed. In Canada, 
these include Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 
(“PIPEDA”); An Act respecting the Protection of 
Personal Information in the Private Sector, R.S.Q. 
1993, c. P‑39.1 (“Quebec ARPPIPS”), Personal Infor‑
mation Protection Act (British Columbia), S.B.C. 
2003, c. 63 (“BC PIPA”); Personal Information 
Protection Act (Alberta), S.A. 2003, c. P‑6.5 (“Alberta 
PIPA”);
• Main ethical concerns: Privacy; Right not to be 
discriminated against; freedom of movement 
• Although COVI App will be used to create a 
risk  score for individuals, such information will 
not  be used to make decisions about the indivi‑
duals; rather it will be used (anonymously) to 
provide individuals with information that can 
help them reduce risks of harm for themselves 
and others
• Auditability is yet to be confirmed, but the source 
code will be made open source and publicly 
available for scrutiny.
• The impact of COVI App data processing 
activity is significant – it will enable citizens 
who have  sufficiently uptodate smartphones 
to  understand the risk of whether they have 
been in  contact with other infected (or poten‑
tially infected) individuals and remove them 
from  the  chain of infection by means of 
notifying them to self isolate and recommending 
actions to mitigate against risk, including self­
isolation.
PRINCIPLE 1 – ETHICAL PURPOSE & 
SOCIETAL BENEFIT
• Generally, use of the app is intended to help 
flatten the epidemiological curve of local COVID‑19 
epidemics and avoid new outbreaks by assisting 
with contact tracing, while protecting individual 
privacy.
• In particular, it is designed to be used on a voluntary 
basis and does not rely on tracing individual 
movement, but rather on proximity information 
regarding with respect to other users.




 – Users will have opportunities to provide express 
consent at several points during the data flow 
process, in order to control what information is 
collected and to whom it is disclosed.
 – Moreover, the users can delete the app and 
their data at any given time (i.e. can remove 
their consent). Upon deletion, the algorithm is 
retrained and all data associated to a user is fully 
removed from the app and the aggregate data 
provided to public health authorities.
 – Instead of providing a binary assessment (yes/no) 
of whether the individual has been in contact 
with another individual who has been diagnosed 
COVID‑19, the AI/ML solution developed by 
MILA calculates the overall likelihood of users’ 
exposure to COVID‑19 (the “risk score”), based on 
demographic, health and behaviour information 
provided by the user, official diagnoses if 
available, and the risk scores of other users in the 
network.
 – There is a concern that providing the risk 
score in numerical form could have negative 
consequences (e.g., creating panic in a user 
with a high score or providing an abusive partner 
with a “control point” to monitor the behaviour 
of their spouse). Instead, COVI App will provide 
information and recommendations in response 
to changes in the risk score. This approach 
intended to empower the user, putting them in 
a position to adopt the appropriate behaviours 
in response to their level of risk. Given that the 
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user’s risk score is itself partially a function of 
the risk scores of other individuals, providing 
recommendations rather than a numerical score 
adds one further layer of obfuscation, thereby 
lowering the possibility of making inferences 
about the risk scores of other users.
PRINCIPLE 2 – ACCOUNTABILITY
• The pseudonymized data necessary for training 
predictive statistical and epidemiological models 
will be stored in a secured server with restricted 
access to selected AI researchers who will train 
these models. 
• This machine will not be managed by the 
government; [MILA is] in the process of setting up 
a COVI Canada not‑for‑profit data trust specifically 
to manage these data.”
• According to the COVI White Paper, “COVI Canada 
will have open rules about its governance, 
open  access to the code and aggregated epi‑
demio logical models, and would be conti‑
nuously monitored by  its board, internal experts 
committees, and external evaluations from inde‑
pendent academic groups and governmental 
representatives, to make sure that it stays faithful 
to its mission. COVI Canada’s entire governance 
model is built around the core values of legitimacy, 
accountability, transparency, and efficiency. […] 
COVI Canada’s single mission of supporting 
Canadians in their fight against COVID‑19 and 
not‑for‑profit nature ensure the data collected 
will never be used for commercial purposes, nor 
sold to private companies. It cannot be used for 
surveillance or to enforce quarantine by govern‑
ments. The data is all stored in Canada and will be 
deleted as soon as the pandemic is over.” 
PRINCIPLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY & 
EXPLAINABILITY
• Users will be all members of the general public 
without any heightened technical sophistication.
• According to the COVI Whitepaper, in order to 
help ensure key components of the terms and 
conditions are “well understood by users, not just 
agreed to haphazardly, [the terms are pre sen‑
ted] using a multi‑layered, progressive disclosure 
approach, which has been shown to balance user 
experience and system transparency. For example, 
a graphics‑heavy top layer illustrating privacy 
implications can link to a somewhat more textual 
second‑layer this can then link to the longer FAQ 
section on the website, which in turn sends users 
to the full privacy policy.”
• According to the COVI Whitepaper, user compre‑
hension is verified rather than assumed: “First, 
we apply in‑app analytics to estimate users’ 
comprehension for example, by looking at the 
average user dropout at various layers of disclosure 
information. Second, we administer dynamic 
comprehension quizzes to a random sample of 
users, allowing us to understand what information 
has and has not been internalized. Finally, disclo‑
sure tools are iteratively revised based on the 
feedback from these measures, to ensure they 
best cater to actual user behaviour.” 
• The output of the model can be explained and 
decisions can be audited. The user does not 
receive specific information as to how the risk 
assessment is calculated. The user will only receive 
personalized recommendations and tips that get 
updated as more information is available. 
• Mila will make available a web page dedicated to 
this app (where the privacy policy will be available 
to app users), where it will explain how individuals 
may submit a complaint about Mila’s handling of 
their personal information in relation to the app.
PRINCIPLE 4 – FAIRNESS & 
NON‑DISCRIMINATION
• The data used will be a combination of user‑
reported and automatically generated data from 
the users devices. The extent to which the data will 
be “representative” will depend on the number 
of users and their relative demographic and 
geographic details. It is estimated that the contact 
tracing component of the COVI App will require 
an uptake rate of 60% of the general populace to 
ensure efficacy and accuracy. For the AI‑aspect 
(aggregate data, epidemiological models, etc.), 
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MILA estimates that the minimal percentage 
of download required is much lower, namely 
approximately 10%.
• Marginalized groups are both the most likely to be 
affected and the least likely to be able to access and 
use a tool such as COVI. For this reason, MILA has 
indicated that the composition of the governance 
structure for the Covi Canada data trust will 
also be submitted to strong inclusion practices 
(i.e. representation of civil society, including vulne‑
rable groups). Moreover, the algorithm will be 
trained to ensure the absence of biases and will be 
submitted to third party, independent algorithmic 
impact assessment, including on the front of 
diversity and inclusion.
PRINCIPLE 5 – SAFETY & RELIABILITY
• As a private messaging network that permits 
direct user input of demographic information, 
health conditions and symptoms, accuracy of risk 
assessment (and hence recommended actions 
to take) cannot be guaranteed if users enter false 
data about themselves. Risk scores propagated 
through the solution can be affected by such 
false entries but unless large numbers of users are 
dishonest (as a proportion of all users), mischief by 
individuals will not have significant effects. 
• If a user receives an official diagnosis, a special 
token or one‑time password will be given to the 
user by the health authority. In other words, 
such diagnoses will be validated by public health 
authorities and not self‑reported.
• Residual Risks: Several premeditated attack 
scenarios have been identified by the develop‑
ers as residual risks inherent to any automatic 
contact tracing system where account creation is 
unrestricted.
• Our view is that these risks largely require a "tech 
savvy" and malicious bad actor. 
• The above points must be viewed in the context 
of  use of the app by the general populace. Levels 
of technological sophistication must be assessed 
as low. Users will treat the app Tech Solution as 
they would any other app on their phone, however 
additional trust levels may be presumed as the 
app will be released with input and approvals 
from public health authorities. Expectations of 
safety, protection from harm and reliability of the 
Tech Solution will therefore be extremely high. 
Furthermore, it should be made absolutely clear 
that the App is not a medical device and (despite 
the notifications and recommendations) does not 
provide/is not a substitute for obtaining medical. 
As a result of all these considerations, we are 
concerned at the potential for a mismatch in 
terms of actual safety and reliability levels and 
public expectations.
•  Our recommendation is that a program of 
public awareness and education should be im‑
plemented in a manner befitting of the wide 
spectrum of public consumption.  
PRINCIPLE 6 – OPEN DATA, FAIR 
COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
• The solution has been designed to interoperate 
internationally.
• The solution will be made available subject to 
an open source license. The type of open source 
licensing model to be adopted has not yet been 
identified.
PRINCIPLE 7 ‑ PRIVACY
• Privacy by design is built into the architecture of 
the COVI App
• Pseudonymized data will be transferred to the 
COVI Canada data trust for assessing risk score.
• According to the COVI White paper, in order 
to further improve user privacy, risk levels are 
quantized to 4 bits of precision before being 
exchanged.
• When a phone sends a message to another 
phone via the cryptographic servers, the receiver 
will not know from which phone (neither phone 
number nor IP address) the message comes 
from. To provide additional protection against 
stigmatization, these messages are sent with a 
random delay of up to a day.
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• The information collected by the application will 
only be accessed by the COVI Canada data trust in 
pseudonymous form in order to train and refine its 
machine learning‑based risk assessment model, 
understand how widely the application has been 
adopted and how its features are being used, 
and determine whether the recommendations 
made are having an impact on a user’s risk score. 
De‑identified, aggregated data based on this 
information can be provided to government for 
epidemiological analysis and strategic planning. 
Geolocation data for contract tracing is exchanged 
through a private messaging system and protec‑
ted from retracing by an encryption system.
• Geolocation and timestamp data needed to 
provide the contact tracing function will be local‑
ly encrypted at rest on the device (as are all data 
collected by the application), hashed using a one‑
way hashing function immediately upon collec‑
tion, and the original information will be discar‑
ded. Additional obfuscation methods will be 
deployed, either at launch or as rapidly as possible 
there after, to further limit the potential for oppor‑
tunistic attempts to re‑identify individuals from 
contact traces, whether by users of the system or 
by govern ment actors.
• Much of the data collected is also deleted on an 
ongoing basis, namely :
 – Data in users’ phones is deleted at the latest 
30 days after its collection;
 – Data used to train the algorithm is deleted at the 
latest 90 days after its collection;
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To be read in conjunction with main PIA for DP‑3T.
FACTORS JUSTIFYING NEED FOR 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
• DP‑3T is a decentralised protocol for a contract 
tracing app hosted on Apple (iOS) and Google 
(Android) smartphoes which is designed to 
facilitate contact tracing in the general populace. 
It proposes an architecture which is capable of 
international deployment.
• The risk assessment for DP‑3T (as a protocol) 
is contingent upon national implementations 
of the technology. As such the countries which 
take it up may have differing legal contexts and 
backgrounds, including in relation to general rules 
of law. As currently envisaged, DP‑3T is primarily 
focussed on EU and European countries (including 
non‑EU members such as the UK and Norway), 
all of which have mature democratic legal princi‑
ples, established consistent data protection laws 
and laws preventing discrimination. Assessment 
of risks for countries outside this cohort is un‑
quantifiable until further information on those 
countries' legislative and geopolitical contexts is 
provided.
• Data Protection (GDPR and associated legislation 
such as ePrivacy directive); laws applicable to 
the   use of telecommunications networks; laws 
appli cable to privacy, individual and mass surveil‑
lance will all be relevant to the use of DP‑3T based 
apps.
• The main ethical concerns around the use of 
DP‑3T based apps include Privacy, the Right not to 
be discriminated against, Freedom of Movement, 
Human Autonomy, Human Agency, Prevention 
from Harm, new kinds of discrimination associated 
with having the App or not having the App (not 
necessarily covered by existing equality laws), 
societal impact on trust (of provider and of co‑
users), and the right not to have an inference made 
about an individual or group of individuals
• DP‑3T does not use AI or Machine Learning. 
Never theless, we do expect there to be a degree 
of Automated Decision Making in the roll‑out of 
the national decentralised solution(s) which may 
invoke Article 22 of GDPR.
• The relevant Data Subjects will be individual 
citizens who have opted into use of the DP‑3T app. 
Data types are pseudo randomised EphID BT LE 
(Bluetooth Low Energy) data packets gene rated 
by mobile phones. Data used could in very limited 
cases (particularly in the decentralised delinked 
operating model proposed in the DP‑3T White 
Paper Design 1) be reconstituted pseudo nomised 
data.
• Although the technological notification package 
of information sent when an individual is deemed 
infected itself contains no health data, the noti‑
fication event could potentially be seen as health 
data or inferred health data, because only data 
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of COVID‑19 positive persons, as confirmed by 
a healthcare professional, are uploaded to the 
backend server.
• DP‑3T can be explained clearly – there is no issue of 
opacity in the solution as it is based on conventional 
BT LE communication between mobile phone 
handsets. Auditability is yet to be confirmed, but 
is based on open source code which is publicly 
available for scrutiny.
• The impact of DP‑3T app data processing activity 
is significant – it will enable citizens to understand 
whether they have been in contact with other 
infected individuals and potentially remove them 
from the chain of infection by self isolation. In 
short, the processing will enable countries to 
better manage and mitigate the impact of their 
local COVID‑19 epidemics  
PRINCIPLE 1 – ETHICAL PURPOSE & 
SOCIETAL BENEFIT
• DP‑3T as conceptualised could be said to be com‑
patible with the principles of human agency and 
autonomy as it is designed such that participa‑
tion would be on a voluntary basis. However, this 
would depend upon the implementation at 
national levels.
• While the design of the DP‑3T is compatible with 
the principles of human agency and autonomy, 
we recommend that the actual national rules 
of implementation should be created to foster 
human agency, autonomy and respect for funda‑
mental rights. The current legislative framework 
applicable to the use of such apps is focussed 
predominantly on use of telecommunications 
devices which does not safeguard individual 
citizen use. In this regard we would refer the reader 
to the proposed draft Coronavirus Safeguards 
Bill, which has been suggested as a safeguarding 
measure in the UK. 
• We would recommend imposing additional safe‑
guards on data deletion. DP‑3T proposal currently 
recommends that data are deleted from servers 
after 14 days, and the solution itself will "gracefully" 
and organically disassemble itself when no longer 
needed as users will stop uploading their data to 
the Authorisation server, or stop using it per se. 
Our proposal is that a "sunset" provision is added 
such that data are automatically deleted when an 
external agency (such as the WHO) declares the 
pandemic over.
• We would caution that contractually, any DP‑3T 
based app will require to conform to both Apple's 
App Store standard agreement and Google's 
Play Store Agreement. Each of these agree‑
ments contain separate privacy related terms 
(Google Play store for example refers to Google's 
Privacy Policy, see section 9 of that Agreement; 
also see section 5.1 Apple's App Store Developer 
Agreement). These terms and conditions each has 
the ability  to  significantly affect (and potentially 
undermine) the privacy handling treatment of 
DP‑3T.
• The general overarching risk of this app is that (like 
any other proximity/contact tracing application) 
it could be used for other purposes post‑pandemic 
(ie for state surveillance purposes). The DP‑3T 
con sor tium has been very careful (indeed assid‑
uous) to prevent this risk materialising for DP‑3T, 
in particular significant design steps in the 
architecture DP‑3T have been taken to maintain a 
decentralised structure, and to minimise instances 
in the design where personal data are used or may 
be inferred.
• There are undoubted public benefits to the use of 
apps such as DP‑3T. Use of the app will potentially 
allow nation states to flatten the epidemio log‑
ical curve of local COVID‑19 epidemics. It may be 
that granular contact tracing and observation 
generally improves the science of epidemiology. 
This information could aid scientists in learning 
the proximity graph surrounding an infected user 
by providing details of their interaction with other 
persons and any consequent spread of infection.
• We remain concerned at the potential for such 
technological solutions to drive undesired "herd" 
behaviours in society – leading to automation 
bias (unconditional trust in outcomes driven by 
the app), driving false confidence at one extreme 
and ostracization of individuals at another. Such 
behaviours may most obviously be directed to 
infected individuals but may also be extended 
to those individuals who do not possess a smart 
phone and are therefore "disenfranchised".
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PRINCIPLE 2 – ACCOUNTABILITY
• As noted above, the risk assessment for DP‑3T 
(as a protocol) is contingent upon national 
implementations of the technology, which have 
the potential to significantly impact any wider 
risk assessment of the solution (for example 
by imposing mandatory installs or mandatory 
quarantines following a Covd‑19 positive notifi‑
cation). We are unable to make definitive sug‑
ges tions in the absence of such national 
imple mentations, but have made summary obser ‑
va tions based on our current knowledge which 
may impact upon such implementations.
• We would recommend that the DP‑3T consortium 
publish a framework of standard national rules and 
guidelines to which use of DP‑3T is subject, this 
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can serve as guidance to governments to ensure 
international co‑operation, consistency of national 
use and application and maximise interoperability 
between countries. Such national standard rules 
should provide for individual citizens to rectify 
identified errors in their data held on the "backend" 
DP‑3T server.
• Third party dependencies also have the potential 
to significantly undermine accountability in the 
solution. In this regard we would identify the 
major OS platform providers, Apple and Google. 
Our recommendation in this regard is that these 
vendors be required to undertake separate and 
publicly available DPIA assessments and provide 
mandatory undertakings (or similar enforceable 
commitment) to conform to national rules specific 
to COVID‑19 pandemic tracing. Such undertakings 
will require not only conformity with national rules 
based frameworks but also transparency to enable 
minimisation (and correction) of cross‑platform 
errors in their technological solutions. 
PRINCIPLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY & 
EXPLAINABILITY
• We are satisfied that Operation of the system in 
terms of data classes and functionality is clearly 
set out in the White Paper and accompanying 
documentation. The Backend and Authorisation 
servers should be fully auditable, subject to access 
being provided by local implementing authorities. 
We observe that this is not a centralised system – 
it is highly distributed. Local data held on smart‑
phones will be outside scope of inspection and 
audit unless access is granted by (or court orders 
are sought effecting same).
• The DP‑3T system is susceptible to Bluetooth LE 
and other cyber risks specific to this technology. 
These risks are not unique to DP‑3T but are 
generic to distributed solutions of this nature. 
We detail some of these risks below, in the 
context of Principle 5 (Safety & Reliability) below. 
In our opinion, there is little information in the 
documentation to suggest robustness in DP‑3T 
above and beyond any other BT LE enabled 
system. 
PRINCIPLE 4 – FAIRNESS & 
NON‑DISCRIMINATION
• As noted above, the risk assessment for DP‑3T 
(as a protocol) is contingent upon national 
implementations of the technology, which have 
the potential to significantly impact any wider 
risk assessment of the solution (for example 
by imposing mandatory installs or mandatory 
quarantines following a Covd‑19 positive notifi‑
cation). We are unable to make definitive sug‑
gestions in the absence of such national 
implementations, but have made summary 
observations based on our current knowledge 
which may impact upon such implementations.
• DP‑3T is designed such that participation would 
be on a voluntary basis. We are concerned 
however that a segment of national populations 
(roughly 40% of over 65 year olds, and under 
16s) may be excluded from participation simply 
because they do not have access to or own a 
smart device.
• We have already indicated that the DP‑3T app 
(in common with similar solutions) could drive 
undesired "herd" behaviours in society – leading to 
automation bias (unconditional trust in outcomes 
driven by the app), driving false confidence at 
one extreme and ostracization of individuals at 
another.
• We are of the view that there needs to be an 
established system of redress for false positives and 
false negatives, as well as re‑identification risks, co‑
locations risks, and proxies. As we have suggested 
under Principle 2, above, we would recommend 
that the DP‑3T consortium publish a framework 
of standard national rules and guidelines to 
which use of DP‑3T is subject, this can serve as 
guidance to  governments to ensure  interna‑
tional co‑operation, consistency of national use 
and application and maximise interoperability 
between countries. Such national standard rules 
should provide for individual citizens to rectify 




PRINCIPLE 5 – SAFETY & RELIABILITY
• All proximity tracing systems that notify users 
that they are at risk enable a motivated adversary 
to identify the infected person (whether that be 
through multiple accounts, manual logging and/
or logging/identifying epochs (time intervals) 
coupled with photo/video identification). Coupled 
with this, Bluetooth Low Energy has inherent 
weaknesses which are capable of exploitation 
with varying degrees of sophistication, such 
as noise injection, tracking of users using 
aspects orthogonal  to contact tracing (ie. by log‑
ging MAC addresses), wardriving, and theft of 
mobile phones.
• Our view is that these risks largely require a "tech 
savvy" and malicious bad actor. The DP‑3T protocol 
has sought to be as privacy preserving as possible 
and to minimize the risks of re‑identification as 
much as possible (especially in Design protocol 2). 
As noted under Principle 3 above, there is little 
information in the documentation to suggest 
robustness in DP‑3T above and beyond any other 
BT LE enabled system.
• The above two points must be viewed in the 
context of use of the app by the general populace. 
Levels of technological sophistication must be 
assessed as low. Users will treat the app Tech 
Solution as they would any other app on their 
phone, however additional trust levels may be 
presumed or required (dependent on culture) 
as the app will be released by national health 
authorities (and/or governments). Expectations 
of safety, protection from harm and reliability of 
the Tech Solution will be high.  We are concerned 
at the potential for a mismatch in terms of actual 
safety and reliability levels and public expectations.
• Our recommendation is that a program of 
public awareness and education should be 
imple mented in relation to each national imple‑
mentation of DP‑3T. In this regard, an expla natory 
"comic" is available in many languages on another 
GitHub webpage made available by the DP‑3T 
consortium to assist public engagement. 
PRINCIPLE 6 – OPEN DATA, FAIR 
COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
• As we have noted above, DP‑3T has been 
released on an open source basis. Data classes 
are compact ephemeral IDs which are capable 
of being transmitted via BT LE protocols. Full 
publication has taken place of system architecture 
to enable this portability. Given the need to 
assess actual national implementations of DP‑3T, 
we are unable to review actual interoperability 
standards. 
• We understand from the separate DPIA that 
location data may be processed for the sole 
purpose of "allowing the application to interact 
with  similar applications in other countries". 
It is unclear if this refers to country‑specific 
implementations of the system or to other 
decentralized tracing control applications. Further 
technical evaluation would be required to assess 
this capability, and additionally to understand 
the extent to which data could be shared as 
between centralised and de‑centralised tracing 
apps.
• So far as wider data sharing are concerned, the 
DP‑3T protocol does not, for privacy reasons, 
currently envisage the sharing of proximity graphs 
with epidemiologists, although we note that this 
functionality may be enabled in later versions.
• The open source nature of the DP‑3T solution is 
confirmed by the fact that it is licensed under 
the MPL 2.0 open source license framework. MPL 
2.0 is a simple copyleft license which encourage 
contributors to share modifications they make 
to the code, while still allowing them to combine 
their own code with code under other licenses 
(open or proprietary) with minimal restrictions. 
Given this context, we do not anticipate complex 
intellectual property risk issues, although we 
must  flag the protocol's dependence upon 
proprietary technologies such as Apple's iOS and 
Google's Android operating system. To a lesser 




PRINCIPLE 7 ‑ PRIVACY
• Our recommendations are consistent with the 
separate DPIA evaluation conducted by the EPFL 
(Prof. Eduouard Bugnion) and id est avocats Sàrl 
(Michel Jaccard and Alexandre Jotterand), Version 
1.0, published 1st May 2020.
• In general, we consider that personal data may be 
processed as part of the system in limited cases. 
Even in the delinked model (see model 2 specified 
in the White Paper), it may be possible to use 
indirect means to correlate and confirm personal 
data elements to the extent necessary to identify 
indivduals, and this will certainly be the case where 
consent is obtained to upload data relating to 
infected individuals onto a backend server. Even 
if, in most cases, the ECJ Breyer test cannot be 
satisfied, we are fully in agreement with the DPIA 
authors that a conservative approach must be 
taken and the solution treated as if it is processing 
personal data.
• In the context of the second point under principle 7, 
we also find that such personal data may also 
contain potentially sensitive data (such as health 
data).  Even though the technological notification 
package of information sent when an individual is 
deemed infected itself contains no health data, the 
notification event itself could potentially be seen as 
health data or inferred health data, because, only 
data of COVID‑19 positive persons, as confirmed 
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To be read in conjunction with main PIA for NHSx COVID19 App (“NHSx App”).
FACTORS JUSTIFYING NEED FOR 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
• As at the time of writing this report, the NHSx App 
is currently in beta testing in the Isle of Wight 
(a little island off the south coast of England which 
is a part of the British Isles). The NHSx App utilises 
a centralised model (as opposed to a decentralised 
model) for proximity tracing – see diagram below. 
It is based on conventional BT LE communication 
between mobile phone handsets. Its goal is to 
simplify and accelerate the process of identifying 
the people who have been in contact with a person 
who has been tested positive with SARS‑CoV‑2 
virus. 
• The NHSx App is reliant on the user’s self­
diagnosis (which may be confirmed or uncon­
firmed). It utilises information about pro ximity 
encounters (the Transmitted IDs, i.e. encrypted 
Sonar ID, together with a timestamp for the 
encounter, and radio signal strength indicator 
information) uploaded by users either when they 
have either (a) “self‑diagnosed” as infected (based 
on their presentation of symptoms assessed in the 
tool) OR (b) they report that they have confirmed 
results that they tested positive for the virus. 
The information provided should reveal to the 
centralised backend Sonar server the devices that 
were in close promity to one another, the duration 
and the distance of that proximity. 
• As part of the self‑diagnosis journey, the App 
includes a facility for a user to request a unique 
one‑time use Reference Number from the Sonar 
Backend. When requested this is then presented 
to the user via the App. This is a unique identifier 
that can be used to request a test for COVID‑19 and 
to interface with human operatives at a purposed 
call centre.
• The system utilises a centralised model run by 
a governmental authority which has expressed 
an appetite for future versions of the App to give 
users the functionality to donate data for further 
research. Therefore there is a greater risk of: 
 – feature/mission creep; 
 – utlising information in a way that may not be 
technically unlawful but could be seen as privacy 
invasive, such as monitoring of social interaction/
contact graphs; 
 – information directly obtained through the 
NHSx App being linked with other data records 
either held diirectly by or indirectly accessi‑
ble to  the governmental authority (such as 
National Central Healthcare Record, geo location 
data records from mobile phone providers, 
information from third party API/operating 




 – new kinds of discrimination/sigmatisation for‑
ming due to pressure from those in Authority/
Civic Leaders to conform/fulfil “civic duty” (e.g.re‑
quiring download of App before retur ning to 
work); and 
 – cyber attacks as a centralised database is likelt to 
be seen as a “honey pot”.
• Although the UK government must comply 
with existing laws to protect Human Rights, 
protect personal data and prevent discrimination 
(amongst other laws applicable to the use of 
telecommunications networks; privacy, individual 
and mass surveillance), it has been highlighted 
amongst both legal practitioners and acade mics 
that there is need for additional laws. It is proposed 
that additional law provide appropriate safe‑
guards and/or management of possible systems 
misuse from malicious actors, mission creep and to 
prevent new forms of discrimination occuring (to 
the degree not already covered by GDPR, e‑Privacy 
Directive, Equality Act, Digital Economy Act 2017, 
Computer Misuse Act,of the Investigatory Powers 
Act 2016. For example, – it is unclear to what degree 
the Part 3, section 61A of the Investigatory Powers 
Act 2016 (which enables people with symptoms or 
a diagnosis of Coronavirus to be tracked without 
notice), will enable such investigatory authorities 
to have access to information either in transit or in 
storage. To this end, we note the draft Coronavirus 
(Safeguards) Bill.
• Its proposed architecture is said not to be 
compatible with forthcoming Apple (iOS) and 
Google (Android) Application Programming Inter‑
face, and therefore may have particular problems 
when deployed on Apple smartphones. Because 
of its centralised architecture, the NHSx  App is 
unlikely to be capable of inter national deploy‑
ment and does not currently demonstrate that 
it is interoperable with other protocols. such  as 
DP‑3T..
• Due to the privacy concerns and possible techno‑
logical issues relating to “always on” BT LE capability, 
a parallel development has commenced utilising 
the decentralised architec ture proposed by Apple 
and Google. 
• This Key Findings report is based on the current 
centralised beta version of the NHSx App and not 
the parallel development whose details have not 
yet been disclosed.
• The relevant data subjects will be individual citi‑
zens who have installed the NHSx App, but at 
present the NHSx App does not process data on 
the basis of consent, but instead relies on other 
lawful bases for processing.
• The NHSx App is using automated decisioning 
(and therefore it invokes Article 22 of GDPR), but is 
not using consent as the lawful basis on which to 
conduct such automated decisioning. Although 
the NHSx App does not use other significant AI or 
Machine Learning, it is likely that the centralised 
backend Sonar server will (further details have not 
been disclosed). 
• PECR/e‑Privacy Directive is also likely to apply in 
respect of cookies or similar technologies, but 
mention of it is omitted from the Trial Privacy 
Policy. (NB: Regulation 6 of PECR would ordinarily 
require consent as the basis for processing cookies 
or similar technologies, unless an exemption, such 
as “the cookie is for the sole purpose of carrying 
out the transmission of a communication over an 
electronic communications network” applied. 
• See Box 1 below for the lawful bases on which 




ACCORDING TO THE TRIAL PRIVACY POLICY
Department for Health and Social Care’s legal basis for processing your personal data under the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018 legislation is:
• GDPR Article 6(1)(e) – the processing is necessary for the performance of its official tasks carried out in the 
public interest in providing and managing a health service
• GDPR Article 9(2)(h) – the processing is necessary for medical diagnosis, the provision of health treatment and 
management of a health and social care system
• GDPR Article 9(2)(i) – the processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health
• DPA 2018 – Schedule 1, Part 1, (2) (2) (f) – Health or social care purposes
The other organisations involved in processing your data, as set out in this Notice will be doing so either with an 
agreement in place with DHSC to provide that service, or with a legal basis of their own.”
IN THE DPIA IT ALSO STATES
For provision of public health exception is underpinned by Regulation 3 of the Health Service (Control of Patient 
Information Regulations) 2002.
• Although the technological notification package of information sent when an individual is deemed infected 
itself contains no health data, the notification event could potentially be seen as health data or inferred health 
data, because only data of COVID‑19 positive or suspected positive persons are uploaded to the backend server.
• The NHSx has not followed the most transparent process nor has it been readily forthcoming with detailed 
information about the App. Unfortunately for a long time much information in the public domain was conflic‑
ting and damaging to trust. A DPIA has been produced for the Isle of Wight trial, but was first published 
after the trial had already commenced. We have not seen any further DPIA for a UK wide rollout. We would 
expect one to be published as a matter of short order.
•  There should be an independent body (as recommended by the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on 
Human Rights) to oversee the use, effectiveness and privacy protections of the app and any data associated 
with this contact tracing. The independent monitoring body should have, at a minimum, similar enforcement 
powers to the Information Commissioner, to oversee how the app is working. It must also be able to receive 
individual complaints. The monitoring body must be given sufficient resources to carry out their functions. 
The DPIA notes an independent Ethics Advisory Board was constituted to obtain views on the proposed 
processing activities (although it is unclear to what extent their remit can affect NHSx decision making), and 
further consultations were carried out with the National Data Guardian's Panel and the Centre for Data Ethics 
and Innovation. As a minimum we would recommend that any continuing oversight be drawn from the 
same panel of experts.
•  Auditability is yet to be confirmed, but is based on open source code which is publicly available for scrutiny.
• The impact of NHSx App data processing activity is significant – it will enable citizens who have sufficiently 
uptodate smartphones to understand whether they have been in contact with other infected (or potentially 
infected) individuals and remove them from the chain of infection by means of notifying them to self isolate 
and recommending that those that they live with also self­isolate. In short, the processing has an impact on 
an individual’s (and those that they live with) freedom of movement and autonomy. The NHSx App should 
enable the UK (if used amongst other measures) to better manage and mitigate the impact of their local 
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PRINCIPLE 1 – ETHICAL PURPOSE & 
SOCIETAL BENEFIT
 – Contractually, NHSx App will be required to 
conform to both Apple's App Store standard 
agreement and Google's Play Store Agreement. 
Each of these agreements contain separate 
privacy related terms. Full commentary of these 
agreements is out of scope of this review but 
each has the ability to significantly affect the 
privacy handling treatment of NHSx App. The 
Operating System Providers (Apple and Google) 
learn that the User installed the User App and 
has registered for the push notification service, 
but cannot see any data. Nevertheless, since 
they provide the operating system running on 
mobile devices, one has to trust them, since they 
could potentially learn information related to the 
proximity tracing system (who is infected, who 
infected whom, social graphs, etc.) and that this 
is a common factor to all CT Apps such as and 
including NHSx App.
 – The NHSx App being a centralised and a govern‑
mental deployment model highlights further 
the importance of transparency, the purpose 
being limited, data collection and storage being 
minimised and kept secure. 
 – It appears that the individual’s response to the 
notification is voluntary, and there a degree of 
human autonomy is maintained. Messaging has 
to be less emotive and coercive than “Support 
our NHS” “Save lives” “do your civic duty for the 
benefit of all in society” “play your part in the 
fight against coronavirus”
 – Original intended aim is good, but here is a 
significant risk of function creep and/or for mass 
surveillance to ensue. We would recom mend 
that; demonstrating transparency, accounta­
bility and that they are seeking to be privacy 
preserving and ethical in the way that the 
NHSx App is made available and continued to 
be deployed is paramount, as is the creation of 
independent oversight.
 – There are some of the risks we associated with 
what the NHSx App of what it could potentially 
do for us as a society and what it could potentially 
do to us as a society.
 – Potential promise of Health benefit/reduction in 
cases of COVID19. 
 – Our smart devices are to become a Proxy for 
human beings and their relationships.
 – Potential to affirm or undermine trust in Govern‑
ment, NHS, other citizens.
 – Potential to provide a false sense of confidence or 
reassurance by having a technological solution 
that is one part of a wider strategy.
• Any other risks (such as for example, the identi‑
fication and potential singling out of infected 
individuals and/or those that are required to self‑
isolate) and the general increase in levels of anxiety 
of the general public about the virus and leaving 
one’s home / circulating amongst people would be 
generic to all other contact tracing apps and need 
to be balanced carefully against the undoubted 
positive impact to society (and human health) in 
the use of such technology. 
• There is indecision in the UK as to whether to 
adopt a centralised or decentralised app. Lack 
of ubiquity (ie more than one app being used 
by  the general populace) will potentially reduce 
the effi ciency of all apps in use and increase 
general confusion in the populace. It also creates 
addi tional  complexity in relation to potential 
interopera bility issues.
• The current DPIA for the Isle of Wight Trial is 
inherently contradictory as to how user data is 
handled (in the context of the centralised app) 
and this has been heavily criticised by privacy 
campaigners and academics. Although you can 
delete data from your handset, it is apparent that 
this will not necessarily lead to data being deleted 
from the Sonar central server.
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OUR RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE:
•  To implement legislation to provide additional safeguards, including redress, (such as that 
proposed by the Coronavirus Safeguards Bill) help build trust and mitigate against risks of 
failure outlined in the PIA.
• To have a plan to protect those who are digitally excluded and do not have access to or own a 
smart device should be put in place, both to protect those not included (likely ageing, vulnerable, 
young children, healthcare needs and mental capacity issues) but also as a strategic fallback if 
the NHSx App fails to function or scale as intended. We note that the NHSx is considering the 
DevicesDotNow initiative.
•  To ensure that appropriate safeguards are put in place regarding the recommendations 
and notifications to ensure that they are proportionate and appropriate to the end user (i.e., 
messaging must be right for child recipient vs adult recipient of notifications. Vulnerability of the 
user will determine how likely that individual is to comply with recommendations or not, and/or 
what they do with that information (n.b.: risk of suicide and/or other mental health issues).
• Safeguards for all should include, clarity over what happens to ALL data after App is deleted 




PRINCIPLE 2 – ACCOUNTABILITY
• NHSx is a health authority sat under the govern‑
mental Department of Health and Social Care. 
It should be held accountable like any other 
government or public authority, in particular 
in respect of Human Rights and Equality Act 
violations.
• The NHS to which NHSx forms a part is a long 
standing health authority which should have 
organisational and accountability constructs 
already established. That said, it is not experien‑
ced in the deployment and ongoing governance 
and oversight of proximity tracing tools. Although 
it has established an Ethics Advisory Board which 
provides advise to the (presumably internal to 
NHSx) App Oversight Board (see EAB Terms of 
Reference here), it is not clear what role or decision 
making power the App Oversight Board has. Our 
recommendation is that independent oversight 
be established.
• It was not clear what (if any) training NHSx would 
either receive or conduct internally to ensure it had 
sufficient capability in the event of a change of 
service provider. 
• As a public health authority and not a technological 
solutions provider it is highly likely that NHSx will 
rely heavily on the experience of its consortium 
of technological services providers. These include 
Amazon Web Services (AWS), Pivotal/VMWare 
Tanzu and Microsoft Azure. It is unclear from the 
DPIA or the Press claims what role (if any) Palantir 
plays within the consortium, but may be assisting 
with understanding the anonymised data. All 
are experienced technology developers. Our 
recommendation would be for NHSx to build 
capacity in this regard.
• Most significantly (and this is likely to be as a result 
of the current legal processing basis position 
taken in the DPIA see summary and Box 1 above) 
there are insufficient access and rectification 
safeguards built into the NHSx App model.
• Third party dependencies also have the potential 
to significantly undermine accountability in 
the solution. In this regard we would identify 
the major OS platform providers, Apple and 
Google.  Our  recommendation in this regard is 
that these vendors be required to undertake 
separate and publicly available DPIA assess­
ments and provide mandatory and legally 
enforceable  under takings in relation to their 
treatment of NHS App data, including metadata 
derived from user behaviour. Such undertakings 
will require not only conformity with UK law, 
regulations and NHSx Codes of Conduct but 
also transparency to enable minimisation (and 
correction) of cross­platform errors in their 
technological solutions. 
PRINCIPLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY & 
EXPLAINABILITY
• As noted above, the NHSx App is in beta testing 
on the Isle of Wight as a pilot project to assess 
the robustness of the centralised app model. As 
part of that pilot, Terms of Use, a Privacy Policy 
and a DPIA have been published. However the 
results of the Isle of Wight trial have not yet 
been published and therefore there is no 
conclusive position. We also await the documents 
for the full implementation of the NHSx App for 
the wider UK
• That said, the functionality of the app and data 
classes used are explainable.
• The NHSx App is susceptible to Bluetooth LE 
and other cyber risks specific to this technology. 
These risks are not unique to a centralised 
proximity tracing tool, but are generic to solutions 
of this nature. We detail some of these risks 
below, in the context of Principle 5 (Safety & 
Reliability) below. In our opinion, there is little 
information in the documentation to suggest 
robustness in NHSx App above and beyond 
any other BT LE enabled system. 
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PRINCIPLE 4 – FAIRNESS & 
NON‑DISCRIMINATION
• The DPIA for the IOW trial states that Art 22 of 
GDPR applies but that the grounds on which 
they are relying on are not consent. It would 
appear that they are relying on Regulations 3(1) 
and 3(3) of the Health Service (Control of Patient 
Information) Regulations 2002 as the exception 
which “lays down suitable measures to safeguard 
the data subjects rights and freedoms and 
legitimate interests. See Michael Veale’s DPIA 
legal analysis for reasons as to why this exception 
might not apply to automated decision making. 
• Irrespective of whether ADM applies or not, 
because of the nature of the App and the 
notification service it provides, individuals are 
likely to be influenced by automation bias 
when accepting the recommendations of the 
app. Furthermore, the following additional 
qualifiers are important to note which could 
have a significant impact on fairness or non‑
discrimination, that is:
 – the content of the notifications, 
 – the sanctions (if any) for non‑compliance with 
such notifications (including but not limited to 
legal sanctions but also those related to return 
to work, particularly after a period furlough), and 
 – the limitations compliance/non‑compliance 
pose (e.g. financial constraints/socio‑economic 
circumstances)..
• NHSx App is designed such that participation 
would be on a voluntary basis. We are concerned 
however that a segment of national populations 
(roughly 40% of over 65 year olds, and under 
16s) may be excluded from participation simply 
because they do not have access to or own a 
smart device.
• We have already indicated that the NHSx 
App (in common with similar solutions) could 
drive undesired "herd" behaviours in society – 
leading to automation bias (unconditional trust 
in outcomes driven by the app), driving false 
confidence at one extreme and ostracization of 
individuals at another.
• We are of the view that there needs to be an 
established system of redress for false positives 
and false negatives, as well as re‑identification 
risks, co‑locations risks, and proxies.
• By virtue of the fact that the NHSx App uses a 
centralised server it is likely that users travelling 
across different Member States cannot be 
efficiently notified. A big risk for border towns 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland. The fact that the NHSx App is 
currently  not interoperable with other EU 
solutions, could be a cause of discrimination or 
unfairness for cross border workers/families.
• In light of the above considerations, there is a risk 
of new kinds of discrimination occur by virtue of 
having/not having the NHSx App.
PRINCIPLE 5 – SAFETY & RELIABILITY
•  All proximity tracing systems that notify 
users  that they are at risk enable a motivated 
adversary to identify the infected person 
(whether that be through multiple accounts, 
manual logging and/or logging/identifying 
epochs (time intervals) coupled with photo/
video identification). Coupled with this, BT LE 
has inherent weaknesses which are capable 
of exploitation with varying degrees of 
sophistication, such as noise injection, tracking 
of users using aspects orthogonal to contact 
tracing (ie. by logging MAC addresses), wardriving, 
and theft of mobile phones.
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• Our view is that these risks largely require a 
"tech savvy" and malicious bad actor. As noted 
under Principle 3 above, there is little information 
in the documentation to suggest robustness in 
NHSx App above and beyond any other BT LE 
enabled system. 
• Contractually, in respect of the Isle of Wight Trial, 
the NHSx App has sought to mitigate against 
some of the malicious circumstances in and 
through its Terms of Use.
• The above points must be viewed in the context 
of   use of the app by the general populace. 
Levels  of  tech nological sophistication must be 
assessed as low. Users will treat the app Tech 
Solution as they would any other app on their 
phone, however additional trust levels may be 
presumed as the app will be released by the 
UK’s governmental Department of Health and 
Social Care under the auspices of NHSx health 
authority. Expectations of safety, protection from 
harm and reliability of the Tech Solution will therefore 
be extremely high. Furthermore, it should be 
made absolutely clear that the App is  not  a   
medical device and (despite the notifications 
and recom mendations) does not provide/is not 
a  substitute for obtaining medical. As a result 
of all these considerations, we are concerned 
at the potential for a mismatch in terms of 
actual safety and reliability levels and public 
expectations.
•  Our recommendation is that a programme 
of public awareness and education should be 
implemented in a manner befitting of the wide 
spectrum of public consumption. The UK might 
want to take their lead from the DP3T consortium’s 
proposal of an explanatory “comic” to assist public 
engagement . 
PRINCIPLE 6 – OPEN DATA, FAIR 
COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
• NHSx App in beta testing phase has been released 
on an open source basis under the permissive 
MIT Licence open source licence. Given this 
context, we do not anticipate complex intellectual 
property risk issues, although we must flag that 
that my change with any dependence upon 
proprietary technologies such as Apple's iOS and 
Google's Android operating system. To a lesser 
degree we would also indicate that BT LE is itself a 
patented technology.
• The NHSx App is designed for UK use only. 
Insufficient information has been disclosed to 
review actual interoperability standards, but given it 
is based on a centralised approach and is currently 
not compatible with the proposed Google and 
Apple API, it is unlikely to be interoperable. 
• As stands under the Isle of Wight trial, 
 – any data sharing that is envisaged with service 
providers is apparently under GDPR compliant 
contracts. It is not fully clear where cloud servers 
are based and therefore where data might be 
hosted (as some are specified as west Europe 
and/or default server). 
 – Data will be shared with NHS England and NHS 
Improvement under existing processing powers 
pursuant to the notice issued by the Secretary of 
State under s. 3(4) of the Health Service (Control 
of Patient Information) Regulations 2002.
 – Purposes for which data will be obtained, include: 
data analysis for public health planning and 
pandemic response, such as resource planning 
and epidemiological modelling; and using de‑
identified or anonymised data for scientific 
research and statistical analysis 
PRINCIPLE 7 ‑ PRIVACY
• In general, we consider that personal data may 
be processed as part of the system . It may be 
possible to use indirect means to correlate and 
confirm personal data elements to the extent 
necessary to identify indivduals, and this will 
certainly be the case where consent is obtained 
to upload data relating to infected individuals the 
central Sonar server. Even if, in most cases, the 
ECJ Breyer test cannot be satisfied, we are fully in 
agreement that a conservative approach must be 




• We also find that such personal data may also 
contain potentially sensitive data (such as health 
data).  Even though the technological notification 
package of information sent when an individual 
declaring themselves as infected itself contains 
no health data, the notification event itself could 
potentially be seen as health data or inferred health 
data, because, only data of COVID‑19 positive (or 
suspected) persons are uploaded to the central 
Sonar server.
• See Principle 4 and the Factors Justifying Impact 
Assessment above regarding lawful basis used for 
processing personal data during the Pilot.
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To be read in conjunction with main PIA for the ROBERT protocol, dated 10 May 2020.
The ROBERT (ROBust and privacy‑presERving 
proximity Tracing) protocol is a proposal for the 
Pan European Privacy‑Preserving Proximity Tracing 
(PEPP‑PT) initiative, whose main goal is to enable the 
development of contact tracing solutions respectful 
to the European standards in data protection, 
privacy and security, within a global response to the 
pandemic. Therefore, any risks would largely be with 
the implementing apps. However, many of these 
risks are inherent with a centralized server system. 
It has to be noted that, for the time being, 
“StopCOVID”, supported by the French government, 
appears to be the only application built on the 
ROBERT protocol. It has been reported that many 
other countries that were said to be backing 
PEPP‑PT have now moved to DP‑3T, using a de‑
centralized structure instead of the centralized 
ROBERT approach. Some of the initial developers of 
the PEPPP‑PT are also reported to have abandoned 
the project due to centralization, transparency and 
privacy concerns.
The objective of applications such as “StopCOVID” – 
and the ROBERT protocol behind them – is to 
trace contacts of a certain proximity and duration 
between citizens. Once a user gets positively tested 
on COVID‑19, and shares this information with the 
application (i.e. health data), the application would 
warn other users that were in close contact with 
the infected person during the infectious period. To 
detect whether two users have been in proximity 
to each other, the applications rely on short‑range 
communications exchanged using the Bluetooth 
wireless technology activated on both users’ devices. 
Thus, the application could help facilitate and accel‑
erate the spread of information amongst citizens 
concerning possible infections.
One of the ideas behind the PEPP‑PT initiative was 
to develop a protocol that could serve as a basis for 
various “national” apps which would then be able 
to interact with each other. Especially within the 
European single‑market and the Schengen area, 
cross‑border travel is likely to increase significantly 
once travel restrictions have been withdrawn. 
Therefore, it is likely that applications based on the 
ROBERT protocol will be used for cross‑border travel 
and, thus, in different jurisdictions. 
As applications based on the ROBERT protocol 
would be processing personal data of users, the main 
regulatory requirements would be laws on privacy 
and data protection (such as the GDPR for EU/EEA 
member states, or national laws on data protection, 
e.g. in Switzerland). The main ethical concerns 
are that (a) a centralised system could be more 
amenable to mission creep by the governments ; 
(b) people could be stigmatized if, by using the 
application, it would become publicly known that 
they had been infected with COVID‑19 and spread 
the disease ; (c) from the data collected through the 
application, malicious users and/or organizations 
could draw contact and/or movement profiles of a 
large number of people.
As regards the stakeholders, apart from the devel‑
opers of ROBERT itself, a couple of other stakeholders 
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need to be considered: There will be developers of 
the applications based on the ROBERT protocol. 
It is likely that applications would be provided by 
government agencies (e.g. national health agencies) ; 
however private initiatives are not excluded from 
using the protocol. As the ROBERT protocol suggests 
a centralized model, there must be a provider for the 
central server (perhaps a national health agency if 
run by a government). 
The ROBERT developers team puts a strong em‑
phasis on the fact that data would be transmitted 
pseudonymously. In addition, due to the centralized 
server model, the protocol does only collect very 
little information on the concrete circumstances of a 
contact. With a centralized approach, the calculation 
of the risk of contagion is done on the server side, 
without taking into account the quality of contacts 
nor personal information. The result could, therefore, 
be unreliable, with probably many false positives as 
opposed to a de‑centralized approach where much 
more information may be collected and stored on 
the user’s device. In terms of explainability, the results 
(i.e. the warning messages sent to users) cannot be 
explained to the specific user because the user will 
not get any information on the location or exact time 
of the contact ; the user must trust the application 
without being able to gather any further information 
as regards the “real” risks. 
Data will be processed on a very large scale. It is the 
idea behind any contact tracing solutions that as 
many people as possible have respective applications 
on their mobile devices and keep them activated. 
If applications were actually used by a very large 
number of people in a given populations (maybe 
60 % or more), contact tracing applications are said 
to become an important instrument to contain the 
virus.
PRINCIPLE 1 – ETHICAL PURPOSE & 
SOCIETAL BENEFIT
ROBERT could provide the deployer – being it nation‑
al or private (i.e. a research institute) – with a better 
understanding of the spreading of the pandemic 
and – potentially – it may contribute in flattening the 
epidemiological curve.
However, the technology itself, and especially the 
risks that are inherent to the centralized structure, 
also bear the risk that data collected through 
applications could be processed for other purposes 
than mitigating the COVID‑19 pandemic by tra‑
cing contacts. The more contact information is 
transmitted to the server, even if this information is 
pseudonymized/anonymized, the greater the risk 
of attacks. The more information the central server 
stores, the greater the risk of loss of anonymity and 
confidentiality, as the success of cryptanalysis attacks 
increases with the amounts of encrypted samples 
available. 
It must be noted, also from an ethical perspective, 
that the ROBERT protocol is published under an 
OpenSource software license (MPL 2.0, https://www.
inria.fr/fr/contact­tracing­bruno­sportisse­pdg­
dinria­donne­quelques­elements­pour­mieux­
comprendre­les­enjeux). Thus, it may well be that 
the technology is used in parts of the world that 
do not follow strict legal principles, including the 
declarations of human and citizen rights, laws on 
privacy, data protection, non‑discrimination, etc. 
These risks are imminent considering that there have 
just recently been serious impairments concerning 
the rule‑of‑law principle even in some EU member 
states (such as Poland and Hungary). 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, any implementation 
of the ROBERT protocol under a given jurisdiction, 
and even the selection of the app supporting device 
(app, mobile device, wearable, etc.) may entail other 
legal, cross border, policy, or contractual obligations 
that have not been subject to this PIA. 
PRINCIPLE 2 – ACCOUNTABILITY
In terms of accountability, there may be other 
risks to consider that come along with third‑party 
dependencies of the applications. These will depend 
on the security model e.g. of the mobile operating 
system, which may have access to all data stored in 
the application provided that such access is allowed 
by the applicable laws.
Bluetooth is used for contract tracing in ROBERT by 
using the beacons principle – that is, devices signal 
each other with short information, without the need 
to establish a Bluetooth connection between them. 
Messages are sent to all devices with Bluetooth 
enabled, there is no ability to send a message to 
only certain, authorized devices. Thus, it is easy for 
anyone to listen to everything that happens on the 
Bluetooth signal. For these reasons, it is possible to 
spread malicious information. This risk becomes 
even more crucial considering that the applications 
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need to be continuously running, with Bluetooth 
connections activated. Moreover, in order to prevent 
“one entry” attacks, the server may introduce some 
randomly selected false positive. In light of the above, 
accuracy might be at risk and, consequently, it 
might generate negative consequence where such 
are not needed (i.e. self‑isolation where the contact 
is not positive). It is noted that several improvements 
have been made to the ROBERT protocol in an 
attempt to mitigate or prevent such risks. However, it 
is impossible to eliminate the risks inherent in using 
a protocol based on Bluetooth. 
PRINCIPLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY AND 
EXPLAINABILITY
Users have an interest in understanding the risk 
of intrusive surveillance, long term tracking and 
the potential for identifying infected individuals, 
and in the risk scoring algorithm of any particular 
implementation. 
It is possible that the app implementer could also 
choose to use the algorithm for purposes such as to 
determine priority of testing or confinement deci‑
sions which could have a significant impact on the 
rights of users.
When a user’s positive status is communicated to 
the central authority it will assign an “at risk” status 
to the persons who are shown to have come in 
contact with the positive case. Due to limitations 
intrinsic to the Bluetooth technology, proximity 
tracing solutions may lead to false positive and/or 
negative (see above). The determination of the risk 
status is therefore subject to the accuracy limitations 
of Bluetooth technology. In addition to proximity 
information, risk scores maybe based on other 
parameters to be decided by the implementor, in 
collaboration with epidemiologists. The developers 
of the protocol note that the actual effect of the 
false positives will depend on the purpose for 
which the app is being used. They note that a false 
positive is more problematic if the fact is to notify 
the user to go into quarantine as opposed to a case 
where the user is only advised that he or she should 
get tested.
ROBERT does not require disclosure of adoption 
rates. It is the idea behind any contact tracing 
solutions that as many people as possible have 
respective applications on their mobile devices and 
keep them activated. Without information available 
on adoption rates, the efficiency of the Pandemic 
Tech Solution may be at risk.
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PRINCIPLE 4 – FAIRNESS & 
NON‑DISCRIMINATION
ROBERT is not an application but a communication 
protocol. One of its design goals is that participants 
should be able to join or leave the system at any 
point. The final decision on whether to make the 
application voluntary or compulsory will be made 
by the organisations that adopt the protocol. The 
French Government’s present position is that the 
StopCovid app will be available on a voluntary basis. 
A final determination is not possible at this stage as 
the app has not yet been launched.
The requirement of Bluetooth enabled smartphones 
as the basis of the protocol limits the participation 
to persons who have access to such devices. In 
particular, children who do not have their own 
devices and others such as the elderly and persons 
with disability who might have trouble engaging 
with the app could be excluded from the contact 
tracing mechanism. Accordingly, any conclusions 
about the aggregate risk profile based on statistics 
collected from the app may not reflect the cases of 
persons belonging to these groups. 
Depending on the implementation of the ROBERT 
protocol, false positive results may be of discrimi‑
natory effect (see above).
Adherence with the standards and guidelines of the 
World Wide Web Consortium's Web Accessibility 
Initiative can help in reducing accessibility barriers in 
the design and implementation of the solution. 
PRINCIPLE 5 – SAFETY AND RELIABILITY
The centralized server structure is the weak point in 
the ROBERT protocol. Risks of using such centralized 
system include the following:
Single point of attack: Any breach in a server would 
endanger the whole federated system and all users 
of affected applications. Intruding the server could 
result in the identification of users. 
Linkability of users: With a centralized system, the 
server is able to learn and potentially piece together 
information about specific users. The server could 
infer that two infected users were in contact at some 
point in time based on timestamps, allowing the 
server to build a partial social graph that reflects 
these encounters. Furthermore, the server could 
identify anonymous uploaders with co‑locations 
by performing a frequency analysis on the uploads 
and  cross referencing with who performed the 
uploads. In addition, the server could identify 
anonymous uploaders with causality, as causality 
is preserved in the uploads. Thus, the server can 
reconstruct a pseudonymous graph using time 
causality.
Tracing of users: The centralized server creates 
ephemeral identifiers and can, at any point, link 
the past and future ephemeral identifiers of any 
user, infected or not, by decrypting back to their 
permanent identifier. In combination with other 
data sets, such as CCTVs, the server can therefore 
track all individuals, infected or not. Given a 
target ephemeral ID, such as one collected by 
law enforcement from a suspect, it is possible to 
tag and classify individuals that third parties can 
recognize without access to the centralized server 
or database. ROBERT’s ephemeral IDs are not 
authenticated, and the server does not provide 
any proof that they are an encryption of the ID, or 
that the correct key was used. This capability could 
allow law enforcement, or other actors, without 
any access to the backend database, to track the 
movements of specific users and communities 
by assigning them distinguishable identifiers and 
recognizing their tagged Bluetooth emissions. This 
could enable long‑term tracking of individuals or 
communities (as one could assign specific identi‑
fiers to target groups of people) by third parties. 
Moreover, users could also detect others EBIDs and 
use them maliciously.
A contact tracing application based on the ROBERT 
protocol must be widely used and run efficiently to 
meet the goal of aiding in the containment of the 
COVID‑19 pandemic. However, some characteristics 
of the present ROBERT protocol give rise to concerns 
as regards the efficiency of such applications. A 
technical failure of ROBERT would mean that a user 
is potentially either not able to share their infected 
status and thus help notify other users or does not 
receive notification about having been in proximity 
to an infected person when queried. In both cases, 
users may have been exposed, but they will not be 
notified and thus could be further exposing others 
by not taking protective measures.
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PRINCIPLE 6 – OPEN DATA, FAIR 
COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IP ownership in implementations of the protocol will 
depend on the choices made by the implementers. 
Licensing terms of particular implementations 
(open source or otherwise) will be determined by 
the implementers.
Under the protocol, data are captured and stored by 
unique ID/user and EBIDs and by timestamps. The 
protocol requires sharing of unique IDs/EBIDs in 
order to map potential infection vectors. The protocol 
describes NATs (Network Address Translation) as 
potential mitigation for individual uploads, but 
notes the limits of NATs both in terms of prevalence 
and location grouping. The protocol also notes that 
to ensure network‑layer unlinkability, the actual 
application implementations must be unlinkable 
using anonymous authentication mechanisms and 
rate‑limiting mechanisms to upload large numbers 
of observations 
PRINCIPLE 7 – PRIVACY 
Though many of the above‑described risks already 
could have adverse effects on user’s privacy, there 
are some further privacy concerns that come with 
the ROBERT protocol.
As outlined before, ROBERT is a protocol, thus a 
technical basis on which various applications may be 
deployed. Therefore, any risks would largely be with 
the implementing apps. However, many of these 
risks are inherent with a centralized server system. 
As any application based on the ROBERT protocol 
would be processing personal data on a very large 
scale, including sensitive data (namely health data, 
possibly also data from children or other particularly 
vulnerable groups), these risks are even more 
considerable.
Data are stored in the server for three weeks. 
However, this should be balanced with public health 
necessities and, in particular, with the pandemic’s 
incubation period. If data retention periods are not 
minimized, the application based on the ROBERT 
protocol may infringe the principles of necessity, 
proportionality and data minimization.
Providing exhaustive and transparent information 
on the processing of personal data may, under 
certain jurisdictions or laws (such as the GDPR), be 
a mandatory legal requirement to observe. However, 
from the information available on the ROBERT 
protocol itself, not all mandatory information can be 
retrieved.
CONCLUSION
The ROBERT protocol with its centralized 
server structure brings a lot of inherent risks 
as regards user privacy and data security. 
Whereas other concerns (such as, for example, 
regarding non‑discrimination, fairness, effi‑
ciency) may relatively easy be mitigated by 
implementing privacy‑by‑design principles 
into the applications, the architecture of the 
protocol itself remains critical. ROBERT may be 
used for purposes that go way beyond what is 
necessary in order to mitigate COVID‑19, and it 
may turn out, depending on the organization 
deploying the application, to become an 
instrument of mass surveillance. 
Although, certainly, also a de‑centralized 
server structure does not come without 
privacy risks  (comp. Serge Vaudenay, Analysis 
of DP‑3T  – Between Scylla and Charybdis, 
Lausanne, 8 April 2020, https://eprint.iacr.
org/2020/399.pdf), at least the risk of being 
silently converted into such an instrument of 
mass surveillance must be considered much 
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FACTORS JUSTIFYING NEED FOR IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT
On 7 April 2020, the Robert‑Koch‑Institut (RKI), the 
German federal agency for public health, published 
a corona data donation app for Android and iOS. 
The RKI app is designed to make users donate to 
the agency health data from their wearables/fitness 
bracelets/fitness apps. The RKI aims to derive from 
such data information on the spread of COVID‑19 
nationwide and on a regional level. 
The goal of the “Corona‑Datenspende” (corona data 
donation) app is to improve prediction possibilities 
for the nationwide spread of COVID‑19 based on 
unspecific health data (such as pulse rates) and, 
thereby, to accelerate and focus future containment 
measures in identified high‑risk areas. That being 
said, the focus of the project is to serve public health 
as opposed to give the donating user an indication 
as to whether he or she may be infected.
Considering that testing capacities are limited and, 
even more importantly, many COVID‑19 infections 
come with only very mild symptoms (so that infected 
people are unlikely to ever ask for a test themselves, 
but may, however, spread the virus to others that 
develop a more severe illness), the RKI aims to 
better estimate the possible number of undetected 
COVID‑19 infections. The project has been publicly 
supported by the German Federal Government and, 
especially, by the Federal Ministry for Health.
Germany can be considered one of the best 
developed democracies of the world, with a high 
standard in terms of implementing rule of law. 
Processing of personal data in Germany (being a 
member state of the EU) is subject to the GDPR, 
also for government agencies. In addition, for 
eGoverment applications, the Bundesamt für 
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnologie (BSI, 
German federal agency for security in information 
technology) has published directive BSI TR‑03107‑1 in 
2019, which also apply to the Corona‑Datenspende 
application.
The RKI has been working on this project together 
with a developing partner from the private sector ; 
examination of the data derived from the use of 
the app will be conducted in collaboration with two 
German universities (Humboldt Universität Berlin, 
FAU Erlangen‑Nürnberg). 
The main ethical concerns are that (a) from the 
data collected through the application, malicious 
users and/or organizations could get personal 
health information from a large number of people, 
(b) malicious users could, by falsifying information 
uploaded to the RKI, influence and interfere with 
the containment measures. It is to be noted in this 
context that the RKI is a direct advisor to the federal 
government, and its advice is also considered by any 
other state or private decision‑makers ; influencing 
the data could, thus, have direct effects on public 
and private pandemic mitigation measures.
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Though the individuals directly affected by data 
processing through the app are limited to users of 
wearables and other fitness tracking applications 
(such as iOS Health) voluntarily donating their data 
to the RKI, the impact of the app on the general 
public must not be underestimated. The “Corona‑
Datenspende” app has been developed and pub‑
lished very quickly upon the detection of the first 
COVID‑19 infections in Germany. It has now been 
available for more than a month and has found a 
significant number of users (about 500,000).
PRINCIPLE 1 – ETHICAL PURPOSE & 
SOCIETAL BENEFIT
The app being provided by the German federal 
agency for public health and publicly promoted by 
the government, its impact on future government 
measurements to mitigate the COVID‑19 pandemic 
and, thus, its societal and economical effects cannot 
be underestimated. 
Successful attacks on the information security or 
widespread malicious use of this app have the 
potential not only to weaken the acceptance of 
and trust in any app‑based measures to contain 
the pandemic, but they may also cause severe 
harm to societal and economic welfare in Germany 
and, considering Germany’s importance for the 
European single market and in international trade, 
also abroad. Thus, any risks as regards the security of 
the app create a significant risk to society as a whole, 
perhaps even on a global level. In addition, any 
shortcomings in the protection of collected data as 
well as erroneous forecasts and measures could have 
a significant impact on the public perception of the 
RKI itself.
The laws and the legal system in Germany, in gen‑
eral, may be considered sufficient as to mitigate 
the risks associated to the application. The German 
federal commissioner for data protection and free ‑
dom of information (BfDI) will supervise the deploy‑
ment and use of this app.
On an individual level, users are free to install and 
install the app. Depending on the devices they use, 
they are able to decide which data to share and 
which to withhold. Users can prevent the app at any 
time from processing data by switching off or not 
wearing their wearable. The most important risk for 
users would be if their share of the data collected by 
the RKI could be associated with a specific user, i.e. if 
they were re‑identified.
PRINCIPLE 2 – ACCOUNTABILITY
In terms of accountability, it has to be noted that the 
RKI app is fully dependent on third‑party devices or 
apps. These come with certain risks themselves, the 
gravity of which will depend on the security model 
e.g. of the mobile operating system.
The app provider is a software enterprise that has 
been dealing with eHealth projects in the past. It 
could have been expected that this provider was 
capable of implementing mandatory GDPR princi‑
ples such as, for instance, Privacy be design (Art 25 of 
the GDPR).
The principles of necessity, proportionality and data 
minimization allegedly have been observed. How‑
ever, as it remains unclear which data are being 
processed exactly and for which particular purposes, 
it cannot be ascertained whether all data are actually 
required for these purposes. The lack of explainability 
certainly constitutes a problem ; however, data 
are said to be transmitted only pseudonymously 
and anonymized before further processing. It is 
somewhat typical to scientific processing, that the 
purposes and the scope of such processing may 
evolve over time.
Development and deployment are publicly funded. 
Therefore, if it turned out that mitigating some 
of the  risks identified herein, would come with 
additional costs, it is very likely that the RKI would 
decide to spend more rather than accept both 
avoidable and inacceptable risks.
PRINCIPLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY AND 
EXPLAINABILITY
As noted above, decisions of the RKI based upon the 
data derived from the “Corona‑Datenspende” may 
have a huge impact on society. However, the RKI 
server offers easy ways to create fake pseudonyms 
with a freely selectable postal code. In addition, 
knowing the pseudonym of a data donor, third 
parties can retrieve his authentication token from 
the RKI server and thus send further data to the RKI 
under the pseudonym of the data donor, including, 
for example, the number of steps taken or other 
activity data. Third parties can also connect their own 
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fitness tracker and thus their health data with the 
pseudonym of another user. These risks must not 
be considered only theoretical because they do not 
require high‑level technical skills. That being said, 
there is a significant risk (especially in regions with 
only a small number of users) that data collected 
through the app may be faulty. This could lead 
to false predictions in either direction. In terms of 
transparency, the public most likely cannot and will 
not be informed about rates of false data input at all. 
Though it must never be forgotten that the app is 
not supposed to serve the individual benefits of its 
users but the general public, it remains questionable 
that the RKI provides so little information on the 
specifics of (algorithmic) data processing operations 
and the processes of risk analysis. For instance, from 
the information available so far, users would know 
that they are to provide their postal code (whereby 
only the first two digits will be further processed). 
Furthermore, users know that any analysis from 
the RKI on the basis of their data will be made 
on “Landkreis” level. However, this is irritating and 
requires further explanation as German postal codes 
are not in any way associated with the “Landkreis” 
regions (comp. fig. 1 and 2 below, both published 
in the public domain under CC0 1.0 license). Thus, it 
remains completely unexplained how the RKI could 
be able to detect infection risks on a “Landkreis” 
level on the basis of the first two digits of a postal 
code. (please note: German postal codes consist of 
five digits, the first two of which indicate a region of 
the country that is usually significantly bigger than 
a “Landkreis”, however, big cities are divided into 
numerous regions, like for instance Hamburg using 
20xxx, 21xxx, 22xxx postal codes). 
German “Landkreise” 
(fig. 1 left) and German 
postal code areas (fig. 2 
right). It can be seen from 
the maps that sometimes 
more than one “Landkreis” 
is covered by a postal 
code area, whereas in 
other cases (especially in 
big cities) one “Landkreis” 
belongs to numerous 
postal code areas.
In terms of explainability, 
it remains entirely unclear 
how the RKI is supposed 
to draw conclusions 
for a “Landkreis” from 
information based on the 




PRINCIPLE 4 – FAIRNESS & 
NON‑DISCRIMINATION
The data are collected from an undefined and 
unrefined group of users. The datasets (especially 
data on activity levels and data concerning health 
like pulse rates etc.) cannot be biased themselves. 
Data are donated by users on a voluntary basis. 
Users would never be directly affected by individual 
decisions of the app or based on the data derived 
from the app. It would only be possible that, based 
on information collected through the app, the RKI 
provides advice to government officials that would 
then perhaps initiate or lift certain containment 
measures. Thus, if data input was false or corrupted, 
individuals, as part of the society, could be treated 
“unfair”. 
PRINCIPLE 5 – SAFETY AND RELIABILITY
Technical analysis of the RKI app revealed a variety 
of major security risks associated with the setup of 
both the server and the data transfer mechanisms. 
This revelation is even more concerning as, also 
considering the communication from the RKI, 
users are to expect a maximum of data security. 
As the RKI app processes personal data on a very 
large scale, including sensitive data (namely health 
data, possibly also data from children or other 
particularly vulnerable groups), these risks are even 
more considerable. The entire model of donating 
one’s personal data for the purposes of serving 
public health depends on users’ trust. Thus, severe 
shortcomings in data security may endanger the 
project as a whole. 
Any breach in a server would endanger the 
whole federated system and all users of “Corona‑
Datenspende”. Intruding the server could result 
in the identification of users. Analysis has revealed 
obvious shortcomings in server security, though. 
The actual data transfer mechanisms for third‑
party devices and Google Fit are inconsistent with 
public communications of the RKI. The RKI server 
gets direct access to and received the data stored 
on the servers of the fitness tracker provider or 
data stored at Google Fit. Access data allow access 
to non‑pseudonymized and historical fitness data 
and, in the case of the providers Fitbit, Garmin, Polar 
and Google Fit, access to the full names of the data 
donors, Direct access of the RKI to the fitness data 
is not even automatically terminated when the 
smartphone app is uninstalled.
PRINCIPLE 6 – OPEN DATA, FAIR 
COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The app is clearly not designed for data sharing 
purposes other than with the RKI itself. The data 
collected through the app will remain with the RKI 
and its research partners. Data collected through 
the app are being used for further scientific research 
on the field of public health.
RKI is mentioned as copyright holder in the iOS app 
store ; parts of the copyright to the solution, under 
German copyright law, necessarily remain with the 
actual developers. That being said, it seems unlikely 
that the app is going to be distributed to other pubic 
health agencies in the world. 
PRINCIPLE 7 – PRIVACY 
Though many of the above‑described risks already 
could have adverse effects on user’s privacy, there 
are some further privacy concerns that come with 
the “Corona‑Datenspende” app.
Consent is implemented by an opt‑in procedure 
(i.e. activating a checkbox underneath the privacy 
notice). This means that consent shall be declared 
electronically using non‑signature‑based processes. 
However, this is not in line with government agency 
directives binding on the RKI. Apart from these 
directives, there have been several Court decisions 
indicating that consent under the GDPR may 
solely be valid if the identity of the data subject is 
undoubtedly clear. Thus, the RKI’s approach not to 
check on user’s names in order to keep their identity 
pseudonymous, may lead to an infringement of 
data protection principles in itself (Art. 9 para. 2 of the 
GDPR).
The age limit of the app is set to “4+” at least in the 
iOS app store, which indicates that the app was 
designed for use also by small children. During the 
registration procedure, the user must confirm that 
he or she was at least 16 years of age. However, this 
does not constitute an age verification mechanism 
worth mentioning. Considering that, under Art. 8 of 
the GDPR, where consent is required in relation to 
the offer of information society services directly to a 
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child, the processing of the personal data of a child 
shall only be lawful where the child is at least 16 years 
old, this constitutes a crucial weakness. 
As the RKI does not actually know its users (see 
above), there are further shortcomings in terms of 
mandatory data protection obligations. Any data 
subject has the right to access information being 
processed about him or her (Art. 15 of the GDPR) ; 
data subjects may also request correction or deletion 
of their data under certain circumstances (Art. 16, 17 
of the GDPR). However, any such right may only be 
granted to a person that can clearly considered to be 
the actual data subject. Providing access to a data 
subject’s personal data to a person other than the 
data subject itself would constitute a severe breach 
of GDPR obligations. Considering that the RKI does 
not know its users, the only way for the RKI to deal 
with possible data subjects’ requests would be on the 
basis of the pseudonymous codes being provided 
to the users during the registration procedures. 
However, as has been shown, these IDs are neither 
secret nor protected against unauthorized copying. 
The actual data processing operations through the 
RKI app differ from those stated in the Privacy Policy. 
Whereas, in the Privacy Policy, the RKI states that 
(a) data were pseudonymized on the device, (b) no 
direct identifiers such as names were submitted to 
the RKI, and (c) data were transferred solely via the 
user’s smartphone, CCC analysis has revealed that 
quite the opposite is true.
CONCLUSION
The RKI app has the potential of improving the predictability of the spread of COVID‑19. However, 
considering the key role of the RKI within the German response to the pandemic, the data basis for RKI 
predictions must adhere to the highest standards of reliability. As CCC analysis has revealed, the app 
itself, its connection to third‑party providers, such as health apps and wearables/fitness trackers, and 
its server infrastructure show some significant shortcomings in terms of data security. At least some 
of these flaws could have been easily avoided, and it raises some concern that RKI’s partners did not 
implement appropriate safeguards in the first place. Even though some of the deficiencies may have 
already been cured and others certainly can be rectified, there is a remainder of risks that adversely 
affect the fundamental human right to privacy as well as the overall reliability and efficiency of the 
entire app. 
In the current state, the “Corona‑Datenspende” app must be considered an infringement and the RKI 
to be in breach of mandatory GDPR obligations, including, without limitation, the principles of data 
minimization (Art. 5 para. 1 lit. c of the GDPR) as well as integrity and confidentiality (Art. 5 para. 1 lit. f of 
the GDPR), the accountability obligations of the controller (Art. 5 para. 2 of the GDPR), the lawfulness 
of processing personal data (Art. 6, 8, 9 of the GDPR), the data subjects’ rights (Art. 15 et seq. of the 
GDPR), the general responsibilities of a data controller (Art. 24 of the GDPR), the core principle of data 
protection by design (Art. 25 para. 1 of the GDPR), and the obligation to implement adequate technical 
and organizational measurements to ensure an appropriate level of security (Art. 32 of the GDPR).
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FACTORS JUSTIFYING NEED FOR IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT
• “Apple/Google Contact Tracing API”, in short 
"Apple/Google API", is a comprehensive solution 
that includes application programming interfaces 
(APIs) and operating system‑level technology to 
assist in enabling contact tracing. 
• Google and Apple announced a two‑phase 
exposure notification solution that uses Bluetooth 
technology on mobile devices to aid in contact 
tracing efforts. 




 – Both phases of the solution harness the power 
of Bluetooth technology to aid in exposure 
notification. Once enabled, users’ devices will 
regularly send out a beacon via Bluetooth 
that includes a random Bluetooth identifier  — 
basically, a string of random numbers that 
aren’t tied to a user's identity and change every 
10‑20 minutes for additional protection. Other 
phones will be listening for these beacons and 
broadcasting theirs as well. When each phone 
receives another beacon, it will record and 
securely store that beacon on the device.
 – At least once per day, the system will download 
a list of the keys for the beacons that have been 
verified as belonging to people confirmed as 
positive for COVID‑19. Each device will check the 
list of beacons it has recorded against the list 
downloaded from the server. If there is a match 
between the beacons stored on the device 
and the positive diagnosis list, the user may be 
notified and advised on steps to take next.
 – To power this solution in the first phase, both 
companies will release application programming 
interfaces (APIs) that allow contact tracing apps 
from public health authorities to work across 
Android and iOS devices, while maintaining 
user privacy. These apps from public health 
authorities will be available for users to download 
via their respective app stores. Once the app is 
launched, the user will then need to consent to 
the terms and conditions before the program is 
active. The companies plan to make these APIs 
available in May. 
 – In the second phase, available in the coming 
months, this capability will be introduced at the 
operating system level to help ensure broad 
adoption, which is vital to the success of contact 
tracing. After the operating system update is 
installed and the user has opted in, the system 
will send out and listen for the Bluetooth 
beacons as in the first phase, but without 
requiring an app to be installed. If a match is 
detected the user will be notified, and if the user 
has not already downloaded an official public 
health authority app they will be prompted to 
download an official app and advised on next 
steps. Only public health authorities will have 
access to this technology and their apps must 
meet specific criteria around privacy, security, 
and data control.
 – If at some point a user is positively diagnosed 
with COVID‑19, he or she can work with the 
health authority to report that diagnosis within 
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the app, and with their consent their beacons 
will then added to the positive diagnosis list. 
User identity will not be shared with other users, 
Apple and Google as part of this process.
• According to the Apple/Google API FAQ, if a user 
decides to participate, exposure notification data 
will be stored and processed on device. Other 
than the random Bluetooth identifiers that are 
broadcast, no data will be shared by the system 
with public health authority apps unless one of the 
following two scenarios takes place:
 – If a user chooses to report a positive diagnosis of 
COVID‑19 to their contact tracing app, the user’s 
most recent keys to their Bluetooth beacons will 
be added to the positive diagnosis list shared by 
the public health authority so that other users 
who came in contact with those beacons can be 
alerted.
 – If a user is notified through their app that they 
have come into contact with an individual who 
is positive for COVID‑19 then the system will 
share the day the contact occurred, how long 
it lasted and the Bluetooth signal strength of 
that contact. Any other information about the 
contact will not be shared.
PRINCIPLE 1 – ETHICAL PURPOSE & 
SOCIETAL BENEFIT
• Generally, use of the app is intended to help 
flatten the epidemiological curve of local COVID‑19 
epidemics and avoid new outbreaks by assisting 
with contact tracing, while protecting individual 
privacy.
• Given the emphasis placed on user opt in and 
voluntary self‑notification, and the primacy of 
human right to health and life, Apple/Google API 
achieves a balance between rights of the individual 
and rights of the community.
• In particular, it is designed to be used on a voluntary 
basis and does not rely on tracing individual 
movement, but rather on proximity information 
regarding with respect to other users.
• As we currently understand it, there are no forced 
auto installs proposed of Apple/Google API, but 
this will depend on functionality implemented at 
national levels.
• Subject to national implementations adding func‑
tionality, there are currently no automated decision 
making implications
• The general overarching risk of this app is that (like 
any other proximity/contact tracing application) it 
could be used for other purposes post‑pandemic. 
• We consider that the wider risks of repurposing 
this app for other state sponsored uses have been 
adequately mitigated by its distributed archi‑
tecture. Google and Apple have indicated that 
they will disable the exposure notification system 
on a regional basis when it is no longer needed.
• Any other risks (such as for example, the identi‑
fication and potential singling out of infected 
individuals and/or those that are required to self‑
isolate) would be generic to all other contact 
tracing apps and need to be balanced carefully 
against the undoubted positive impact to society 
(and human health) in the use of such technology. 
PRINCIPLE 2 – ACCOUNTABILITY
• The API is provided by Apple and Google who 
will  be accountable upon failure. Accountability 
is also likely to reside with the national health 
authority adopting Apple/Google API architecture 
for local/national implementation – ie. ultimately 
the national government.”
• Apple and Google are project sponsors and 
providers of the API. The front‑end apps will be 
developed by local government or public health 
agencies
• We have not seen details related to the governance 
structure for this offering 
PRINCIPLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY & 
EXPLAINABILITY
• As the Apple/Google API system depends on 
conventional BT LE technology for proximity 
tracing, the system demonstrates equivalent levels 
of robustness which would be exhibited by any 
other distributed network/system.
• The Backend and Authorisation servers should be 
fully auditable, subject to access being provided 
by local implementing authorities. We observe 
that this is not a centralised system – it is highly 
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distributed. Local data held on smartphones will 
be outside scope of inspection and audit unless 
access is granted by (or court orders are sought 
effecting same).
• Both Google and Apple have published a joint suite 
of documents aimed at explaining technological 
features of the API – see apple.com/covid19/
contact tracing/ These specifications comprise 
(i) BT Specification (ii) Cryptography Specification 
and (iii) Framework API document outlining on a 
technological basis how they will implement such 
apps in their OS.
PRINCIPLE 4 – FAIRNESS & NON‑
DISCRIMINATION
• The choice to use this technology rests with the 
user, and he or she can turn it off at any time by 
uninstalling the contact tracing application or 
turning off exposure notification in Settings.
• There will be no monetization from this project by 
Apple or Google.
PRINCIPLE 5 – SAFETY & RELIABILITY
• As the Apple/Google API system depends on 
conventional Bluetooth Low Energy technology 
for proximity tracing. 
• Bluetooth Low Energy has inherent weaknesses 
which are capable of exploitation with varying 
degrees of sophistication, such as noise injection, 
tracking of users using aspects orthogonal to 
contact tracing (ie. by logging MAC addresses), 
wardriving, and theft of mobile phones.
• The system demonstrates equivalent levels of 
robustness which would be exhibited by any other 
distributed network/system
PRINCIPLE 6 – OPEN DATA, FAIR 
COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
• The solution has been designed to interoperate 
internationally.
• Apple/Google have authored an open source 
reference implementation of an Exposure Notifica‑
tions server: https://github.com/google/exposure­
notifications­server
PRINCIPLE 7 ‑ PRIVACY
• Contractually, Apple/Google API will require to 
conform to both Apple's App Store standard 
agreement and Google's Play Store Agreement. 
Each of these agreements contain separate privacy 
related terms (Google Play store for example refers 
to Google's Privacy Policy, see section 9 of that 
Agreement ; also see section 5.1 Apple's App Store 
Developer Agreement).
• According to Google and Apple, they have put user 
privacy at the forefront of this exposure notification 
technology’s design and have established strict 
guidelines to ensure that privacy is safeguarded:
 – Consistent with well‑established privacy princi‑
ples, both companies are minimizing data used 
by the system and relying on users’ devices to 
process information.
 – Each user will have to make an explicit choice to 
turn on the technology. It can also be turned off 
by the user at any time.
 – This system does not collect location data from 
your device, and does not share the identities of 
other users to each other, Google or Apple. The 
user controls all data they want to share, and the 
decision to share it.
 – Random Bluetooth identifiers rotate every 
10‑20 minutes, to help prevent tracking.
 – Exposure notification is only done on device and 
under the user's control. In addition people who 
test positive are not identified by the system to 
other users, or to Apple or Google.
 – The system is only used for contact tracing by 
public health authorities apps.
 – Google and Apple will disable the exposure 
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To be read in conjunction with draft PIA and whitepaper for BlueTrace protocol.
FACTORS JUSTIFYING NEED FOR IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT
• “TraceTogether”, is a Bluetooth‑based application 
running on the BlueTrace protocol with the aim 
of assisting and increasing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of contact tracing. TraceTogether was 
launched in March 2020 and is downloadable 
through the Apple AppStore and Google Play.
• TraceTogether will record who a user has been in 
contact with, but not where. The devices that are 
running the TraceTogether application will actively 
communicate with nearby devices and will only 
record information regarding the proximity of the 
other device and the duration of the contact.
• Users of TraceTogether are only required to register 
their phone number with the application. No 
other personal information is obtained. Upon 
registration, the user will be issued with a user ID 
(“UserID”) for identification purposes.
• A TempID (“TempID”) is generated by the back‑
end server to the device on a temporary basis. 
The TempID is mainly used for communication 
between devices and only the Ministry of Health 
of the Republic of Singapore (“MOH”) has the 
secret key to decrypt the TempIDs to reveal the 
underlying UserID, created time and expiry time. 
The temporary ID is random, anonymized and 
refreshed at regular intervals. 
• Upon a user being diagnosed with COVID‑19, the 
MOH seeks the user’s consent to share the stored 
encounter information to the back‑end server 
(being the TempIDs the user’s device has retrieved 
and stored). The MOH seeks personal confirmation 
on the physical encounters that the user can 
remember. The MOH will decrypt the information 
and analyze the encounters to determine whether 
they need to be in touch with any other users who 
have been in close encounter with the COVID‑19 
contracting user. 
• The goal of this project is to assist public health 
authorities in their efforts to fight the spread of 
COVID‑19 by notifying users of at‑risk interactions 
with patient users allowing potential patients of 
COVID‑19 to be identified in a privacy‑preserving 
manner.
• TraceTogether is designed so that only the MOH 
will have access to the phone numbers of the 
users, subject to the user consenting to the sharing 
of the information. The information collected by 
the MOH (and on the device) will only be used 
for COVID‑19 contact tracing. It also appears 
that the MOH is committed to safeguarding the 
information collected and will not disclose the 
data to any other users. 
• TraceTogether will only collect data on the basis 
of consent ; the installation of TraceTogether is 
voluntary.
• The information collected through TraceTogether 
will not be used to make decisions about the 
individuals ; rather it will be used (anonymously) to 
supplement the existing contact tracing practice 
as adopted by the MOH. It is not intended that 




PRINCIPLE 1 – ETHICAL PURPOSE & 
SOCIETAL BENEFIT
• Generally, use of the app is intended to help control 
the widespread of COVID‑19 and to take patients 
into treatment at an early stage by assisting with 
contact tracing, while protecting individual privacy.
• It is designed to be used on a voluntary basis and 
does not rely on tracing individual movement, 
but rather on identifying Encounter Information 
of COVID‑19 diagnosed patients to contact other 
users who may had been in close contact with 
such diagnosed patient.
• TraceTogether is designed to promote human 
agency and autonomy
 – Users will have opportunities to provide express 
consent on downloading the application, 
allowing the application to send and record 
Encounter Messages and on sharing such 
Encounter Messages to MOH. 
 – TraceTogether does not process any information 
collected through the application, it is not 
designed to operate with AI/ML.
 – TraceTogether does not use any data to diagnose 
potential patents of COVID‑19, instead it merely 
collects information of whether any other users 
had been in close contact with the diagnosed 
patient in order for MOH to contact and invite for 
diagnosis.
• Strictly speaking, the information to be collected 
through TraceTogether is limited to non‑personally 
identifying information to reduce the risk of infrin‑
ging any individual privacy.
PRINCIPLE 2 – ACCOUNTABILITY
• The government in Singapore is mainly account‑
able for the operation of TraceTogether.
• Although laudable, this may impact its utility 
to public health as TraceTogether is deployed 
internationally. Singapore is a socially cohesive 
society with a high degree of trust in government. 
TraceTogether and other applications based 
on the BlueTrace protocol may struggle for the 
widespread adoption needed for its success in 
jurisdictions that do not share these characteristics. 
Alternatively, other jurisdictions may need to 
supplement the introduction of TraceTogether 
with mandatory rules and regulations in order to 
achieve the intended societal benefit. This, in turn, 
may create other risks or concerns, especially in 
relation to accountability.
• For TraceTogether, the White Paper introduces 
mechanisms to ensure that information would 
not be intercepted or Encounter Messages would 
not be intercepted and attacked. Encounter 
Information stored on individuals’ devices are 
encrypted and TempIDs are generated randomly 
at intervals. However, the White Paper does not 
provide any solution or accountability in regards 
to any flaws in the solution. In particular, Project 
Owners have received complaints from users who 
had been contacted by scammers impersonating 
the MOH.
• Individual phone number and Encounter History, 
upon consent, are uploaded to the MOH’s back‑
end server where this data is processed manually. 
Again, the White Paper remained silent on the 
counter‑measures to any security breach in relation 
to the back‑end server. No guidance was given on 
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how long that information will be retained in the 
back‑end server. 
• As mentioned above, one of the key elements 
to TraceTogether being able to succeed is the 
high degree of trust the people have in the local 
government.
• The lack of any specific legislation in Singapore 
which expressly provides for the protection, restric‑
ted use, security and destruction of the personal 
data will be seen by some as a concern. It may be 
that from a local perspective, some will not see this 
as an issue.
PRINCIPLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY & 
EXPLAINABILITY
• Users will be all members of the general public.
• TraceTogether does not rely on complicated 
technology. It is built on conventional Bluetooth 
technology, which has been used by smart phones 
for years. 
• The output of the model can be explained and 
decisions can be audited. 
• No information was disclosed in the White 
Paper on the provider of the Project Owner’s 
cloud‑based backend server. Similar issue was 
raised for the Australian COVIDSafe app where 
claims were made that certain US Government 
agencies are able to access the data covertly and 
certainly without notice to irrelevant individuals 
under the US Patriot Act and the US CLOUD Act 
because the Australian Government contracted 
with Amazon Web Services for the provision of 
back end server. 
PRINCIPLE 4 – FAIRNESS & NON‑
DISCRIMINATION
• There is no concern in relation to fairness & non‑
discrimination of TraceTogether. It is solely up to 
the MOH to decide how to process the information 
released by the consenting users. This is a matter of 
government policy in dealing with the pandemic 
instead of an issue of the Pandemic Tech Solution.
• TraceTogether will collect all Encounter Messages 
in the device’s proximity, as long as TraceTogether 
is being installed.
• Concerns have been expressed that people who do 
not have mobile devices or mobile devises capable 
of downloading and operating the TraceTogether 
App are at a clear disadvantage. Notwithstanding 
the high level of mobile device proliferation in 
Singapore, there are some people (particularly 
certain senior citizens who of course are in the 
significant vulnerability group) who are unable to 
utilise the App
PRINCIPLE 5 – SAFETY & RELIABILITY
• The success of TraceTogether is significantly 
dependent on users providing a valid phone 
number upon registration and having the device 
with TraceTogether installed with the user at 
all time in order to produce reliable results. This 
is further restricted for users with a device that 
operates the iOS operating system (i.e. Apple) as 
BlueTooth technology does not operate in the 
background on iOS. This is an issue for which the 
Project Owner is still seeking a solution.
• The privacy safeguards will also have direct impact 
on the reliability of the Pandemic Tech Solution as 
many steps in between require manual input by 
users and the MOH, for example what happens if 
the user does not pick up the phone when being 
contacted by the MOH ?
• The White Paper is also silent on the effectiveness 
of the Pandemic Tech Solution, especially in a 
crowded area where BlueTooth technology may 
not operate as efficiently.
• The device must also be connected to the 
internet for at least once per day in order for the 
back‑end server to generate sufficient numbers 
of TempID  to be used by TraceTogether. Expert 
opinion suggests that, to further minimize any risk 
of attacks, TempID should be generated locally on 
individual’s device.
• Data collection process is designed to render 
replay/ relay attack difficult, but this does not seem 
to be a watertight solution. 
PRINCIPLE 6 – OPEN DATA, FAIR 
COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
• The solution has been designed to interoperate 
internationally. There are mechanisms built to 
allow exchange of information between different 
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public authorities from different jurisdictions but 
it is unclear how this will function at the moment.
• Presently, it is not intended for the Project Owner 
to launch the solution in jurisdiction other than 
Singapore. Users from the United States and 
United Kingdom would be able to install and run 
the application provided they have a Singaporean 
phone number.
• The BlueTrace protocol is open sourced and 
the Project Owner has indicated that any other 
jurisdictions are free to implement locally as they 
deemed appropriate. This includes the COVIDSafe 
application launched by the Department of Health 
of the Australian Government. 
PRINCIPLE 7 ‑ PRIVACY
• Although this may impact the effectiveness of the 
Pandemic Tech Solution, the solution is designed 
to protect privacy data. 
• Pseudonymized data (i.e. phone number) is 
required for the operation of TraceTogether. The 
Project Owner will have no other information 
(include the name of the owner of the phone 
number) even when given consent to access the 
data collected through TraceTogether.
• There are measurements in place to ensure that 
even the pseudonymized data would be difficult 
to be intercepted or have any value to attackers. 
However, it is our view that there are still areas of 
concerns in relation to a leakage of personal data, 
especially for attackers with malicious intention. 
Re‑identification may still be possible (i.e. if the 
attackers managed to decrypt the TempID to 
retrieve the phone number of the devices and 
hacked the database of telecommunication 
companies to re‑identify the user).
• Whilst the information collected does not reveal 
GPS or geological location, it may give rise to 
other valuable information such as the identity of 
other users that one user meets on a regular and 
frequent basis.
• Nevertheless, the solution is intended to fully 
comply with the existing privacy law. Users are 
able to revoke their consent at any time, and all 
information collected would be deleted auto‑
matically thereafter. Moreover, information will 
only be stored on an individual device for not more 
than 21 days, after which it would be automatically 
deleted immediately. But the White Paper is silent 
on the availability to users on accessing, reviewing 
and correcting the information stored in the 
device and stored with the back‑end server after 
initial consent was given.
• Singapore has not introduced any amendments 
to its privacy legislation in relation to data gene‑
rated by the contact tracing App. It appears that 
there are no plans at all for amendments to the 
Singapore Privacy Act. Rather, the Singapore 
Health Ministry’s contact tracing activities and the 
use of collected data are already subject to sectoral 
rules in place under the Singaporean Infectious 
Diseases Act. It would also appear that collected 
data would be protected from misuse under the 
Singapore Official Secrets Act but, as mentioned, 
these are not specific privacy related pieces of 
legislation
• In contrast, privacy of data generated by the 
Contact Tracing App has generated significant 
political and social commentary in Australia. 
There has been a number of very prominent 
privacy academics and professionals who have 
publically stated their concerns with the privacy 
statements made by the Government and the 
privacy regulations that are being promulgated. 
This will have actively discouraged a number of 
people from downloading the App (although at 
the time of this key finding, there are over 5 million 
downloads of the App in Australia). Nonetheless, a 
number of high profile politicians and other people 
have stated that they won’t be downloading the 
App because of privacy concerns. In response to 
this, the Federal Government of Australia issued a 
Determination (which has the effect of legislation) 
introducing certain privacy protections in relation 
to data generated by the App – including, for 
example, the fact that the data must be encrypted, 
it can only be accessed by certain personnel, it 
must be destroyed within a certain amount of 
time and so on. In addition, the Federal 
Government late last week issued an exposure 
draft of amendments to Australia’s Privacy Act 
to give further effect to the Determination and 
to extend privacy protection. In other words, 
Australia is treating privacy protection in relation 
to data generated by the contact tracing App as 
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To be read in conjunction with Privacy Impact Assessment and whitepaper for COALITION App 
(“COALITION App”).
FACTORS JUSTIFYING NEED FOR IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT
• COALITION App (“COALITION App”) is designed 
to allow contact tracing in the general populace 
and proposes an architecture which is capable of 
international deployment.
• Coalition was conceived with an international 
audience in mind, therefore its creators are 
keen to deploy it internationally. As such the 
countries which take it up may have differing 
legal contexts and backgrounds, including in 
relation to general rules of law. In light of the 
above considerations, since Coalition may be 
deployed in non‑democratic or quasi‑democratic 
countries, potential deployment risk is high. 
• Since Coalition may be deployed in non‑demo‑
cratic or quasi‑democratic countries, potential 
deployment risk is high. 
• Market/industry/sector – General use application. 
The app is intended to be used across all aspects 
of society and industry by all citizens that possess 
a smartphone.
• Main regulatory requirements – Data Protection 
(GDPR and associated legislation such as 
ePrivacy directive); laws applicable to the use of 
telecommunications networks; laws applicable to 
privacy, individual and mass surveillance. 
• Main ethical concerns: Privacy, Right not to be 
discriminated against, government surveillance. 
• Auditability is yet to be confirmed, but the source 
code will be made open source and publicly 
available for scrutiny.
• The impact of Coalition App data processing 
activity is significant – it will enable citizens 
who have sufficiently uptodate smartphones to 
understand the risk of whether they have been 
in contact with other infected (or potentially 
infected) individuals and remove them from the 
chain of infection by means of notifying them 
to self isolate and recommending actions to 
mitigate against risk, including self­isolation.
PRINCIPLE 1 – ETHICAL PURPOSE & 
SOCIETAL BENEFIT
• Coalition aims to provide an effective solution 
to fight the COVID‑19 crisis, while protecting 
individual privacy.
• In particular, Coalition is designed to be used on 
a voluntary basis and does not rely on tracing 
individual movement, but rather on proximity 
information with respect to other users.
• Although the system relies on the collection 
of information that cannot be linked to indivi‑
duals (non‑personal data), such information 
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may relate to the health of the Users, if 
they decide to upload their data further to 
testing positive.
• The Coalition App will only be downloaded and 
installed by Users on a voluntary basis.
• All processed data will be anonymised and Users 
will only notify the back‑end server of their having 
tested positive for COVID‑19 on a voluntary basis. 
• These factors significantly reduce the risk 
of citizens’ right to data protection being 
breached or that citizens may be discriminated 
against. Generally, use of the app is intended to 
help flatten the epidemiological curve of local 
COVID‑19 epidemics and avoid new outbreaks by 
assisting with contact tracing, while protecting 
individual privacy.
• The solution generally complies with the ethical 
purposes of beneficence and non‑maleficence. 
However, the general overarching risk of this 
app is that (like any other proximity/contact 
tracing application) it could be used for other 
purposes post‑pandemic (i.e. for state surveillance 
purposes).
PRINCIPLE 2 – ACCOUNTABILITY
• The role of Nodle, from a legal standpoint, has not 
been clarified, hence accountability criteria are 
not clear.
• Major third party dependencies include:
• OS providers – Apple and Google
• BT LE System infrastructure and specification
• OS provider and BT LE infrastructure risks have 
already been previously identified.
• There are no third party data sources as SKs and 
TIDs identifiers are generated by user handsets. 
• In the White Paper it states that User can, at any 
time, request access to the personal data that 
relates to User. It states further that such data 
are, e.g. phone number and associated random 
IDs. It is unclear whether a method for correcting 
personal data is provided
PRINCIPLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY & 
EXPLAINABILITY
• Users will be all members of the general public 
without any heightened technical sophistication.
• Data are not proprietary – they are ephemeral 
identifiers: ie pseudo randomised BT LE (Bluetooth 
Low Energy) data packets.
• The Backend and Authorisation servers should be 
fully auditable. 
• However note that this is not a centralised 
system  – it is highly distributed. Local data 
held on  smartphones will be outside scope 
of inspection  unless access is granted by (or 
court orders are sought effecting same). 
• As the Coalition system depends on conventional 
BT LE technology for proximity tracing and TIDs 
are auto generated by phone handsets, the 
system should demonstrate equivalent levels of 
robustness which would be exhibited by any other 
distributed network/system.
• Coalition is susceptible to BT hacking and other 
cyber‑risks.
• These risks are not unique to Coalition but are 
generic to distributed solutions of this nature. 
PRINCIPLE 4 – FAIRNESS & NON‑
DISCRIMINATION
• Although certain current aspects of the Coalition 
solution do not seem to be consistent with its 
stated characteristic of only processing anony‑
mized personal data (i.e. during the installation 
process and when user self‑declares positive, 
the app requires user’s mobile phone number), 
the general understanding is that when deployed 
in a “production” environment, no personal data 
as defined under the GDPR will be processed. 
Thus, no automated individual decision making 
or processing as per article 22 of the GDPR will 
be involved in connection with the Coalition app 
deployment and no AI‑induced discrimination 
appears likely.
• However, a more basic form of de facto discri‑
mination may arise as certain segments of 
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the population either by reason of age, census 
or disability are not in a position as to own or 
appropriately handle smartphones or other digital 
devices upon which the app must be installed.
PRINCIPLE 5 – SAFETY & RELIABILITY
• Coalition, as an anonymous solution is theoretically 
subject to coordinated collective hacking conduct, 
where, for example, a number of individuals self‑
declare infected even if not tested positive for 
coronavirus with a view to sabotaging the solution. 
Although the likelihood of such a coordinated 
scheme is unlikely, should it be implemented it 
may cause widespread distress to people who 
are notified of having been close to infected 
individuals, even if this is not the case.
• Certain security risks have been anticipated in 
connection with the cryptographic technology 
used by the app developers, however such risks 
require a "tech savvy" and malicious bad actor.
• Conversely, major risks may be associated to the 
general population potentially attributing to 
the app reliability and robustness which may prove 
ephemeral, since they are dependent on a number 
of factors, including the app installation and 
adoption by a significant share of the populace.
• Our recommendation is that a programme 
of public awareness and education should be 
implemented in a manner befitting of the wide 
spectrum of public consumption.  
PRINCIPLE 6 – OPEN DATA, FAIR 
COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
• The solution has been designed to operate intern‑
ationally.
• The solution will be made available subject to an 
open source license. 
PRINCIPLE 7 ‑ PRIVACY
• Whereas it might be opined that users’ data are 
not truly anonymized, but only subjected to hard 
pseudonymization, it appears that only extremely 
tech‑savvy bad actors may succeed to re‑identify 
users’ personal data.
• Therefore, it might be argued that anonymized 
data fall outside the field of application of the 
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To be read in conjunction with main PIA for Arogya Setu App.
FACTORS JUSTIFYING NEED FOR IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT
The Pandemic Tech Solution (or Solution) is a 
mobile application developed by the Government 
of India with private partnership. The app developers 
describe it as a solution to connect essential health 
services with the people of India to fight against 
COVID‑19. The Pandemic Tech Solution’s terms note 
that it is “aimed at augmenting the initiatives of the 
Government of India, particularly the Department 
of Health, in proactively reaching out to and 
informing the users of the app regarding risks, best 
practices and relevant advisories pertaining to the 
containment of COVID-19”. Further, the App's terms 
of use also state that the App will serve as a digital 
representation of an e‑pass where available. The 
App will also provide links to convenience services 
offered by various service providers.The key features 
of the Pandemic Tech Solution include contact 
tracing, self‑assessment by users and integration 
of e‑pass for movement during the lockdown. The 
Pandemic Tech Solution uses the user's Bluetooth 
and GPS location data to carry out contact tracing 
and the underlying structure of the Pandemic Tech 
Solution is largely centralised. The data collected by 
the Solution is highly sensitive as it contains personal 
information including health status, location etc. 
albeit in a de‑identified format.
The Solution may have a significant impact on 
the user's right to privacy, which constitutes a 
fundamental right. The Pandemic Tech Solution is 
citizen‑facing. By way of notifications issued under 
the Disaster Management Act, 2005 (DMA), the 
Government of India has directed employers to 
ensure that the Solution is installed by employees on 
a best effort basis and empowered district authorities 
to advice individuals to install the Solution. While the 
DMA contains broad powers on measures that may 
be taken in response to a disaster situation, there 
is no specific enabling provision under the DMA 
which expressly permits any curtailment of the right 
to privacy. There are also questions as to the legal 
oversight of the Solution, particularly in light of the 
fact that India has no overarching data protection 
law. As per the Data Access and Knowledge Sharing 
Protocol, 2020 (Protocol) released by the government, 
the Pandemic Tech Solution may be used to make 
decisions in relation to sharing of a user's data for (i) 
directly formulating or implementing an appropriate 
health response, (ii) to assist in the formulation or 
implementation of a critical health response, or (iii) 
for research purposes. The Protocol also lays down 
other principles for the collection and processing of 
the data. However, the Protocol itself does not have 
any specific legislative basis and can be modified at 
any point by the Empowered Group that notified it.
Stakeholders impacted by the Solution are citizens 
(end users), employers, universities/research institu‑
tions or entities, government and healthcare 
personnel.
The Government of India along with its private 
partners is responsible for the Pandemic Tech 
Solution and departments or officers may be held 
responsible for certain non‑compliances under the 
DMA. The terms of use state that the Government 
will make best efforts to ensure that the Solution 
performs as described. However, the Government 
will not be liable for (a) the failure of the Solution to 
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accurately identify persons who have tested positive 
to COVID‑19 ; (b) the accuracy of the information 
provided by the Solution as to whether the persons 
who users have come in contact with have in fact 
been infected by COVID‑19. This impacts the extent 
of responsibility and control which may be expected 
from the Government.
The Pandemic Tech Solution reportedly has 
114  million downloads and likely a similar number 
of users. The data is collected constantly and it has 
the potential of becoming a tool of mass surveillance. 
The impact of processing the data is significant, 
as it will enable the government to understand 
whether Solution users have been in contact with 
other infected individuals and potentially remove 
them from the chain of infection by quarantine or 
isolation. It may further allow persons carrying out 
medical and administrative interventions necessary 
in relation to COVID‑19 the information they might 
need about the user in order to be able to do 
their job.
PRINCIPLE 1 – ETHICAL PURPOSE & 
SOCIETAL BENEFIT
The Solution has been provided by the Government 
of India to aid the response efforts to the COVID‑19 
crisis in India. Though employers and district 
authorities are required to ensure that the Solution 
is installed on a best effort basis. This could lead to 
a situation where employees / individuals are left 
with no option but to install the Solution. This may 
negatively impact human agency and autonomy 
and may have implications on a user's right to 
privacy and may result in loss of livelihood should 
they choose not to use the Solution, including by 
way of criminal prosecution under the DMA.
The absence of an overarching data protection 
law and a legislative backing to the Solution raise 
concerns on the legal implications and risks of harm 
to users. In addition to this, there is the general 
overarching risk of surveillance related use, false 
negatives, unauthorised access to data (including 
health data) and triangulation of user location. 
However, there are efforts being made to limit the 
period of data retention by the Solution and the 
manner in which data sharing can take place, which 
will reduce these effects to an extent.
PRINCIPLE 2 – ACCOUNTABILITY
The Solution, as initially released on 2 April 2020, 
was not open source and reverse engineering was 
also prohibited. However, the reverse engineering 
restriction has been removed and the Solution has 
been made open source at the source code level 
(for Android only) on 26 May 2020 i.e. nearly two 
months after its release. The terms of service permit 
users to report defects or bugs in the Solution to 
the Government. Given that the Solution was made 
open source, at the source code level, only after 26 
May 2020, the App’s code has not yet been audited 
by independent third parties. The Government has 
announced a bug bounty program (open till 26 June 
2020) and anyone who reports vulnerabilities with 
the Solution will be awarded up to INR 400,000. 
Further, in order to ensure accountability, the 
Solution must also share information on the server‑
side code/centralization processes.
It is therefore difficult to comment on the accoun‑
tability of the Solution As the Solution strives to 
achieve multiple purposes such as aiding both 
users and government authorities in responding to 
the COVID‑19 threat, it is also difficult to determine 
whether the data collected is necessary and limited 
to such purpose.
The Solution also does not extensively apply the 
Privacy by Design model. This is evidenced by the 
fact that some users are forced to create an account 
and provide their data to the Solution, there is an 
absence of a mechanism to delete their account and 
the Solution collects data and stores it along with the 
user's personal data. While the period for retention 
of an individual’s data by the Solution is limited and 
specified in its terms and the Protocol, the Solution 
itself does not have a defined retention term. 
PRINCIPLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY AND 
EXPLAINABILITY
There is a lack of transparency about the process of 
development of the Solution, including details of the 
private individuals and organisations that assisted 
the government in this initiative and the alternatives 
that were considered. There is also very little transpa‑
rency on the Solution's use of information, accuracy 
of outcomes, etc. as the Solution's code (for Android 
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only) has only recently been made available for 
audit and the Government of India has not provided 
updates on the system architecture, data sets, 
processes or results. However, the Government has 
identified the manner in which the data collected 
from the Solution shall be used and the time period 
for which it may be retained. It is essential that the 
Government provides similar transparency on the 
Solution itself, and provides information such as the 
audits undergone by the Solution, the manner in 
which it makes decisions, etc. 
PRINCIPLE 4 – FAIRNESS & 
NON‑DISCRIMINATION
The Solution does not meet accessibility standards. It 
is not possible to determine the quality of decisions 
made by the Solution at this stage due to insufficient 
availability of public information.
PRINCIPLE 5 – SAFETY AND RELIABILITY
The Pandemic Tech Solution has recently been 
made open source at the App source code level 
(for Android)and is largely centralised. The Solution, 
as initially released on 2 April 2020, was not open 
source and reverse engineering was also prohibited. 
However, the reverse engineering restriction has 
been removed and the Solution has been made 
open source at the source code level on 26 May 2020 
i.e. nearly two months after its release. The terms of 
service permit users to report defects or bugs in the 
Solution to the Government. The Government has 
announced a bug bounty program (open till 26 June 
2020) and anyone who reports vulnerabilities with 
the Solution will be awarded INR 400,000. Given that 
the Solution was made open source at the source 
code level only after 26 May 2020, the App’s code has 
not yet been audited by independent third parties. 
Further, open sourcing has been selective and the 
server side source code is still not open source. There 
is not yet enough data on whether the Solution 
is functioning in the exact manner that has been 
specified by the government. There are news reports 
of ethical hackers pointing out security issues in the 
Solution. While these claims have been disputed by 
the Solution’s developers, it is difficult to comment 
on the veracity of the claims of either side without 
the Solution’s code being audited by multiple 
independent researchers. 
With respect to information security certifications, 
the Protocol requires entities handling the Response 
Data to implement the ISO/IEC 27001 standard. 
Further, data is encrypted in transit as well as at 
rest. However, insufficient information is available 
relating to secure software development and details 
of implementation of encryption measures.
The privacy policy of the Solution specifies certain 
use restrictions. Data will be used only by the 
Government of India in anonymised, aggregated 
datasets for the purpose of generating reports, 
heat maps and other statistical visualisations for 
the purpose of the management of COVID‑19 in 
the country or to provide users general notifications 
pertaining to COVID‑19 as may be required. There 
exists a possibility of subversion of intended use and 
extended state surveillance. The Government of 
India requires employers to ensure that employees 
install the Solution on a best effort basis and district 
authorities are also empowered to advise individuals 
to install the Solution. Consent will be invalid if used 
as part of mandatory enforcement. There is not 
enough data to comment on whether the Solution 
can be used for dual purposes.
As the Pandemic Tech Solution processes personal 
data on a very large scale, including sensitive data 
(namely health data, possibly also data from children 
or other particularly vulnerable groups), any breach 
in security measures could violate user privacy as 
well as endanger the whole centralised system. 
PRINCIPLE 6 – OPEN DATA, FAIR 
COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Information on the scope of interoperability with tech 
solutions offered by other providers is insufficient. 
As per the privacy policy and Protocol for the 
Solution, data will be used only by the Government of 
India, public health institutions, Indian universities / 
research institution and onward transfer to third 
parties is restricted. Further, reuse of data for other 
public interest projects is also restricted as per the 
Protocol. Information on ownership or intellectual 
property rights attaching to the Pandemic Tech 
Solution is insufficient. At this point there isn’t 
enough information to assess whether the Solution 
or data gathered by it could be distributed to other 
public health agencies in the world.
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PRINCIPLE 7 – PRIVACY 
Many of the above‑described risks have adverse 
effects on user’s privacy. The Government of India 
requires employers to ensure that employees 
install the Solution on a best effort basis and district 
authorities are also empowered to advise individuals 
to install the Solution. Consent will be invalid if used 
as part of mandatory enforcement. Further, children 
and vulnerable groups are included and there are no 
security safeguards for processing of the information 
of such groups.
While the privacy policy and the Protocol specify 
a data retention / deletion procedure, currently, 
there is no option to de‑register or logout from the 
Solution. Since the personal data will be retained as 
long as the "account remains in existence", there is 
currently no way of ensuring that the personal data 
is deleted from the Solution.
There is insufficient data with respect to assessing 
whether beyond the data subject, the privacy of 
an identified group be at risk. The Solution is not 
very clear on what the consequences of a “yellow” 
or “orange” report are with respect to the self‑
assessment test to be undertaken on the Solution. 
As per the privacy policy, every time the user 
completes a self‑assessment test, the Solution will 
collect their location data and upload it along with 
the DiD to the server. While the stated purpose is 
that this information will be used by the government 
to evaluate whether a disease cluster is developing 
at any geographic location, due to the lack of clarity 
around yellow/orange reports, it is unclear if this will 
be used to identify the probability of a user having 
COVID‑19 or for any other testing‑related purpose or 
may also expose identified group to be at risk.
There is insufficient data to show whether individuals 
are aware of observation at some point in time and 
whether and how new data is created.
CONCLUSION
The Solution has the potential of improving the predictability of the spread of COVID‑19. However, since 
the Solution has been made open source (for Android only) at the source code level recently, there 
is insufficient data, as yet, on whether the Solution adheres to the highest standards of safety and 
reliability. However, initiative like the bug bounty program are steps in the right direction to encourage 
investigation of the Solution and to report vulnerabilities. Reports have highlighted significant 
shortcomings in terms of data security but these claims have been rebutted by the Government. Even 
though some of the deficiencies may have already been cured and others certainly can be rectified, 
there is a remainder of risks that adversely affect the fundamental human right to privacy as well as the 
overall reliability and efficiency of the entire Solution. 
Further, as employers / district authorities may make it mandatory of individuals to install the App, 
the consent framework for collection of personal and sensitive personal data remains questionable. 
The Pandemic Tech Solution is not geared for use by people who are differently abled. Given that the 
Solution may be made mandatory for its use for various activities such as for right to access work place 
or travel, the solution is in‑accessible to a large number of people. The Solution is not transparent or 
explainable and a person impacted with a false positive has no institutional process to challenge it. In 
terms of legal protections and remedies, there is no specific legal framework in place for holding the 
government accountable for privacy breaches except general constitutional remedies that flow from 
the recognition of privacy as a fundamental right. 
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To be read in conjunction with the PIA for Estimote’s Workplace Safety Wearable, dated May 15, 2020. There 
is very little public information available on the Estimote wearable solution, so this review has been based 
on the available documentation, the CEO’s interview and third party documentation, both cited in the PIA. 
FACTORS JUSTIFYING NEED FOR IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 
In early April 2020, Estimote, Inc. launched its 
workplace safety wearable device solution to assist 
companies with contact tracing and identification 
of infected or exposed employees. Estimote is a 
for‑profit company based in Krakow, Poland that 
was formed in or around 2012. The solution aims to 
help companies save money by maintaining a safe 
workplace and quickly identifying and resolving risks. 
The solution is a modification of an existing “panic 
button” wearable, which, when deployed with other 
Estimote beacon technology, is used by employees 
to alert management to an event, with the Estimote 
beacons identifying where in the company building 
the employee is experiencing such event. The new 
workplace safety wearable is virtually the same 
hardware, with new code snippets created to add 
in the contact tracing and health identification 
services. 
The goal of the Estimote solution is to identify 
infected or symptomatic employees (by virtue of their 
pressing a button on the wearable) and accelerate 
and focus containment measures by the company 
both for exposed employees and in the identified 
areas of the company. The solution is fully dependent 
on the infected or symptomatic employee reporting 
their positive COVID‑19 diagnosis or experiencing 
of symptoms. The backend of the solution cannot 
serve its actual function without obtaining such 
information from the infected employee’s wearable 
device. The solution is not currently customer or 
publicly focus, and is instead intended to be used 
solely within a company’s physical locations. 
The Estimote solution stores information, presum‑
ably employee names, locations, durations in 
locations, contacts with other employees, and 
healthy status. No specifics of the solution have 
been released ; thus it is unknown what informa‑
tion is stored on the wearable, transmitted from 
the wearable via cellular network to the backend, 
and is maintained on the backend. There is no 
information as to how long all of this sensitive 
information is stored, how it is stored, where it 
is stored, who has access to it, whether it can be 
exported or shared, and whether Estimote will 
have access to or host any of the implementing 
companies’ data or systems. 
Because the Estimote solution is meant to be used 
by companies world‑wide, it is possible that several 
countries’ laws and regulations would apply both 
to Estimote and the implementing companies. 
As such, there is an inherent risk for employees 
where the solution is deployed in countries that 
do not have strong (or any) data protection laws 
and regulations, workplace monitoring and safety 
laws and regulations, laws against discrimination, 
telecommunications regulations, collective barg‑
aining agreements, regulations for wearable devices, 
regulations for medical devices, and protections 
from mass surveillance. 
The main ethical concerns are that (a) mandatory 
usage and sharing of employee health data, (b) 
employee privacy, (c) transparency about who can 
see and use the data, (d) security of the data, and 
(e) what else it might or could be used for outside 
of the intended purposes. These concerns are 
further compounded by the fact that each company 
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that implements the solution is responsible for its 
own implementation, unless Estimote assists in 
operating it or providing its hosted cloud services for 
the backend of the solution. 
Though the individuals directly affected by data 
processing are limited to users of the wearable 
device, voluntarily providing their data to their 
company, the solution could have an impact on 
the  general public by helping implementing 
companies quickly identify and contain possible 
outbreaks. The Estimote solution was developed 
and deployed very quickly upon the COVID‑19 
crisis  becoming a worldwide pandemic. It has been 
deployed in several companies, though no usage 
or deployment data has been released by either 
Estimote or any of the implementing companies. 
PRINCIPLE 1 – ETHICAL PURPOSE & 
SOCIETAL BENEFIT 
The Estimote solution is being deployed to protect 
employees from other employees by enforcing 
social distancing guidelines, alerting companies 
to employees that fail to comply with social 
distancing guidelines, and to help quickly identify 
potential exposures and attempt to contain further 
exposures in the workplace. The Estimote solution 
aims to assist companies, not the general public, 
though, as noted above, the implementation of 
the solution by companies could have a positive 
impact on the general public by helping to identify 
and contain possible outbreaks. Further societal 
benefits could include helping employees come 
back to the workplace from being furloughed 
or in an unpaid status, help employees and their 
family members feel safe both in their workplace 
and at home knowing they have not been exposed 
at work, helping companies maintain clean 
workplaces and products both for employees and 
customers, and if tests are limited, help identify 
those employees that should be tested based on 
their exposure(s). 
There is minimal autonomy provided to the 
employee in that they have the option to not wear 
the device, to  turn it off or to let it die and not 
replenish the charge. In practice, however, there 
may not be any actual autonomy, as employee’s 
work or job retention may be based on mandatory 
usage. Importantly, the  entire solution may not 
work effectively if employees choose to opt‑out 
of wearing the device, as it would not be able 
to effectively contact trace potentially exposed 
employees or locations. While employee data is 
said to be anonymized either on the device or in 
the transmission from the device to the backend, 
the Estimote dashboard makes de‑anonymization 
appear very easy. Employees also would appear not 
to have any control (or potentially even knowledge) 
of how, where, when, and by whom, their personal 
data is de‑anonymized and shared. 
Although Estimote intends for the wearing of the 
device to be voluntary, doing so may adversely 
affect the solution’s efficacy. Thus, there is a conflict 




Successful attacks on the information security or 
widespread malicious use of the device and its data 
have the potential to weaken the acceptance of 
and trust in the solution to contain the pandemic 
at the workplace. If the solution is easily hackable 
or manipulated, does not work as intended, or is 
used for uses not consented to, then it could affect 
both Estimote’s and the implementing companies’ 
reputation and business. 
The use of a centralized system increases the risks of 
attacks and that data collected through the device 
and on the backend could be used for uninten‑
ded purposes, including nefarious purposes, such 
as surveillance and location tracking outside the 
workplace. 
Because each company will have its own implem‑
entation of the Estimote solution, it is possible 
that other legal, cross border, policy, or contractual 
obligations could apply that have not been 
mentioned or reviewed in this PIA. 
PRINCIPLE 2 – ACCOUNTABILITY 
In terms of accountability, the Estimote solution 
is largely dependent on third‑party company 
implementations since the solution is fully pro‑
grammable by the implementing companies. 
Estimote has not disclosed what portions are not 
customizable. These risks are unknown, as company 
implementations appear to be private, and should 
arguably at least stay somewhat private, to help 
protect their employees’ sensitive information. 
This appears to be Estimote’s first foray into a device 
aimed specifically at a health crisis, though the 
originating panic button device could be used to 
notify of a health‑related event or emergency. It is 
unknown how or whether there will be any support 
provided for the solution, including if employees 
have issues with the devices or companies have 
issues with the backend or customization. 
Importantly, Estimote has not updated its Privacy 
Policy since 2015, including not making any 
adjustments after the enactment of GDPR, including 
in its home country, Poland. The Privacy Policy does 
not mention or appear to apply to the wearable 
solution. 
The principles of necessity, proportionality and data 
minimization have not been disclosed. No privacy 
measures have been disclosed, other than the fact 
that data will be transmitted in anonymized form 
to the backend, and viewable in the backend in 
anonymized form until the company wishes to 
de‑anonymize it. The company could potentially 
use and share the de‑anonymized data for both 
intended and unintended purposes. 
Development and deployment are funded by 
Estimote, a private company. Therefore, if it turned 
out that mitigating some of the risks identified 
in this  PIA would come with additional costs, it 
unknown whether Estimote would decide to 
spend more rather than accept both avoidable and 
unacceptable risks. Though, not doing so could have 
an impact on its reputation and business. 
PRINCIPLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY AND 
EXPLAINABILITY 
While there is transparency in use of the device, as an 
employee can clearly see who is wearing one, there 
is very little transparency with respect to everything 
else about the solution. Further, an employee should 
assume that at least some of his or her personally 
identifying information is stored and processed 
by the back end, as that would be inherent in any 
properly working contact tracing solution. 
It is unknown how or what personally identifying 
information of the employees is contained in the 
solution, and employees appear to generally not 
have access to any of their data stored or used by 
the solution. However, each implementation will 
be based on the specific implementing company’s 
existing data and requirements. 
There are no specific Terms of Service for the 
Estimote solution. Estimote’s existing Terms of 
Service are from 2015 and do not mention or appear 
to cover wearables. While Estimote’s undated Terms 
of Sale appear to apply to other Estimote goods, they 
do not specifically mention the wearable solution, 
nor do they mention the predecessor it was based 
on – the panic button solution. 
It is unknown what terms will apply for employees 
that use the device, as the company that 
implements the wearable will likely be entering into 
the agreement with Estimote, not any individual 
employees. Thus, employees could then be subject 
potentially to Estimote’s terms, but also any terms 
and/or policies of their employer. 
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While the general solution is fairly explainable, it does 
not include specifics as to the wearable or backend, 
or to any company’s implementation. 
PRINCIPLE 4 – FAIRNESS & NON‑
DISCRIMINATION 
In terms of accessibility, the device should be able 
to be used by any and all persons, as it is wearable 
either on a neck lanyard, wrist device, or as an access 
card. Since the wearer does nothing but turn it on, 
it should be usable by anyone, including those with 
limited capacity or ability. 
The quality of the data is subject to the veracity of the 
employees using it as well as the potential accuracy 
limitations of Bluetooth and LTE technology. Thus, 
there could be reporting of false positives and 
corrective action taken, when, in fact, it was not 
actually necessary. Or, failures to report in order to 
maintain one’s job or paycheck, which could expose 
other employees and sites within the company. 
So, there is a risk that employees will purposely not 
report, though less of a risk that employees will 
falsely report, their infected statuses. 
The quality of the data is also subject to proper 
functioning of the wearable, transmission means 
and the backend. If the device malfunctions and 
a report is not registered or transmitted to the 
backend, then employees would be left open to 
potential exposure and great health risk. 
Because companies can collect location data, not 
just for purposes of contact tracing, its usage could 
be unfair and/or used in a discriminatory manner. 
PRINCIPLE 5 – SAFETY AND RELIABILITY 
Very little technical data has been released, so no 
technical analysis of the Estimote solution has been 
performed, including assessing the security and 
reliability of the solution. This is very concerning, 
as employees are likely to expect their person and 
sensitive data to be both secure and accurate. The 
wearable is relatively new, with the prior device 
having been released just a few years ago. No 
reliability or security data has been released on the 
original device, or this new workplace safety version. 
Employees are at risk of their data being disclosed 
and potentially used for unintended purposes. An 
employee’s infected status could be made public 
without their authorization. Or, an employee could 
be tracked outside of the company or during non‑
working hours to create a full picture of each of the 
employee’s movements. 
The backend contains all of the data from the 
wearables, plus additional identifying data about 
the employees. A breach of the centralized server 
could lead to revealing all of the data and personal 
information contained in the solution. Each 
implementing company will be responsible for 
securing their own environment, unless they utilize 
Estimote’s cloud hosted environment, in which 
case Estimote should have primary responsibility. 
It is unclear whether Estimote will have access to a 
company’s data, in addition to the implementing 
companies. It is also unclear whether the data will be 
shared with any third parties, as the Privacy Policy is 
so old that it does not cover this wearable solution. 
It is possible that the device could also transmit 
data back to Estimote, or elsewhere, not just to the 
company that has implemented the solution. 
Although unlikely, the device could be considered a 
medical device and then would be subject to medical 
device regulations. Particularly, if the company 
customizes the implementation to be assisted in 
its function by pharmacological, immunological or 
metabolic means. However, the EU has extended 
the time period for compliance with its medical 
device regulations until next May. 
Although Estimote has noted that the data is 
securely transmitted from the device to the backend, 
no information as to how this is accomplished has 
been disclosed. 
PRINCIPLE 6 – OPEN DATA, FAIR 
COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The Estimote solution is proprietary and owned by 
Estimote, including all intellectual property, as no 
parts of it appear to be open sourced. Currently the 
solution will be used solely by Estimote’s company 
customers, though public health uses are being 
explored. Companies will likely enter into some form 
of a license agreement with Estimote for the use of 
the wearable and the backend. Users may then be 
subject to their employer’s policies or agreement 
with respect to their use of the wearable. 
As noted above, it is unknown whether Estimote 
will have access to the data collected by the device 
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or processed on the backend, in addition to the 
implementing company. The device is not meant 
to do anything other than its intended purpose, 
however, it is fully programmable and thus can be 
altered to serve other purposes. 
PRINCIPLE 7 – PRIVACY 
No specific information has been provided as to 
what data is stored on the devices or on the backend, 
though based on the limited disclosures, certain 
data can.
be inferred to be collected. Based on images and 
description on Estimote’s website, it appears that an 
employee’s movements, proximity (and duration) to 
other employees, and actual (or believed) infection is 
collected and stored by the backend. The movement 
and proximity data is likely to be stored by the device 
before being transmitted to the backend. It is known 
whether the employee’s personal information is 
stored on the device, or in the backend, or both. 
It also appears that specific location within the 
company can be collected if used in conjunction 
with out Estimote beacon technology, or via the 
limited indoor GPS capabilities of the device. 
While Estimote believes that employees should opt‑
in, there is no stated method for obtaining consent. 
The Estimote Terms of Service state that the com‑
pany is responsible for obtaining the necessary 
rights from the employee, but there are no specifics 
as to the scope of consent required. Further, as noted 
above, the Terms of Service are from 2015 and do not 
address wearable devices, nor GDPR requirements. 
Under the GDPR, data subjects have the right to 
access information being processed about him 
or her and may request correction or deletion of 
their data under certain circumstances, however, 
there is no information disclosed about how this 
will work either with Estimote or the implementing 
companies. Estimote appears to view itself as 
acting as a processor, though the language of its 
documentation make that less than fully clear. 
Estimote appears to be relying on its customers (the 
implementing companies) to have determined the 
lawful basis for processing, and states in its Privacy 
Policy that “Customer Data Is owned and controlled 
by our customers...we collect and process Customer 
Data solely on behalf of our customers....” There 
do not appear to be any requirements on control 
of data. 
There is no information available regarding security 
processes, de‑identification, or anonymization of 
the information to be collected and stored by the 
implementing companies, nor by Estimote. 
CONCLUSION
The Estimote solutions presents several high 
risks largely due to the lack of information and 
disclosures about the solution. While emplo‑
yees may benefit from a solution that helps 
them stay safe and healthy, it is unknown 
whether the Estimote solution will, in fact, do 
so. There is no information on the majority 
of the principles set forth in the PIA. This 
includes information as to the serious privacy, 
cybersecurity and related concerns that the 
technology raises, as well as analysis of the 
potential legal and regulatory requirements, 
such as those under privacy and data 
protection laws and regulations (i.e.,  GDPR, 
CCPA, PIPEDA), workplace monitoring and 
safety laws and regulations, laws against 
discrimination, telecommunications regula‑
tions, collective bargaining agreements, 
regulations for wearable devices, regulations 
for medical devices, and protections from 
mass surveillance. 
The centralized solution presents a weak point 
which is further exacerbated by the apparently 
lack of standards on implementations. While 
some implementing companies may have 
rigorous security, need to know disclosures, 
and opt‑in participation, there will likely also 
be companies that don’t. If the central server 
is compromised, the entire system would then 
likely be compromised, including employee 
health and location data. However, in order for 
the solution to be effective, employees should 
opt‑in, yet doing so gives up virtually all of their 
autonomy and control over their own data. 
Lastly, the reliability of the solution is also 
unknown. If the devices malfunction, it could 
put employees and potentially the company’s 
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To be read in conjunction with main PIA for TerraHub Credential Link Solution, dated 26 May 2020.
FACTORS JUSTIFYING NEED FOR IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT
TerraHub has developed a verification platform for 
workers, products, and processes. The company's 
product, Credential Link builds an irrefutable 
audit trail for worker training, authorizations, and 
health self‑assessments. It thus provides workforce 
management tools for verifying and sharing health 
self‑assessments, safety and professional certificates. 
In the early days of COVID‑19, TerraHub recognized 
that its Credential Link solution might have a role in 
controlling the spread of the virus. On this platform, 
employers have access to critical worker information 
before they arrive on site. Accordingly, employees are 
now able to upload for example COVID‑19 test results 
or training courses relating to sanitary measures. 
Each individual has the following data associated 
with them: personal identity information, credential 
details, credential verification details, audit trail 
history, employer and project associated details. 
The total volume of data for each individual is under 
500Kb (average). However, aggregate data for 
analytics is spread across an entire organization’s 
user base. So, organizations can have a relatively 
large amount of data to work with to make decisions 
based on analytic data.
Three stakeholders were identified: the organization 
deploying the tool (i.e the employer), the workers 
using the tool (i.e the employees) and the orga‑
nizations issuing the credentials (i.e the issuers). 
The Solution works with the Hyperledger Fabric 
blockchain protocol. Each individual is authenticated 
using a public key that is registered when the 
individual is given access to the relevant shared 
private channel. The data cannot be read nor 
updated by any individual not previously registered. 
There are two kind of access: user access and admin 
access. Admin access is limited to authorized roles 
from the employer. Specific symptoms reported 
by the worker can only be accessed by that worker. 
Employer gets an OK/Not OK summary for each 
worker without any detailed elements relating to 
the self‑assessment. Data may be shared with the 
third parties by giving explicit consent and access 
can be revoked by the worker. Third parties are 
the organizations to which the worker gives the 
authorization to access the data. 
This update of the solution has been released in 
April 2020 to help companies ensure the safety of 
employees returning to work after the lockdown 
period. The main ethical concerns may relate to the 
following points:
• Whether the blockchain‑based technology used 
allows the users to effectively exercise their rights 
(re modification / erasure) ;
• Whether both the technology used, and the 
algorithm added for the health self‑assessment 
are transparent and explainable ;
• Whether the use of Credential Link by the 
employer might affect the rights and interests of 
employees, for example by creating discriminatory 
situations ;
• Whether the governance of the solution clearly 
frames the secondary use of data inferred from 
the solution by the employer. 
A supplemental PIA is useful in the context of the 
implementation of the Pandemic Tech Solution to 
exit the sanitary crisis and help secure workplaces. 
Indeed, the relationship between employer and 
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employees is deemed to be unbalanced per se, and 
accordingly it should be assessed whether the use 
of this Solution by the employer may threaten the 
rights and interests of the employee. 
More specifically, three ethical concerns have been 
identified at this point:
• How to ethically frame the decisions taken by the 
employer when receiving a “NOT OK” summary 
from the Solution ? 
 – For example, might a “NOT OK” worker obliged 
to stay home suffer from a salary loss or a red flag 
in its relating personnel file ?
 – Also, what would happen in a given organization, 
if an employee refuses to use this solution ?
 – How does the “OK/NOT OK” summary is 
completed ? Can we infer information from this 
summary ?
• How to ensure that the employee will not overpass 
or lie on the self‑assessment to avoid any repressive 
action from the employer ? 
 – For example, might an employee afraid of 
repressive action lie on the self‑assessment 
health status and thus render the Solution 
inefficient by putting at risk other workers of the 
company ?
 – NB: The irrefutable nature of a blockchain 
technology is useful if and only if the primary 
source of information is reliable.
• Are there any ways to use this data by the 
employers for different purposes initially planned ?
 – Is the data provided by the employee stored on‑
chain or off‑chain ?
 – Is there a way for employer to store a copy of this 
data ? (e.g screen shots)
Additionally, the Solution collects and displays to 
the employer sensitive data, for which it must be 
ensure maintaining security and integrity as well as 
preserving a certain control from the employees. 
This PIA should help both TerraHub and Project 
Owner to deploy the Solution with respect to 
legal and ethical principles to trade‑off between 
organization’s interests of workplace safety and 
rights and privacy of workers. 
It should be noted that part of the assessment 
leading to the issue of the OK/NOT OK summary 
is based on a simple algorithm (i.e. for the health 
self‑assessment) that is not deemed to integrate 
AI or machine‑learning as defined in the present 
Pandemic Impact Assessment framework. 
However, such completion should be considered if 
complementary information about the functioning 
of the algorithm could indicate otherwise.
PRINCIPLE 1 – ETHICAL PURPOSE & 
SOCIETAL BENEFIT
The solution is currently deployed in Canada only, 
but might completely be deployed in other regions/
countries which could significantly modify the risk 
rating relating to the legal framework. The relevance 
and proportionality of the use of Credential Link 
should be assessed by the Project Owner with 
regard to the excessive surveillance of employees 
that it may engender.
Furthermore, while deploying this solution, it should 
particularly be assessed who will be subject to the 
use of the solution (i.e. only employees or any person 
entering a site of the Project Owner) and how the 
data will be use to limit any infringement to the 
rights of users. 
High risks were also identified regarding the use 
of the Summary by the employer, which might 
significantly affect the autonomy of workers and 
thus should be carefully framed. The Project 
Owner  should consider not to take decisions 
significantly affecting the autonomy and / or 
dignity  of workers on the sole basis of the solution 
at stake.
Finally, considering that information about cred‑
entials and self‑assessments is stored off‑chain, 
it partially prevents the data from being publicly 
available in an irrevocable manner. Accordingly, it 
remains the responsibility of each issuer to impl‑
ement appropriate safeguards including time‑limit 
or automatic deletion of the information. However, 
it should be noted that the worker can revoke the 
authorizations granted to access the data, which 




PRINCIPLE 2 – ACCOUNTABILITY
Centralized and decentralized components should 
be detailed, regarding both the protocol and/
or the governance of the solution. Accordingly, 
the governance of Credential Link should be 
determined precisely by the Project Owner, as it is 
the first step to rate the level of risk inherent to the 
implementation of the solution. Some measures 
were taken by TerraHub to limit the technical and 
privacy risks, nonetheless it will also depend on the 
way the organization will deploy and implement 
Credential Link.
Also, sufficient measures should be implemented 
to determine if the decision‑making process allows 
Project Owner operators to adjust parameters, to 
follow or not the Summary output, etc.
Data is stored both on and off chain. Off chain data 
require encryption and a distributed model uses 
QLDB ; off chain data requires encryption stored in 
S3. On chain, are only stored the hashes that point to 
all the off‑chain sources so as to ensure no changes 
are made off‑chain. All "issuers" are identified by the 
network as the originators of a credential. Employer 
can define an administrator that can access public 
employee information, for example credentials, 
but not health self‑assessments. An employer can 
be an "issuer" and a "reader", and they can define 
an administrator that can access public employee 
information, for example credentials, but not health 
self‑assessments. 
The Project Owner should ensure at all time it 
remains accountable for the responsible deployment 
of the Solution, including by means of “human‑in‑
the‑loop” or “human‑over‑the‑loop” to make sure 
that humans oversight is active and involved in 
relation to recommendation provided by the “OK/
NOT OK” Summary.
PRINCIPLE 3 – TRANSPARENCY AND 
EXPLAINABILITY
Two issues must be distinguished when assessing 
transparency and explainability criteria for Credential 
Link: the permissioned blockchain protocol, on 
the one hand, and the private algorithmic decision 
making tool, on the other hand. Indeed, regarding the 
health self‑assessment, an algorithm is implemented 
in the solution to assess whether a worker presents 
risks of exposure to COVID‑19. This algorithm consists 
in a basic survey on the employee’s latest actions 
deemed to be “at‑risk” (e.g. traveling, symptoms, 
contact with infected person). Considering that no 
access was given to the survey nor the algorithm 
itself, it is not possible to determine the risk rating 
of obtaining a false summary. Nor it is possible to 
determine if the outputs of the algorithms could be 
explained or if the functioning of the algorithm could 
be explained (black‑box situation). It is assumed that 
the use of such a basic algorithm contributes to 
limiting this risk but does not eliminate it completely 
as false positives or false negatives are still possible, 
thus questioning the transparency of the application. 
As far as the blockchain protocol is concerned, in 
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order to limit the risks regarding explainability, the 
Project Owner should take appropriate measure 
to make sure that such innovative and complex 
technology is being fully understood by its users.
Moreover, it seems that very few materials are 
currently available to users, which may identify a 
mitigation measure to be taken. The functioning of 
the solution should be explained to employees, with 
all the consequences attached to the use of that 
solution. No opacity should remain on the conditions 
of use, the privacy issues, and how the solution works. 
PRINCIPLE 4 – FAIRNESS & 
NON‑DISCRIMINATION
The data processed by Credential Link is only 
modified but not transformed, or only to the extent 
of providing the Project Owner with the summary 
but in that case, only the granularity of available 
data changes. 
Besides, inequalities inherent to the use of the 
application may arise between workers familiar 
with technologies and the ones for whom the 
use of blockchain technology means very little. 
More precisely, if the use of Credential Link is not 
mandatory but voluntary or incentive, it should 
be assessed whether all workers will be able to 
acknowledge all the outputs of accepting to use it. 
This can relate to the idea of an “ethically” free and 
informed consent. Indeed, such a consent to use the 
app may be guided by employer pressure, or social 
pressure, for example if there are beneficence or 
maleficence effects attached to the use of Credential 
Link, which could appear infringing the fairness 
principle. 
Finally, the risk of having derivative misuse of the 
application appears high if no conditions are clearly 
set while implementing it. 
PRINCIPLE 5 – SAFETY AND RELIABILITY
It appears that TerraHub implemented strong 
technical and organizational measures to ensure 
both safety and confidentiality of the Pandemic 
Tech Solution, by adopting recognized technical 
standards including encryption all along the 
transactions. The most pregnant risk remaining 
relates to the redress mechanisms, for example in 
case of hacking resulting in the loss of the credentials, 
as no information has been provided on that point. 
The blockchain technology used lowers the risk of 
falsification, once the hash of the data is stored on‑
chain, but could not guarantee that the original 
source of the data stored off‑chain is reliable.
However, the risk of dual use is assumed to be 
high, as once the Project Owner has the lead on 
the solution and collect inferred data, it becomes 
difficult to control any subversion of intended use. 
PRINCIPLE 6 – OPEN DATA, FAIR 
COMPETITION & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The fact that Credential Link relies on an open 
source blockchain protocol increases transparency 
and prevent from most of infringement risks to 
intellectual property rights. 
More generally, when assessing such a solution 
working with a blockchain protocol and a algorithm 
layer, this Principle should be assessed with regards 
to each part of the solution, as the analysis may vary 
considering the blockchain protocol (here open‑
source) or the algorithm (here proprietary and 
non‑public). 
PRINCIPLE 7 – PRIVACY 
There is often a warning to be issued when 
employer   / employee relationship is at the core of 
the use of a technology. In the present case, there 
might be risks regarding the preservation of workers’ 
privacy, which TerraHub has tried to limit at best 
to only grant access to the minimum information 
required. The employee keeps control over the 
provided data, both with the authorization system 
and the possibility to disactivate the application. 
Nevertheless, risks remain regarding the use by 
the employer / Project Owner of the information 
extracted from Credential Link. The major concern 
with this solution was about the information being 
stored on‑chain, which would have resulted in the 
impossibility to exercize the rights of correction 
and/or erasure thus severely affecting the rights of 
workers. It appears that workers’ data is stored off‑
chain and is accordingly not publicly available, and 
consequently the retention period and deletion 
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of the data remain of the sole responsibility of the 
organizations storing it. 
It should also be noted that regarding specifically the 
answers to the health self‑assessment, the worker 
cannot modify them anymore once submitted, 
but can re‑take the survey. The Project Owner 
should assess whether appropriate safeguards are 
implemented regarding the rights to privacy of 
workers, notably by determining efficient processes 
for employees to exercise their rights.
If Privacy and Data Protection concerns remain 
reasonable regarding the design of Credential Link, 
further risks appear when considering secondary 
use of the data by Project Owner. More specifically, 
it is here considered the possibility for Project 
Owner to process any derived or inferred data 
collected from the summary or any other feature 
provided by the solution. Such a use could entail 
severe consequences for the workers and should be 
consciously framed when deploying Credential Link 
within an organization.
CONCLUSION
The Credential Link solution seems to offer some safeguards to reach its purpose: ensuring a safe return 
to work for organizations adopting it. However, two kinds of risks should be particularly observed: i) risks 
inherent to the design of the solution itself, and ii) risks linked to the implementation of the solution by 
the Project Owner. 
Regarding the risks inherent to the solution itself, the present Pandemic Impact Assessment reveals 
that the worker data is at least stored off‑chain, which limits the risk of rending the data constantly 
and publicly available on the blockchain. The fact that data is stored off‑chain results in the transfer of 
responsibility to the organization by which the data is stored for implementing appropriate retention 
period and erasure processes, with respect to the principle of data minimization that could lead the 
choice of adopting a Pandemic Tech Solution. Besides, the Project Owner should in either way ensure 
that any organization accessing the worker’s data, or processing derived or inferred data, implemented 
adequate retention periods and processes for workers to effectively exercise their rights, thus making 
sure for the end‑user that all the information will eventually be deleted from systems of third parties 
to which s.he granted authorization at once. It should also be highlighted that the use of blockchain, if 
it allows to have irrefutable and accurate data, also entails the impossibility to verify the veracity of the 
updated data 
Furthermore, regarding the specific question of the summary made available to the employer, it should 
be noted that the health self‑assessment is based on a simple algorithm: it determines if a worker is 
OK by tallying the answers and indicating OK if the person has no symptoms, has not travelled or 
come into contact with a sick person. Once the answers are submitted, the worker cannot modify the 
answers, but can take the survey again. Therefore, it should be assessed the possibility for the employer 
to access the previous results of the assessment or whether only the latest results are displayed which 
could contain a risk of falsification if the worker takes the test again to artificially modify the result. 
However, the possibility for the employer to access the previous results would potentially infringe 
the principles of necessity, proportionality, and data minimization. Consequently, arises a trade‑off 
between privacy preservation and workers’ protection on the one hand, and the need for accuracy on 
the other hand. 
Another identified risk is the lack of documentation available for the end‑user. Due to the context in 
which the assessment was led, maybe this documentation has just not come to our attention, but it 
seems that no Terms of Use or Privacy Policy is available for the solution. Terms of Use appear to be 
of crucial importance, as the use of Credential Link by employers may have significant consequence 
on employees in case of misuse (both by the employee in case of lie and by the employer in case of 




Regarding the risks inherent to the adoption of the solution by the Project Owner, more significant 
concerns should be raised. First, the consequences of the summary sent to the employer should be 
precisely determined and discussed prior to the adoption of the solution, to prevent any infringement 
to the rights of employer and any discriminatory measures. For example, if the daily summary 
indicates that the worker is “NOT OK” (i.e. s.he cannot access the workplace without putting at risk its 
coworkers), there should be a procedure indicating if the worker shall stay home, but it should also 
be documented what it implies concretely. More precisely, it could be imagined that if the worker is 
in incapacity of accessing safely the workplace because s.he does not hold verified COVID‑19 testing 
results, it will entail a loss of salary corresponding to the time spent home, which might be deemed as 
a discriminatory measure as if the solution had not been implemented, the employee would not have 
suffered such a loss. 
The other major risk in the context of implementation of the solution relates to the secondary use of the 
data made by the Project Owner. While considering adopting a Pandemic Tech Solution as Credential 
Link, it should be assessed to what extent analytics or secondary use of the collected data may be 
done. This point partially relates to the previous one as secondary use should be determined to avoid 
any use against the employee and making sure there will be no misusage leading to discriminatory 
situation, whether by comparing the data from a particular worker to another or by using the data to 
make decision that would not benefit the workers and that would not have been taken without access 
to this data. 
Mitigation measures should integrate a specific internal body ensuring to respect the rights of workers 
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